The matter of consciousness: from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism
"Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and...
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford ; New York
Oxford University Press
[2023]
|
| Edition: | First edition |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Summary: | "Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections |
| Physical Description: | xii, 265 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780198840459 |
Staff View
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| adam_text | Contents Acknowledgments Sources xi xiii I. THE CASE FOR THE EPISTEMIC GAP 1. Introduction 1.1 Mary and the Knowledge Argument 1.2 Historical Background 1.3 What the Knowledge Argument Shows 1.4 The Three Main Steps 1.5 A More Precise Formulation 1.6 The Chapters 3 5 6 10 13 19 23 2. The Significance of Structure 2.1 A Structural Explanation of theLearning Claim 2.2 Chalmers on Structure 2.3 Are Spatiotemporal and NomieConcepts Structural? 2.4 Absolutely Intrinsic Properties 2.5 Conclusion 26 26 29 31 35 37 3. Structure, Physical Knowledge, and Ignorance 3.1 The Equivocation Objection 3.2 The Ignorance Objection 3.3 The New-Concepts Objection 3.4 Conclusion 38 38 41 50 54 4. Phenomenal Knowledge without Experience 4.1 The No-Experience-Necessary Objection 4.2 RoboMary 4.3 Hyperbolic Mary 4.4 Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge 4.5 Conclusion 55 55 58 62 64 67 5. Non-Propositional Phenomenal Knowledge 5.1 The Ability-Hypothesis Strategy 5.2 The Acquaintance-Hypothesis Strategy 5.3 The Source of the Problem 5.4 Conclusion 69 70 77 82 83
viii CONTENTS 6. Phenomenal Representation 6.1 The Argument fromRepresentationalism 6.2 Mary’s Revenge 6.3 Responses 6.4 Introspective Misrepresentation 6.5 Conclusion 84 85 89 93 96 101 II. THE CASE FOR THE MODAL GAP 7. Deduction and Necessity 7.1 The New Fact Thesis 7.2 The Argument from No Primitive Necessitation 7.3 The Two-Dimensional Knowledge Argument 7.4 Conclusion 105 105 108 118 121 8. Epistemic-Modal Bridge Principles 8.1 In Defense of the Metaphysical Spin 8.2 Radical Opacity and Revelation 8.3 Conclusion 123 124 128 137 9. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and Chalmers’s Dilemma 9.1 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 9.2 Chalmers’s Dilemma 9.3 Balog and Circularity 9.4 Further Applications 9.5 Conclusion 138 138 140 144 148 153 10. Consequences of Social Externalism 10.1 The Ball-Tye Argument 10.2 The Concept-Mastery Strategy 10.3 Objections and Replies 10.4 Conclusion 154 155 157 161 171 11. The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts 11.1 The Conditional-Analysis Strategy 11.2 The Oracle Argument 11.3 Explaining the Intuitions 11.4 Counterarguments 11.5 Conclusion 172 173 174 178 180 184 III. THE CASE FOR THE ONTOLOGICAL GAP 12. The 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Supervenience Requirement on Physicalism The Grounding Argument Zhong’s Objections Montero’s and Brown’s Objections Conclusion 187 188 190 193 198
CONTENTS ІХ 13. Two Final Objections 13.1 A Quinean Strategy 13.2 Hybrid Strategies 13.3 Conclusion 199 199 203 207 14. Consciousness and Fundamentality 14.1 The Entailment Thesis 14.2 Against the Entailment Thesis 14.3 Objections 14.4 Conclusion 208 208 211 216 222 15. The Knowledge Argument, Russellian Monism, and Causal Integration 15.1 The Path to Russellian Monism 15.2 Howell’s Integration-Failure Argument 15.3 Kind’s Pessimism 15.4 Conclusion 225 225 228 236 239 16. Conclusion 241 Bibliography Index 243 261
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| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgments Sources xi xiii I. THE CASE FOR THE EPISTEMIC GAP 1. Introduction 1.1 Mary and the Knowledge Argument 1.2 Historical Background 1.3 What the Knowledge Argument Shows 1.4 The Three Main Steps 1.5 A More Precise Formulation 1.6 The Chapters 3 5 6 10 13 19 23 2. The Significance of Structure 2.1 A Structural Explanation of theLearning Claim 2.2 Chalmers on Structure 2.3 Are Spatiotemporal and NomieConcepts Structural? 2.4 Absolutely Intrinsic Properties 2.5 Conclusion 26 26 29 31 35 37 3. Structure, Physical Knowledge, and Ignorance 3.1 The Equivocation Objection 3.2 The Ignorance Objection 3.3 The New-Concepts Objection 3.4 Conclusion 38 38 41 50 54 4. Phenomenal Knowledge without Experience 4.1 The No-Experience-Necessary Objection 4.2 RoboMary 4.3 Hyperbolic Mary 4.4 Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge 4.5 Conclusion 55 55 58 62 64 67 5. Non-Propositional Phenomenal Knowledge 5.1 The Ability-Hypothesis Strategy 5.2 The Acquaintance-Hypothesis Strategy 5.3 The Source of the Problem 5.4 Conclusion 69 70 77 82 83
viii CONTENTS 6. Phenomenal Representation 6.1 The Argument fromRepresentationalism 6.2 Mary’s Revenge 6.3 Responses 6.4 Introspective Misrepresentation 6.5 Conclusion 84 85 89 93 96 101 II. THE CASE FOR THE MODAL GAP 7. Deduction and Necessity 7.1 The New Fact Thesis 7.2 The Argument from No Primitive Necessitation 7.3 The Two-Dimensional Knowledge Argument 7.4 Conclusion 105 105 108 118 121 8. Epistemic-Modal Bridge Principles 8.1 In Defense of the Metaphysical Spin 8.2 Radical Opacity and Revelation 8.3 Conclusion 123 124 128 137 9. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and Chalmers’s Dilemma 9.1 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 9.2 Chalmers’s Dilemma 9.3 Balog and Circularity 9.4 Further Applications 9.5 Conclusion 138 138 140 144 148 153 10. Consequences of Social Externalism 10.1 The Ball-Tye Argument 10.2 The Concept-Mastery Strategy 10.3 Objections and Replies 10.4 Conclusion 154 155 157 161 171 11. The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts 11.1 The Conditional-Analysis Strategy 11.2 The Oracle Argument 11.3 Explaining the Intuitions 11.4 Counterarguments 11.5 Conclusion 172 173 174 178 180 184 III. THE CASE FOR THE ONTOLOGICAL GAP 12. The 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Supervenience Requirement on Physicalism The Grounding Argument Zhong’s Objections Montero’s and Brown’s Objections Conclusion 187 188 190 193 198
CONTENTS ІХ 13. Two Final Objections 13.1 A Quinean Strategy 13.2 Hybrid Strategies 13.3 Conclusion 199 199 203 207 14. Consciousness and Fundamentality 14.1 The Entailment Thesis 14.2 Against the Entailment Thesis 14.3 Objections 14.4 Conclusion 208 208 211 216 222 15. The Knowledge Argument, Russellian Monism, and Causal Integration 15.1 The Path to Russellian Monism 15.2 Howell’s Integration-Failure Argument 15.3 Kind’s Pessimism 15.4 Conclusion 225 225 228 236 239 16. Conclusion 241 Bibliography Index 243 261 |
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| spelling | Alter, Torin Andrew 1963- Verfasser (DE-588)132661527 aut The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism Torin Alter First edition Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press [2023] © 2023 xii, 265 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections Russell, Bertrand 1872-1970 (DE-588)118604287 gnd rswk-swf Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd rswk-swf Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 gnd rswk-swf Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd rswk-swf Monismus (DE-588)4170453-8 gnd rswk-swf Consciousness Monism Russell, Bertrand 1872-1970 (DE-588)118604287 p Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 s Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 s Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 s Monismus (DE-588)4170453-8 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034284868&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Alter, Torin Andrew 1963- The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism Russell, Bertrand 1872-1970 (DE-588)118604287 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd Monismus (DE-588)4170453-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)118604287 (DE-588)4006349-5 (DE-588)4174611-9 (DE-588)4066559-8 (DE-588)4170453-8 |
| title | The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism |
| title_auth | The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism |
| title_exact_search | The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism |
| title_full | The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism Torin Alter |
| title_fullStr | The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism Torin Alter |
| title_full_unstemmed | The matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism Torin Alter |
| title_short | The matter of consciousness |
| title_sort | the matter of consciousness from the knowledge argument to russellian monism |
| title_sub | from the knowledge argument to Russellian Monism |
| topic | Russell, Bertrand 1872-1970 (DE-588)118604287 gnd Bewusstsein (DE-588)4006349-5 gnd Physikalismus (DE-588)4174611-9 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd Monismus (DE-588)4170453-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Russell, Bertrand 1872-1970 Bewusstsein Physikalismus Wissen Monismus |
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