Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles:
"The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Iden...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY
Oxford University Press
2022
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, since what is usually known as the trivial version of the principle is consistent with objects differing only numerically. He provides two positive arguments for the Principle: one based on broadly Humean considerations excluding a certain kind of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other based on ideas about what grounds the having of certain properties by objects. This book also presents two new arguments against restricted versions of the principle according to which, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible. It is further argued that one of the arguments for the weakest version of the principle can be extended to abstract objects. The conclusion is drawn that, necessarily, there are no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that differ only numerically." -- |
| Beschreibung: | viii, 134 Seiten 22 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780192866868 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, since what is usually known as the trivial version of the principle is consistent with objects differing only numerically. He provides two positive arguments for the Principle: one based on broadly Humean considerations excluding a certain kind of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other based on ideas about what grounds the having of certain properties by objects. This book also presents two new arguments against restricted versions of the principle according to which, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible. It is further argued that one of the arguments for the weakest version of the principle can be extended to abstract objects. The conclusion is drawn that, necessarily, there are no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that differ only numerically." -- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804184902294306816 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents Preface vii Introduction 1 1. Preliminaries 5 2. Trivializing Properties and NT-properties 31 3. Black’s World 61 4. The Possibility of Blacks World 75 5. Two Arguments for PII 101 References Index 127 133
|
| adam_txt |
Contents Preface vii Introduction 1 1. Preliminaries 5 2. Trivializing Properties and NT-properties 31 3. Black’s World 61 4. The Possibility of Blacks World 75 5. Two Arguments for PII 101 References Index 127 133 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 1969- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1174817615 |
| author_facet | Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 1969- |
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| author_sort | Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 1969- |
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| bvnumber | BV048814782 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1374561587 (DE-599)BVBBV048814782 |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV048814782 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T21:31:13Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:46:43Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780192866868 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034080630 |
| oclc_num | 1374561587 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | viii, 134 Seiten 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)1174817615 aut Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra First edition Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY Oxford University Press 2022 viii, 134 Seiten 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles is the thesis that, necessarily, no two (concrete) objects differ only numerically. This is the weakest version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra argues that there is no trivial version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, since what is usually known as the trivial version of the principle is consistent with objects differing only numerically. He provides two positive arguments for the Principle: one based on broadly Humean considerations excluding a certain kind of necessary connection between distinct objects, and the other based on ideas about what grounds the having of certain properties by objects. This book also presents two new arguments against restricted versions of the principle according to which, necessarily, no two objects can be purely qualitatively indiscernible or intrinsically purely qualitatively indiscernible. It is further argued that one of the arguments for the weakest version of the principle can be extended to abstract objects. The conclusion is drawn that, necessarily, there are no objects, whether abstract or concrete, that differ only numerically." -- Unsichtbarkeit (DE-588)4345668-6 gnd rswk-swf Differenz (DE-588)4195641-2 gnd rswk-swf Objekt Philosophie (DE-588)4172302-8 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 gnd rswk-swf Identity (Philosophical concept) Objekt Philosophie (DE-588)4172302-8 s Differenz (DE-588)4195641-2 s Unsichtbarkeit (DE-588)4345668-6 s Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034080630&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 1969- Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles Unsichtbarkeit (DE-588)4345668-6 gnd Differenz (DE-588)4195641-2 gnd Objekt Philosophie (DE-588)4172302-8 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4345668-6 (DE-588)4195641-2 (DE-588)4172302-8 (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4026482-8 |
| title | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles |
| title_auth | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles |
| title_exact_search | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles |
| title_full | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra |
| title_fullStr | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra |
| title_full_unstemmed | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra |
| title_short | Two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles |
| title_sort | two arguments for the identity of indiscernibles |
| topic | Unsichtbarkeit (DE-588)4345668-6 gnd Differenz (DE-588)4195641-2 gnd Objekt Philosophie (DE-588)4172302-8 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Identität (DE-588)4026482-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Unsichtbarkeit Differenz Objekt Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie Identität |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=034080630&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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