Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization:
"The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C]
World Bank
[2008]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Policy research working paper
4680 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 EUV01 HTW01 FHI01 IOS01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not. "--World Bank web site |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/20/2009 |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a22000001cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049073941 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230731s2008 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-1-WBA)093232314 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1392148202 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLM005468469 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-521 |a DE-573 |a DE-523 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Finger, J. M. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization |c J. Michael Finger, Julio J. Nogues |
| 264 | 1 | |a [Washington, D.C] |b World Bank |c [2008] | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Policy research working paper |v 4680 | |
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 500 | |a Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/20/2009 | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a "The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not. "--World Bank web site | |
| 533 | |a Online-Ausg |n Also available in print | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Dumping (International trade) |z Latin America | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Free trade |z Latin America | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Nogués, Julio J. |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 710 | 2 | |a World Bank |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Finger, J. M |a Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-WBA | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034335833 | ||
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 |l EUV01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 |l HTW01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 |l FHI01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 |l IOS01 |p ZDB-1-WBA |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804185390572109824 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Finger, J. M. |
| author_facet | Finger, J. M. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Finger, J. M. |
| author_variant | j m f jm jmf |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049073941 |
| collection | ZDB-1-WBA |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-1-WBA)093232314 (OCoLC)1392148202 (DE-599)GBVNLM005468469 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03463nmm a22004691cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049073941</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230731s2008 xxu|||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-1-WBA)093232314</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1392148202</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLM005468469</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-523</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Finger, J. M.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization</subfield><subfield code="c">J. Michael Finger, Julio J. Nogues</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">[Washington, D.C]</subfield><subfield code="b">World Bank</subfield><subfield code="c">[2008]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Policy research working paper</subfield><subfield code="v">4680</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/20/2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not. "--World Bank web site</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausg</subfield><subfield code="n">Also available in print</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Dumping (International trade)</subfield><subfield code="z">Latin America</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Free trade</subfield><subfield code="z">Latin America</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nogués, Julio J.</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">World Bank</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Finger, J. M</subfield><subfield code="a">Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034335833</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680</subfield><subfield code="l">EUV01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680</subfield><subfield code="l">HTW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680</subfield><subfield code="l">FHI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680</subfield><subfield code="l">IOS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-1-WBA</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049073941 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T22:27:45Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:54:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034335833 |
| oclc_num | 1392148202 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-521 DE-573 DE-523 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource |
| psigel | ZDB-1-WBA |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | World Bank |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Policy research working paper |
| spelling | Finger, J. M. Verfasser aut Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization J. Michael Finger, Julio J. Nogues [Washington, D.C] World Bank [2008] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 4680 Includes bibliographical references Title from PDF file as viewed on 5/20/2009 "The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not. "--World Bank web site Online-Ausg Also available in print Dumping (International trade) Latin America Free trade Latin America Nogués, Julio J. Sonstige oth World Bank Sonstige oth Finger, J. M Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Finger, J. M. Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization Dumping (International trade) Latin America Free trade Latin America |
| title | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization |
| title_auth | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization |
| title_exact_search | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization |
| title_full | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization J. Michael Finger, Julio J. Nogues |
| title_fullStr | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization J. Michael Finger, Julio J. Nogues |
| title_full_unstemmed | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization J. Michael Finger, Julio J. Nogues |
| title_short | Safeguards and antidumping in Latin American trade liberalization |
| title_sort | safeguards and antidumping in latin american trade liberalization |
| topic | Dumping (International trade) Latin America Free trade Latin America |
| topic_facet | Dumping (International trade) Latin America Free trade Latin America |
| url | http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-4680 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fingerjm safeguardsandantidumpinginlatinamericantradeliberalization AT noguesjulioj safeguardsandantidumpinginlatinamericantradeliberalization AT worldbank safeguardsandantidumpinginlatinamericantradeliberalization |