Obligation and responsibility:
"This chapter explains the four principal issues that are explored in this book. The four items on the Putative Contrasts List summarize these issues: (1) Both moral responsibility and moral obligation require freedom but whereas, seemingly, the former does not require freedom to do otherwise,...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2023]
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | "This chapter explains the four principal issues that are explored in this book. The four items on the Putative Contrasts List summarize these issues: (1) Both moral responsibility and moral obligation require freedom but whereas, seemingly, the former does not require freedom to do otherwise, the latter does. (2) Semicompatibilism regarding responsibility (or obligation) is the thesis that even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise, it is compatible with responsibility (or obligation). Arguably, while responsibility semicompatibilism is plausible, obligation semicompatibilism is far less tenable. (3) Externalism about responsibility or obligation is the view that how you acquire apt antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, may influence whether you are responsible for, or are morally obligated to do, something. It appears that whereas responsibility externalism is true, there is little or no reason to believe that obligation externalism is true. (4) While obligations can change with time's passage, blameworthiness cannot. The general conclusion argued for is that the only item on this list that captures a real difference is item (3). Obligation and responsibility are far more similar to each other than items (1), (2), and (4) suggest. A chapter-by-chapter synopsis concludes the discussion"-- |
Beschreibung: | x, 267 Seiten 22 cm |
ISBN: | 9780197657829 |
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520 | 3 | |a "This chapter explains the four principal issues that are explored in this book. The four items on the Putative Contrasts List summarize these issues: (1) Both moral responsibility and moral obligation require freedom but whereas, seemingly, the former does not require freedom to do otherwise, the latter does. (2) Semicompatibilism regarding responsibility (or obligation) is the thesis that even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise, it is compatible with responsibility (or obligation). Arguably, while responsibility semicompatibilism is plausible, obligation semicompatibilism is far less tenable. (3) Externalism about responsibility or obligation is the view that how you acquire apt antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, may influence whether you are responsible for, or are morally obligated to do, something. It appears that whereas responsibility externalism is true, there is little or no reason to believe that obligation externalism is true. (4) While obligations can change with time's passage, blameworthiness cannot. The general conclusion argued for is that the only item on this list that captures a real difference is item (3). Obligation and responsibility are far more similar to each other than items (1), (2), and (4) suggest. A chapter-by-chapter synopsis concludes the discussion"-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Contents Acknowledgments ix 1. Obligation and Responsibility: Four Alleged Differences 1.1. Introduction 1.2. Ihe General Picture 1.3. Synopsis 1 1 16 23 2. Alternate Possibility Arguments for Varieties of Incompatibilism 26 2.1. Minimal Principles and Two Varieties of Incompatibilism 27 2.2. Assessment Optioni: Reject Frankfúrt Examples 30 2.3. Assessment Option 2: Accept Frankfurt Examples 31 3. Obligation Semicompatibilism 3.1. Obligation and Alternatives 3.2. Symmetry 3.3. An Argument for “Impermissible” Implies “Can” 3.4. DBWC and “Wrong” Implies “Can” 49 4. Responsibility Semicompatibilism 4.1. Traditional Semicompatibilism 4.2. Reassessing Frankfurt Examples 4.3. Actual-Sequence Accounts of Responsibility 75 75 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.8. 4.9. A Flicker Defense-Inspired Objection Blameworthiness Semicompatibilism Praiseworthiness Semicompatibilism A Slight Digression: Tracing Swaraj Semicompatibilism as an Alternative? The First Two Items on the Putative Contrasts List 5. The Free Will Premise 5.1. An Expected Impasse 49 50 54 63 76 79 86 98 99 100 101 108 111 112
viii CONTENTS 5.2. Ability 5.3. Variability 5.4. Incompatibility with the Primary Minimal Principles 6. Internalism and Externalism 6.1. Radical Reversal Cases and Responsibility 6.2. Responsibility and History 6.3. Radical Reversal Stories and Forward-Looking Responsibility 6.4. Why the Difference in Responsibility and Obligation? 6.5. A Putative Problem and a Reply 116 121 129 135 135 140 148 151 152 7. More Radical Reversal Stories and Appraisals 7.1. Radical Reversal Stories and Practical Rationality 7.2. Love’s Fragility 157 167 8. Obligation, Blameworthiness, and Time 187 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4. 8.5. 157 Background Initial Thoughts against Future Blameworthiness Initial Thoughts Favoring Future Blameworthiness Changing Blameworthiness Ramifications 188 191 193 204 206 9. Obligation, Overridingness, and Punishment 9.1. Obligation Incompatibilism and Overridingness 9.2. Review: The Argument for Impermissibility Incompatibilism 9.3. Punishment Imperiled 210 210 213 215 10. Concluding Reflections 225 10.1. The Primacy ofthe Morally Deontic 225 10.2. History and Changeability 239 10.3. Alternate Possibilities, Obligation, and Responsibility 241 10.4. Options 243 References Index 249 261
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adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgments ix 1. Obligation and Responsibility: Four Alleged Differences 1.1. Introduction 1.2. Ihe General Picture 1.3. Synopsis 1 1 16 23 2. Alternate Possibility Arguments for Varieties of Incompatibilism 26 2.1. Minimal Principles and Two Varieties of Incompatibilism 27 2.2. Assessment Optioni: Reject Frankfúrt Examples 30 2.3. Assessment Option 2: Accept Frankfurt Examples 31 3. Obligation Semicompatibilism 3.1. Obligation and Alternatives 3.2. Symmetry 3.3. An Argument for “Impermissible” Implies “Can” 3.4. DBWC and “Wrong” Implies “Can” 49 4. Responsibility Semicompatibilism 4.1. Traditional Semicompatibilism 4.2. Reassessing Frankfurt Examples 4.3. Actual-Sequence Accounts of Responsibility 75 75 4.4. 4.5. 4.6. 4.7. 4.8. 4.9. A Flicker Defense-Inspired Objection Blameworthiness Semicompatibilism Praiseworthiness Semicompatibilism A Slight Digression: Tracing Swaraj Semicompatibilism as an Alternative? The First Two Items on the Putative Contrasts List 5. The Free Will Premise 5.1. An Expected Impasse 49 50 54 63 76 79 86 98 99 100 101 108 111 112
viii CONTENTS 5.2. Ability 5.3. Variability 5.4. Incompatibility with the Primary Minimal Principles 6. Internalism and Externalism 6.1. Radical Reversal Cases and Responsibility 6.2. Responsibility and History 6.3. Radical Reversal Stories and Forward-Looking Responsibility 6.4. Why the Difference in Responsibility and Obligation? 6.5. A Putative Problem and a Reply 116 121 129 135 135 140 148 151 152 7. More Radical Reversal Stories and Appraisals 7.1. Radical Reversal Stories and Practical Rationality 7.2. Love’s Fragility 157 167 8. Obligation, Blameworthiness, and Time 187 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4. 8.5. 157 Background Initial Thoughts against Future Blameworthiness Initial Thoughts Favoring Future Blameworthiness Changing Blameworthiness Ramifications 188 191 193 204 206 9. Obligation, Overridingness, and Punishment 9.1. Obligation Incompatibilism and Overridingness 9.2. Review: The Argument for Impermissibility Incompatibilism 9.3. Punishment Imperiled 210 210 213 215 10. Concluding Reflections 225 10.1. The Primacy ofthe Morally Deontic 225 10.2. History and Changeability 239 10.3. Alternate Possibilities, Obligation, and Responsibility 241 10.4. Options 243 References Index 249 261 |
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author | Haji, Ishtiyaque |
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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T21:46:01Z |
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institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780197657829 |
language | English |
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spelling | Haji, Ishtiyaque Verfasser (DE-588)1047696118 aut Obligation and responsibility Ishtiyaque Haji New York, NY Oxford University Press [2023] x, 267 Seiten 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "This chapter explains the four principal issues that are explored in this book. The four items on the Putative Contrasts List summarize these issues: (1) Both moral responsibility and moral obligation require freedom but whereas, seemingly, the former does not require freedom to do otherwise, the latter does. (2) Semicompatibilism regarding responsibility (or obligation) is the thesis that even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise, it is compatible with responsibility (or obligation). Arguably, while responsibility semicompatibilism is plausible, obligation semicompatibilism is far less tenable. (3) Externalism about responsibility or obligation is the view that how you acquire apt antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, may influence whether you are responsible for, or are morally obligated to do, something. It appears that whereas responsibility externalism is true, there is little or no reason to believe that obligation externalism is true. (4) While obligations can change with time's passage, blameworthiness cannot. The general conclusion argued for is that the only item on this list that captures a real difference is item (3). Obligation and responsibility are far more similar to each other than items (1), (2), and (4) suggest. A chapter-by-chapter synopsis concludes the discussion"-- Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 gnd rswk-swf Verantwortungsethik (DE-588)4236475-9 gnd rswk-swf Duty Responsibility Verantwortungsethik (DE-588)4236475-9 s Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-765784-3 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034145181&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Haji, Ishtiyaque Obligation and responsibility Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 gnd Verantwortungsethik (DE-588)4236475-9 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4365723-0 (DE-588)4236475-9 |
title | Obligation and responsibility |
title_auth | Obligation and responsibility |
title_exact_search | Obligation and responsibility |
title_exact_search_txtP | Obligation and responsibility |
title_full | Obligation and responsibility Ishtiyaque Haji |
title_fullStr | Obligation and responsibility Ishtiyaque Haji |
title_full_unstemmed | Obligation and responsibility Ishtiyaque Haji |
title_short | Obligation and responsibility |
title_sort | obligation and responsibility |
topic | Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 gnd Verantwortungsethik (DE-588)4236475-9 gnd |
topic_facet | Deontologie Verantwortungsethik |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034145181&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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