Evidence, respect and truth: knowledge and justice in legal trials
Can we rely solely on statistics when we judge what is true and just? This book takes a holistic approach to addressing this question. It considers the legal trial as its paradigmatic case study before analysing a wide range of different cases, including profiling, the use of algorithms to predict s...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Hart Publishing
2022
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Can we rely solely on statistics when we judge what is true and just? This book takes a holistic approach to addressing this question. It considers the legal trial as its paradigmatic case study before analysing a wide range of different cases, including profiling, the use of algorithms to predict students' grades, and the authorisation of automated cars. The book suggests that when we make judgements about the truth or about justice, approximations are not good enough. Truth and justice are uncompromising. They must be so, because the value that underlies them both is respect; and respect takes no compromise. Thus, in the search for truth as in the search for justice, a body of evidence that imposes a statistical compromise will not do. Only evidence that in principle allows reaching the truth and doing justice is good evidence. Once such evidence has been traced, the burden is on us to make good use of the evidence and reach truth and justice. We might or might not succeed, but once we have done our best on evidence that allows success, our judgements are justified; and as such, they can resolve conflicts over the truth and over justice |
| Beschreibung: | xiv, 201 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781509942657 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Can we rely solely on statistics when we judge what is true and just? This book takes a holistic approach to addressing this question. It considers the legal trial as its paradigmatic case study before analysing a wide range of different cases, including profiling, the use of algorithms to predict students' grades, and the authorisation of automated cars. The book suggests that when we make judgements about the truth or about justice, approximations are not good enough. Truth and justice are uncompromising. They must be so, because the value that underlies them both is respect; and respect takes no compromise. Thus, in the search for truth as in the search for justice, a body of evidence that imposes a statistical compromise will not do. Only evidence that in principle allows reaching the truth and doing justice is good evidence. Once such evidence has been traced, the burden is on us to make good use of the evidence and reach truth and justice. We might or might not succeed, but once we have done our best on evidence that allows success, our judgements are justified; and as such, they can resolve conflicts over the truth and over justice | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CONTENTS Preface............................................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements........................................................................................................... ix Introduction................................................................................................................. 1 PARTI THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LEGAL FACT FINDING 1. The Rationality of Belief and Error Eliminability....................................... 11 I. Epistemology and Proof Paradoxes: A Very Brief Introduction............ 12 II. Legal Practice: Logically Ineliminable Errors.......................................... 13 III. Rational Legal Belief.................................................................................. 15 A. Error Avoidability.............................................................................. 15 B. Error Eliminability........................................ ....................................16 IV. Error Eliminability and Truth Tracking....................................................19 V. Error Eliminability and Eliminative Induction........................................23 A. Inferentialism.................................................................................... 24 B. Logical Inferences: Syllogisms and their Propositional Structure............................................................................................ 25 C. Logical Forms of Inference in Legal Practice..................................26 D. A Way
Forward.................................................................................. 32 i. Affirming Propositions in Eliminative Induction.................. 32 ii. Error Eliminability.................................................................... 32 2. The Challenge from Error and Error Eliminability......................................34 I. Sceptical Challenges........................................................... 34 A. Ancient Scepticism............................................................................ 35 B. Modern Scepticism........................................................................... 37 C. Withstanding Sceptical Challenges.................................................. 39 II. Error Eliminability and the Argument about Error.............................. 40 III. Error Eliminability and Other Sceptical Arguments............................ 43 3. Between the Epistemic and the Practical: Pushing against a Persisting Difficulty................................................................................ 45 I. Does Knowledge Have Practical Value?................................................. 46 II. The Practical Value of Epistemic Reasons: Stability of Belief and Successful Action....................................... 49
xii Contents IIL Pragmatism: The Epistemic Value of Practical Reasons....................... 50 IV. A Shared Method of Reasoning for the Epistemic and the Practical....................................................................................... 54 V. An Overarching Value: Introducing Respect........................................ 56 PART II THE PRACTICALITY OF LEGAL FACT FINDING 4. Respecting, Asserting and Error Eliminability............................................. 61 I. Legal Assertions........................................................................................61 II. Informing of Wrongdoing....................................................................... 64 III. Reasons to Inform as Reasons to Assert: Respect for Persons............. 65 A. An Account of Respect for Persons................................................67 B. Respect and Belief............................................................................ 68 C. Respect for Wronged Persons......................................................... 72 D. A Derivative Reason to Investigate Evidence of Wrongdoing.... .74 E. Respect for Wrongdoers.................................................................. 75 IV. Respect and the Norm of (Legal) Assertion......................................... 76 V. Conclusions............................................................................................. 79 5. Respecting, Doing Justice and Error Eliminability......................................81 I. Justice as Fairness and Justified Belief: The Convergence of
Justifications...................................................................................82 II. The Context of a Legal Trial.................................................................... 88 III. Accounting for the Convergence and Taking it Forward: Respect, Evidential Conditions and ‘Disaster Prevention................... 90 A. Respect and ‘Disaster Epistemology’.............................................. 98 B. Respect and Distributive Disasters................................................. 98 C. Respect and Retributive Disasters: Introducing Fairness in Retribution........................................... 99 IV. A More Rigid Account: Epistemic Value as a Source of Moral Value................................................................................ 102 V. Conclusions............................................................................................. 104 6. Resolution......................................................................................................... 106 I. Conflict Resolution Outside and Inside Legal Discourse.................... 106 II. Error Eliminability and Legal Resolution............................................. Ill A. The Open Edge of Error Eliminability.......................................... Ill B. The ‘Stopping Procedure’: Preventing Fresh Conflict Over Agency..................................................................... 112 i. On Agency and Engagement in Error Elimination............. 112 ii. Engaging in Error Elimination and Preventing
Conflict..................................................................................... 113
Contents III. 7. xiii Some Procedural Implications............................................................... 116 A. The Right to Silence........................................................................ 117 B. Confrontation Rights...................................................................... 118 C. Adversary......................................................................................... 120 D. The Presumption of Innocence...................................................... 120 From Respect to Cost Analysis in Criminal Judgments............................ 122 I. Evidence of Past Misconduct................................................................. 123 A. The Law............................................................................................124 B. Tragic Errors.................................................................................... 127 C. The Elements of Tragedies..............................................................128 D. The Defendant’s Tragedy................................................................ 129 E. Comparing the Defendant’s Story with that of the Greek Tragic Hero..................................................................................... 132 E Back to the Law............................................................................... 134 II. Statistical Evidence that Indicates Propensity....................................... 135 III. Statistical Evidence that Does Not Indicate Propensity........................ 136 IV. A Mutual Tragedy: The Error of the Legal
System................................138 V. Practical Implications: Aesthetics, Ethics and the Value of Choice.......................................................................................... 140 VI. Error Eliminability and Cost Analysis................................................... 142 A. The Problem.................................................................................... 142 B. Decision Theory: Applying Maximin............................................144 i. Initial Application: Errors and Profoundly Tragic Errors............................................................................145 ii. Taking the Analysis Forward: The Role of Incentives.............................................................................147 C. Can the Analysis Generalise?......................................................... 148 Appendix: The Range of PossibleOutcomes under a Rule of Admission of ‘Bad Character Evidence’ and under a Rule of Exclusion of‘Bad Character Evidence’....................................................... 149 PART III RESPONSIBILITY 8. Epistemic and Moral Responsibility........................................................... 153 I. Legal Assertions and Epistemic Responsibility.................................. 153 A. Why Epistemic Responsibility?...................................................154 II. Legal Assertions and Practical Responsibility.....................................156 A. Responsibility for Externalised Burdens..................................... 157 B. Why Responsibility for Externalised
Burdens?.......................... 159 C. Substantive Responsibility: The Decision Maker’s Burden...... 160 D. Why Substantive Responsibility?................................................ 163 III. Conclusions............................................................................................ 166
xiv Contents PART IV BEYOND LEGAL FACT FINDING 9. Applications................................................................................................ 169 I. Artificial Intelligence..........................................................................170 II. Algorithmic Sentencing: Predicting how a Human Would Make Retributive Judgements.......................................................... 174 III. Algorithmic Prediction of Students’ Grades...................................... 177 IV. Allocation of Resources in the Private and Public Domains............. 180 V. Automated Cars and Other Dangerous Machines........................... 182 VI. Profiling and Individual Risk Prediction Based on Group Affiliation................................................................................ 184 VIL Personal Attitudes.............................................................................186 VIII. Beliefs about Groups and the Problemof Prejudice......................... 189 Bibliography......................................................................................................... 192 Index................................................................................................................... 199
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| adam_txt |
CONTENTS Preface. vii Acknowledgements. ix Introduction. 1 PARTI THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LEGAL FACT FINDING 1. The Rationality of Belief and Error Eliminability. 11 I. Epistemology and Proof Paradoxes: A Very Brief Introduction. 12 II. Legal Practice: Logically Ineliminable Errors. 13 III. Rational Legal Belief. 15 A. Error Avoidability. 15 B. Error Eliminability. .16 IV. Error Eliminability and Truth Tracking.19 V. Error Eliminability and Eliminative Induction.23 A. Inferentialism. 24 B. Logical Inferences: Syllogisms and their Propositional Structure. 25 C. Logical Forms of Inference in Legal Practice.26 D. A Way
Forward. 32 i. Affirming Propositions in Eliminative Induction. 32 ii. Error Eliminability. 32 2. The Challenge from Error and Error Eliminability.34 I. Sceptical Challenges. 34 A. Ancient Scepticism. 35 B. Modern Scepticism. 37 C. Withstanding Sceptical Challenges. 39 II. Error Eliminability and the Argument about Error. 40 III. Error Eliminability and Other Sceptical Arguments. 43 3. Between the Epistemic and the Practical: Pushing against a Persisting Difficulty. 45 I. Does Knowledge Have Practical Value?. 46 II. The Practical Value of Epistemic Reasons: Stability of Belief and Successful Action. 49
xii Contents IIL Pragmatism: The Epistemic Value of Practical Reasons. 50 IV. A Shared Method of Reasoning for the Epistemic and the Practical. 54 V. An Overarching Value: Introducing Respect. 56 PART II THE PRACTICALITY OF LEGAL FACT FINDING 4. Respecting, Asserting and Error Eliminability. 61 I. Legal Assertions.61 II. Informing of Wrongdoing. 64 III. Reasons to Inform as Reasons to Assert: Respect for Persons. 65 A. An Account of Respect for Persons.67 B. Respect and Belief. 68 C. Respect for Wronged Persons. 72 D. A Derivative Reason to Investigate Evidence of Wrongdoing. .74 E. Respect for Wrongdoers. 75 IV. Respect and the Norm of (Legal) Assertion. 76 V. Conclusions. 79 5. Respecting, Doing Justice and Error Eliminability.81 I. Justice as Fairness and Justified Belief: The Convergence of
Justifications.82 II. The Context of a Legal Trial. 88 III. Accounting for the Convergence and Taking it Forward: Respect, Evidential Conditions and ‘Disaster Prevention. 90 A. Respect and ‘Disaster Epistemology’. 98 B. Respect and Distributive Disasters. 98 C. Respect and Retributive Disasters: Introducing Fairness in Retribution. 99 IV. A More Rigid Account: Epistemic Value as a Source of Moral Value. 102 V. Conclusions. 104 6. Resolution. 106 I. Conflict Resolution Outside and Inside Legal Discourse. 106 II. Error Eliminability and Legal Resolution. Ill A. The Open Edge of Error Eliminability. Ill B. The ‘Stopping Procedure’: Preventing Fresh Conflict Over Agency. 112 i. On Agency and Engagement in Error Elimination. 112 ii. Engaging in Error Elimination and Preventing
Conflict. 113
Contents III. 7. xiii Some Procedural Implications. 116 A. The Right to Silence. 117 B. Confrontation Rights. 118 C. Adversary. 120 D. The Presumption of Innocence. 120 From Respect to Cost Analysis in Criminal Judgments. 122 I. Evidence of Past Misconduct. 123 A. The Law.124 B. Tragic Errors. 127 C. The Elements of Tragedies.128 D. The Defendant’s Tragedy. 129 E. Comparing the Defendant’s Story with that of the Greek Tragic Hero. 132 E Back to the Law. 134 II. Statistical Evidence that Indicates Propensity. 135 III. Statistical Evidence that Does Not Indicate Propensity. 136 IV. A Mutual Tragedy: The Error of the Legal
System.138 V. Practical Implications: Aesthetics, Ethics and the Value of Choice. 140 VI. Error Eliminability and Cost Analysis. 142 A. The Problem. 142 B. Decision Theory: Applying Maximin.144 i. Initial Application: Errors and Profoundly Tragic Errors.145 ii. Taking the Analysis Forward: The Role of Incentives.147 C. Can the Analysis Generalise?. 148 Appendix: The Range of PossibleOutcomes under a Rule of Admission of ‘Bad Character Evidence’ and under a Rule of Exclusion of‘Bad Character Evidence’. 149 PART III RESPONSIBILITY 8. Epistemic and Moral Responsibility. 153 I. Legal Assertions and Epistemic Responsibility. 153 A. Why Epistemic Responsibility?.154 II. Legal Assertions and Practical Responsibility.156 A. Responsibility for Externalised Burdens. 157 B. Why Responsibility for Externalised
Burdens?. 159 C. Substantive Responsibility: The Decision Maker’s Burden. 160 D. Why Substantive Responsibility?. 163 III. Conclusions. 166
xiv Contents PART IV BEYOND LEGAL FACT FINDING 9. Applications. 169 I. Artificial Intelligence.170 II. Algorithmic Sentencing: Predicting how a Human Would Make Retributive Judgements. 174 III. Algorithmic Prediction of Students’ Grades. 177 IV. Allocation of Resources in the Private and Public Domains. 180 V. Automated Cars and Other Dangerous Machines. 182 VI. Profiling and Individual Risk Prediction Based on Group Affiliation. 184 VIL Personal Attitudes.186 VIII. Beliefs about Groups and the Problemof Prejudice. 189 Bibliography. 192 Index. 199 |
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| spelling | Levanon, Liʾat Verfasser (DE-588)1033238376 aut Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials Liat Levanon Oxford Hart Publishing 2022 xiv, 201 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Can we rely solely on statistics when we judge what is true and just? This book takes a holistic approach to addressing this question. It considers the legal trial as its paradigmatic case study before analysing a wide range of different cases, including profiling, the use of algorithms to predict students' grades, and the authorisation of automated cars. The book suggests that when we make judgements about the truth or about justice, approximations are not good enough. Truth and justice are uncompromising. They must be so, because the value that underlies them both is respect; and respect takes no compromise. Thus, in the search for truth as in the search for justice, a body of evidence that imposes a statistical compromise will not do. Only evidence that in principle allows reaching the truth and doing justice is good evidence. Once such evidence has been traced, the burden is on us to make good use of the evidence and reach truth and justice. We might or might not succeed, but once we have done our best on evidence that allows success, our judgements are justified; and as such, they can resolve conflicts over the truth and over justice Due process of law Justice Law / Mathematical models Evidence Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-5099-4266-4 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034132759&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Levanon, Liʾat Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials |
| title | Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials |
| title_auth | Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials |
| title_exact_search | Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials |
| title_full | Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials Liat Levanon |
| title_fullStr | Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials Liat Levanon |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evidence, respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials Liat Levanon |
| title_short | Evidence, respect and truth |
| title_sort | evidence respect and truth knowledge and justice in legal trials |
| title_sub | knowledge and justice in legal trials |
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