Resistance to multilateral influence on reform: the political backlash against private infrastructure investments
"Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizati...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2005]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
3690 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2005 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance. "--World Bank web site | |
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| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:47Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:31Z |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Henisz, Witold J. Verfasser aut Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2005] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3690 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/25/2005 "Coercive isomorphism is a prominent source of institutional change. The literature to date has emphasized how actors that are powerful and legitimate (for example, a national government) may coerce the adoption of reforms by dependent actors (for example, state governments and other organizations whose activities are governed by the federal government). The authors observe that an actor's power alone may be sufficient to promote reform, regardless of the actor's legitimacy. But such reforms are more susceptible to subsequent change than those that emerge from processes not subject to the influence of external actors whose sway derives from their power alone. They develop and test their arguments in the context of the worldwide electricity provision industry by analyzing countries' adoption of reforms in response to conditional lending practices by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The authors find that reforms adopted in response to coercive pressures exerted by these organizations encounter much greater resistance, and that the incidence of financial and economic crises, the absence of checks and balances in established political institutions, and the inexperience of investor coalitions dramatically increase the predicted level of resistance. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Electric power Case studies Infrastructure (Economics) Case studies Loans, Foreign Case studies Zelner, Bennet A. Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Henisz, Witold J Resistance to multilateral influence on reform http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3690 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Henisz, Witold J. Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments Electric power Case studies Infrastructure (Economics) Case studies Loans, Foreign Case studies |
| title | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments |
| title_auth | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments |
| title_exact_search | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments |
| title_full | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner |
| title_fullStr | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner |
| title_full_unstemmed | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner |
| title_short | Resistance to multilateral influence on reform |
| title_sort | resistance to multilateral influence on reform the political backlash against private infrastructure investments |
| title_sub | the political backlash against private infrastructure investments |
| topic | Electric power Case studies Infrastructure (Economics) Case studies Loans, Foreign Case studies |
| topic_facet | Electric power Case studies Infrastructure (Economics) Case studies Loans, Foreign Case studies |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3690 |
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