The creation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of property rights: the political and economic consequences of a corrupt privatization

"How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets ca...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Hoff, Karla Ruth (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research c2005
Schriftenreihe:NBER working paper series working paper 11772
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:BSB01
EUV01
HTW01
FHI01
IOS01
Volltext
Zusammenfassung:"How does the lack of legitimacy of property rights affect the dynamics of the creation of the rule of law? We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards rule of law, and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. We show that a demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of weak legal institutions increases the expected relative return to stripping assets, and strippers may gain from a weak and corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Beschreibung:Includes bibliographical references
Title from PDF file as viewed on 12/7/2005
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource