How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ?: Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru
When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of th...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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Washington, D.C
The World Bank
2008
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| Zusammenfassung: | When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten)) |
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| spelling | Kaufmann, Daniel Verfasser aut How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru Kaufmann, Daniel Washington, D.C The World Bank 2008 1 Online-Ressource (42 Seiten)) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it Online-Ausg Accountability Bad governance Bribery Citizens Corruption Governance Governance Indicators Income Inequality National Governance Poor governance Public Officials Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures Public Service Delivery Kaufmann, Daniel Sonstige oth Recanatini, Francesca Sonstige oth Montoriol-Garriga, Judit Sonstige oth Kaufmann, Daniel How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4492 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kaufmann, Daniel How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru Accountability Bad governance Bribery Citizens Corruption Governance Governance Indicators Income Inequality National Governance Poor governance Public Officials Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures Public Service Delivery |
| title | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru |
| title_auth | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru |
| title_exact_search | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru |
| title_exact_search_txtP | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru |
| title_full | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru Kaufmann, Daniel |
| title_fullStr | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru Kaufmann, Daniel |
| title_full_unstemmed | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru Kaufmann, Daniel |
| title_short | How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery ? |
| title_sort | how does bribery affect public service delivery micro evidence from service users and public officials in peru |
| title_sub | Micro-Evidence From Service Users And Public Officials In Peru |
| topic | Accountability Bad governance Bribery Citizens Corruption Governance Governance Indicators Income Inequality National Governance Poor governance Public Officials Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures Public Service Delivery |
| topic_facet | Accountability Bad governance Bribery Citizens Corruption Governance Governance Indicators Income Inequality National Governance Poor governance Public Officials Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures Public Service Delivery |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4492 |
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