Bargaining theory:
The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analys...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
[2023]
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| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge elements
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analyses of bargaining problems that focus on axiomatic analysis, according to which a solution of a given bargaining problem satisfies certain formal criteria, and strategic bargaining, according to which a solution results from the moves of ideally rational and knowledgeable claimants. Next, it discusses the conventionalist analyses of bargaining problems that focus on how members of a society can settle into bargaining conventions via learning and focal points. In the concluding section this Element discusses how philosophers use bargaining theory to analyze the social contract |
| Beschreibung: | 90 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781108706681 |
Internformat
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| 520 | 3 | |a The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analyses of bargaining problems that focus on axiomatic analysis, according to which a solution of a given bargaining problem satisfies certain formal criteria, and strategic bargaining, according to which a solution results from the moves of ideally rational and knowledgeable claimants. Next, it discusses the conventionalist analyses of bargaining problems that focus on how members of a society can settle into bargaining conventions via learning and focal points. In the concluding section this Element discusses how philosophers use bargaining theory to analyze the social contract | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV048894756 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:49:14Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:49:07Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781108706681 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034159286 |
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| physical | 90 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2023 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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| series2 | Cambridge elements |
| spelling | Vanderschraaf, Peter 1962- Verfasser (DE-588)17138203X aut Bargaining theory Peter Vanderschraaf Cambridge Cambridge University Press [2023] © 2023 90 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge elements The Nash bargaining problem provides a framework for analyzing problems where parties have imperfectly aligned interests. This Element reviews the parts of bargaining theory most important in philosophical applications, and to social contract theory in particular. It discusses rational choice analyses of bargaining problems that focus on axiomatic analysis, according to which a solution of a given bargaining problem satisfies certain formal criteria, and strategic bargaining, according to which a solution results from the moves of ideally rational and knowledgeable claimants. Next, it discusses the conventionalist analyses of bargaining problems that focus on how members of a society can settle into bargaining conventions via learning and focal points. In the concluding section this Element discusses how philosophers use bargaining theory to analyze the social contract Gesellschaftsvertrag (DE-588)4020655-5 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungstheorie, allgemein Philosophy of science SCIENCE / Philosophy & Social Aspects Soziale und politische Philosophie Spieltheorie Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 s Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 s Gesellschaftsvertrag (DE-588)4020655-5 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-108-58863-8 |
| spellingShingle | Vanderschraaf, Peter 1962- Bargaining theory Gesellschaftsvertrag (DE-588)4020655-5 gnd Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4020655-5 (DE-588)4139583-9 (DE-588)4138606-1 |
| title | Bargaining theory |
| title_auth | Bargaining theory |
| title_exact_search | Bargaining theory |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Bargaining theory |
| title_full | Bargaining theory Peter Vanderschraaf |
| title_fullStr | Bargaining theory Peter Vanderschraaf |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bargaining theory Peter Vanderschraaf |
| title_short | Bargaining theory |
| title_sort | bargaining theory |
| topic | Gesellschaftsvertrag (DE-588)4020655-5 gnd Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Gesellschaftsvertrag Verhandlungstheorie Entscheidungstheorie |
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