The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies: a computational social science approach
Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them....
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore
Cambridge University Press
2023
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| Series: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Summary: | Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by 'logrolling'- conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this 'governance cycle' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of "functionally rational" senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal |
| Item Description: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 02 Feb 2023) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (ix, 209 Seiten) Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781009315449 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781009315449 |
Staff View
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| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
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| isbn | 9781009315449 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | De Marchi, Scott 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)171806581 aut The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach Scott de Marchi, Duke University, Michael Laver, New York University Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore Cambridge University Press 2023 1 online resource (ix, 209 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in comparative politics Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 02 Feb 2023) Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by 'logrolling'- conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this 'governance cycle' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of "functionally rational" senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal Coalition governments / Mathematical models Confidence voting / Mathematical models Social sciences / Mathematical models Große Koalition (DE-588)4138015-0 gnd rswk-swf Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 gnd rswk-swf Mathematische Modellierung (DE-588)7651795-0 gnd rswk-swf Große Koalition (DE-588)4138015-0 s Mathematische Modellierung (DE-588)7651795-0 s Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 s DE-604 Laver, Michael 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)122708601 aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover 978-1-00-931547-0 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 978-1-00-931548-7 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009315449 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | De Marchi, Scott 1967- Laver, Michael 1949- The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach Coalition governments / Mathematical models Confidence voting / Mathematical models Social sciences / Mathematical models Große Koalition (DE-588)4138015-0 gnd Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 gnd Mathematische Modellierung (DE-588)7651795-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4138015-0 (DE-588)4055916-6 (DE-588)7651795-0 |
| title | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach |
| title_auth | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach |
| title_exact_search | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach |
| title_full | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach Scott de Marchi, Duke University, Michael Laver, New York University |
| title_fullStr | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach Scott de Marchi, Duke University, Michael Laver, New York University |
| title_full_unstemmed | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach Scott de Marchi, Duke University, Michael Laver, New York University |
| title_short | The governance cycle in parliamentary democracies |
| title_sort | the governance cycle in parliamentary democracies a computational social science approach |
| title_sub | a computational social science approach |
| topic | Coalition governments / Mathematical models Confidence voting / Mathematical models Social sciences / Mathematical models Große Koalition (DE-588)4138015-0 gnd Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 gnd Mathematische Modellierung (DE-588)7651795-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Coalition governments / Mathematical models Confidence voting / Mathematical models Social sciences / Mathematical models Große Koalition Sozialwissenschaften Mathematische Modellierung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009315449 |
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