Understanding Russian coercive signaling:
Moscow regularly uses limited military actions-far short of direct aggression but often creating escalatory risks-that have caused concern and consternation in Western capitals. It is, however, far from clear what Russia intends to signal through these actions. Different understandings of Moscow...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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Santa Monica
Rand Corporation
2022
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Moscow regularly uses limited military actions-far short of direct aggression but often creating escalatory risks-that have caused concern and consternation in Western capitals. It is, however, far from clear what Russia intends to signal through these actions. Different understandings of Moscow's objectives could lead to dramatically divergent interpretations of events. In the first comprehensive analysis of Russian coercive signaling toward the United States and its allies, the authors of this report analyze these activities over recent years to provide a better understanding of the drivers of Moscow's behavior and practical guidelines for assessing future events. The authors posit several hypotheses regarding Russian motives and evaluated them using three methods: an examination of Russian strategic writing and leadership statements on the topic, a quantitative modeling effort, and qualitative case studies of specific incidents. The authors found solid empirical grounds to make judgments about Russia's motives. They suggest that much of the assertive, dangerous, or unsafe Russian activity appears to be directed at shaping specific patterns of ongoing U.S. or allied behavior. Moscow appears to be using coercive signals to send targeted messages regarding activities that it finds problematic. Most Russian proactive activities, such as scheduled exercises or strategic bomber training flights, convey general deterrence signals and do not pose immediate safety concerns. Using their analysis of past Russian behavior, the authors provide tools to discern the possible motives behind future activities. The research for this report was conducted in calendar year 2020. The draft was completed in March 2021 |
| Beschreibung: | XVII, 148 Seiten Illustrationen, Karten (teilweise farbig) |
| ISBN: | 9781977408891 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Defining Coercive Signaling and Identifying Possible Drivers -- Chapter Three: Russian Strategic Thinking on Signaling -- Chapter Four: Statistical Analysis of Russian Coercive Signaling -- Chapter Five: Case Studies -- Chapter Six: Conclusion -- Appendix: Additional Statistical Data | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Moscow regularly uses limited military actions-far short of direct aggression but often creating escalatory risks-that have caused concern and consternation in Western capitals. It is, however, far from clear what Russia intends to signal through these actions. Different understandings of Moscow's objectives could lead to dramatically divergent interpretations of events. In the first comprehensive analysis of Russian coercive signaling toward the United States and its allies, the authors of this report analyze these activities over recent years to provide a better understanding of the drivers of Moscow's behavior and practical guidelines for assessing future events. The authors posit several hypotheses regarding Russian motives and evaluated them using three methods: an examination of Russian strategic writing and leadership statements on the topic, a quantitative modeling effort, and qualitative case studies of specific incidents. The authors found solid empirical grounds to make judgments about Russia's motives. They suggest that much of the assertive, dangerous, or unsafe Russian activity appears to be directed at shaping specific patterns of ongoing U.S. or allied behavior. Moscow appears to be using coercive signals to send targeted messages regarding activities that it finds problematic. Most Russian proactive activities, such as scheduled exercises or strategic bomber training flights, convey general deterrence signals and do not pose immediate safety concerns. Using their analysis of past Russian behavior, the authors provide tools to discern the possible motives behind future activities. The research for this report was conducted in calendar year 2020. The draft was completed in March 2021 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents About This Report............................................................................................... iii Summary.............................................................................................................. v CHAPTER ONE Introduction......................................................................................................... 1 Research Questions....................................................................................... 2 Research Approach.......................................................................................2 Report Structure........................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER TWO Defining Coercive Signaling and Identifying Possible Drivers................... 5 Relevant Concepts from the International Relations Literature.................. 5 Empirical Analysis of Recent Russian Behavior......................................... 16 Parsing Russia’s Possible Objectives: Hypotheses...................................... 23 Evaluating the Hypotheses......................................................................... 32 CHAPTER THREE Russian Strategic Thinking on Signaling....................................................... 33 Introduction................................................................................................ 33 Relevant Russian Concepts......................................................................... 34 Russian Views on U.S. Signaling Activities............................................... 39
Conclusion.................................................................................................. 43 CHAPTER FOUR Statistical Analysis of Russian Coercive Signaling.......................................45 Introduction................................................................................. 45 Data Collection and Availability................................................................ 45 Modeling..................................................................................................... 56 Hypothesis Testing...................................................................................... 57 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 79 xiii
Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling CHAPTER FIVE Case Studies............................................................................................................. 83 Air-Surface....................................................................................................... 84 Surface-Surface .............................................................................................. 90 Air-Air............................................................................................................... 95 Conclusion..................................................................................................... 102 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion........................................................................................................... 105 Findings........................................................................................................ 105 Implications................................................................................................. 109 APPENDIX Additional Statistical Data............................................................................... 113 Abbreviations....................................................................................................... 135 References............................................................................................................. 137 xiv
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Contents About This Report. iii Summary. v CHAPTER ONE Introduction. 1 Research Questions. 2 Research Approach.2 Report Structure. 4 CHAPTER TWO Defining Coercive Signaling and Identifying Possible Drivers. 5 Relevant Concepts from the International Relations Literature. 5 Empirical Analysis of Recent Russian Behavior. 16 Parsing Russia’s Possible Objectives: Hypotheses. 23 Evaluating the Hypotheses. 32 CHAPTER THREE Russian Strategic Thinking on Signaling. 33 Introduction. 33 Relevant Russian Concepts. 34 Russian Views on U.S. Signaling Activities. 39
Conclusion. 43 CHAPTER FOUR Statistical Analysis of Russian Coercive Signaling.45 Introduction. 45 Data Collection and Availability. 45 Modeling. 56 Hypothesis Testing. 57 Conclusion . 79 xiii
Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling CHAPTER FIVE Case Studies. 83 Air-Surface. 84 Surface-Surface . 90 Air-Air. 95 Conclusion. 102 CHAPTER SIX Conclusion. 105 Findings. 105 Implications. 109 APPENDIX Additional Statistical Data. 113 Abbreviations. 135 References. 137 xiv
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Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling Pawlyk, Oriana, “US Pilots’ Close Calls with Russian Aircraft Are Likely to Continue, Experts Say,” Military.com, April 25,2020. As of February 24,2021: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/04/25/us-pilots-close-callsrussian-aircraft-are-likely-continue-experts-say.html Plourde, Aimée Μ., “The Origins of Prestige Goods as Honest Signals of Skill and Knowledge,” Human Nature, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2008, pp. 374-388. “Postanovlenie Praviteľstva RF ot 22 fevralya 2020 g., № 201, Ό poryadke primeneniya oruzhiya i boevoi tekhniki pri okhrane gosudarstvennoi granitsy Rossiiskoi Federatsii v vozdushnom prostranstve’ (dokument ne vstúpil v silu),” webpage, February 28,2020. As of March 3,2021: https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/73571491/ Powell, Robert, “Nuclear Brinkmanship, Limited War, and Military Power,” International Organization, Vol. 69, No. 3, Summer 2015, pp. 589-626. President of the Russian Federation, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, Presidential Edict No. 683, Moscow, December 31,2015. ProQuest, “Military Database,” database, undated. As of August 17, 2021: https://www.proquest.com/military/advanced Pu, Xiaoyu, Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order, Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2019. Rahmat, Ridzwan, and Lee Willett, “USN to Forward Deploy Aegis Baseline 9 Guided-Missile Cruiser to Japan in 2015,” Janes Navy International, January 21, 2015. Renshon, Jonathan, “Status Deficits and War,” International Organization, Vol. 70, No. 3, Summer
2016, pp. 513-550. Renshon, Jonathan, Fightingfor Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017. Rossiya 24, ‘Krym. Puť na Rodinu,” video, YouTube, May 6, 2019. As of December 30, 2020: https://youtu.be/G14xzIEcuIw “Russia and US Warships Almost Collide in East China Sea,” BBC News, June 7, 2019. “Russia Denies NATO Statement About Its Su-27 Fighter Violating Danish Border,” TASS, August 31, 2020. “Russian Admiral Lauds Crew’s Poise in Near-Collision with US Cruiser,” Sputnik, June 10,2019. As of December 30,2020: https://sputniknews.com/asia/201906101075770078-us-cruiser-russiandestroyer-near-collision-naval-incident/ “Russian Jet Makes ‘Provocative and Unprofessional’ Pass at USS Donald Cook,” CBS News, April 14, 2014. 144
References “Russian Military Pilots Set Records for Flight Hours—Aerospace Force Chief,” Interfax, December 22,2016. “Russian Navy Ship Maneuvers Unsafe, Unprofessional,” Commander 7th Fleet Public Affairs, June 7, 2019. Sartori, Anne E., “The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes,” International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1, Winter 2002, pp. 121-149. Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966. Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. Schmitt, Eric, “U.S.-Russia Military Tensions Intensify in the Air and on the Ground Worldwide,” New York Times, September 1,2020. Schwarz, Michael, and Konstantin Sonin, “A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 24, No. 1, May 2008, pp. 163-183. Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 2, June 2008, pp. 294-308. Sechser, Todd S., “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2018, pp. 318-345. “Secretary Kerry’s Phone Call with Foreign Minister Lavrov,” U.S. Department of State, webpage, April 15,2016. As of October 27, 2020: https://2009-2017.state.gOv/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/255870.htm “Severnyi flot ne podvel,” Na strazhe Zapoliar’ia, No. 11, March 22,2014. Shcherbakov, Vladimir, “Dinamichnyi ‘kharassment:’ Amerikanskie strategicheskie
bobardirovshchiki proveryayut na praktike novuyu kontseptsiyu pentagona,” Aerokosmicheskoe obozrenie, No. 3,2020. “Shoigu rasskazal ob imitatsii aviatsiei NATO raketnykh udarov po Rossii,” RT, September 6, 2020. As of March 3, 2021: https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/780761-shoigu-nato-imitaciya-udary Sivkov, Konstantin, “Kak voevať s mnogolikim vragom,” Voennopromyshlennyi kur’er, September 4, 2018. Sleight, Jessica, Global Zero Military Incidents Study, Washington, D.C.: Global Zero, updated May 1, 2017. Stars and Stripes, homepage, undated. As of August 17, 2021: https://www.stripes.com/ 145
Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling “Statement Regarding Interaction Between USS Farragut and Russian Navy Ship,” U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, webpage, January 10, 2020. As of October 27, 2020: https://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/2054258/ statement-regarding-interaction-between-uss-farragut-and-russian-navy-ship/ Stewart, Phil, “Russia Jets Make ‘Simulated Attack’ Passes Near U.S. Destroyer: U.S.,” Reuters, April 13, 2016. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” database, undated. As of August 17,2021: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex Stoner, Kathryn, and Michael McFaul, “Who Lost Russia (This Time)? Vladimir Putin,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 2015, pp. 167-187. “Su-27 perekhvatili bombardirovshchik SShA B-52 nad Chernym morem,” Izvestiya, August 28,2020. As of December 30,2020: https://iz.ru/1054162/2020-08-28/ su-27-perekhvatili-bombardirovshchik-ssha-b-52-nad-chernym-morem Tilghman, Andrew, “Russian Attack Aircraft Just Flew Within 30 Feet of a U.S. Navy Ship,” Military Times, April 13, 2016. As of February 17, 2021: https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/04/13/ russian-attack-aircraft-just-flew-within-30-feet-of-a-u-s-navy-ship/ Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter, “Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 55, No. 6,2011, pp. 996-1020. “To Maximum Radius: Russian Aerospace Forces Long-Range Aviation Is 102 Years Old on 23 December,” Krasnaya Zvezda, December 23,2016. “The Training and Look
of the Armed Forces Will Change,” Krasnaya Zvezda, June 24,2008. “Training Time for Southern MD Base Pilots up by 50%,” Interfax, November 27,2014. Trushin, Vasilii, “Pobedit’, ne ubivaya,” Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, June 5,1998. “The Unmanned Hopes of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 6,2009. “Up in the Sky, 3,500 Times,” Krasnaya Zvezda, December 10,2013. “UPDATE 1-Russian Jet’s Passes Near U.S. Ship in Black Sea ‘Provocative’— Pentagon,” Reuters, April 14,2014. 146
References U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa, “Unsafe, Unprofessional Intercept of US Bomber by Russian Aircraft over the Black Sea,” press release, August 29,2020. U.S. Army Europe and Africa, “U.S. Army Europe and Africa Press Releases and Media Advisories,” webpage, undated. As of January 18,2022: https://www.europeafrica.army.mil/PressReleases/ U.S. Army News Service, homepage, undated. As of August 17,2021: https://www.army.mil/arnews U.S. Carriers, “USS Donald Cook DDG 75 History,” webpage, last updated - July 18,2021. As of August 18, 2021: http://www.uscarriers.net/ddg75history.htm “US Cruiser Impeded Russian Warship’s Passage in East China Sea,” TASS, June 7,2019. As of October 27,2020: https://tass.com/defense/1062467 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Petroleum and Other Liquids: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB,” webpage, last updated February 18,2021. As of August 17,2021: https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rbrteM.htm U.S. European Command, “U.S. Navy Ship Encounters Aggressive Russian Aircraft in Baltic Sea,” webpage, July 26, 2016. As of October 27, 2020: https://www.eucom.mil/article/35359/u-s-navy-ship-encounters-aggressiverussian-aircraft-in-baltic-sea U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa and U.S. 6th Fleet, “News,” webpage, undated. As of August 17, 2021: https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Press-Room/News/ “US Says Russian Military Conducted Unsafe Intercept of B-52 over Black Sea; Violated NATO Airspace in Separate Incident,” Associated Press, August 30, 2020. “USS Donald Cook Buzzed Again by Russian Jets in Baltic,” CBS News, April 13, 2016. “USS Lassen
and USS Farragut Return from Deployment,” Commander, U.S. Second Fleet Public Affairs, webpage, June 16, 2020. As of December 30, 2020: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2284162/ uss-lassen-and-uss-farragut-return-from-deployment/ U.S. Navy, “Aggressive Approach by a Russian Navy ship on USS Farragut (DDG 99),” video, YouTube, January 10, 2020. As of December 30,2020: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_B-mMtQUr_Y feature=emb_logo U.S. News and World Report, “Secrets of the Cold War: What Happened to 31 U.S. Spy Planes,” March 14,1993. 147
Understanding Russian Coercive Signaling USNI News Video, “Russian Warship Closes on USS Chancellorsville,” video, YouTube, June 7,2019. As of December 30, 2020: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WrzMI7-URcM “V Minoborony ne soglasny s zayavleniem SShA ob opasnom prolete Su-24,” RIA Novosti, April 14, 2016. Vasiliyev, Roman, “Audiozapis’ perekhvata B-52 28.082020 v akvatorii chernogo morya,” video, YouTube, September 3,2020. As of December 30, 2020: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tOyigTLgTXw feature=youtu.be Weiss, Andrew, and Nicole Ng, Collision Avoidance: The Lessons of U.S. and Russian Operations in Syria, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2019. Winkler, David F., Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China, 1945—2016, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2017. Wohlforth, William C., “Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War, 1600-1995,” in Elliott Abrams, ed., Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1998. Yakukhno, S., “Perspekitvy razvitiya strategicheskoi bobardirovochnoi aviatsii VVS SShA,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie. No. 6,2020. 148----- f Bayerische I Staatsbibliothek |
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| author | Charap, Samuel 1980- Stravers, Andrew Drennan, John Massicot, Dara |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1140057758 (DE-588)1230073604 (DE-588)1203094132 (DE-588)1139899600 |
| author_facet | Charap, Samuel 1980- Stravers, Andrew Drennan, John Massicot, Dara |
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| author_sort | Charap, Samuel 1980- |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV048559845 |
| contents | Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Defining Coercive Signaling and Identifying Possible Drivers -- Chapter Three: Russian Strategic Thinking on Signaling -- Chapter Four: Statistical Analysis of Russian Coercive Signaling -- Chapter Five: Case Studies -- Chapter Six: Conclusion -- Appendix: Additional Statistical Data |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1371321740 (DE-599)BVBBV048559845 |
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Drenna, Dara Massicot [und 4 weitere]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Santa Monica</subfield><subfield code="b">Rand Corporation</subfield><subfield code="c">2022</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XVII, 148 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Illustrationen, Karten (teilweise farbig)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Defining Coercive Signaling and Identifying Possible Drivers -- Chapter Three: Russian Strategic Thinking on Signaling -- Chapter Four: Statistical Analysis of Russian Coercive Signaling -- Chapter Five: Case Studies -- Chapter Six: Conclusion -- Appendix: Additional Statistical Data</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Moscow regularly uses limited military actions-far short of direct aggression but often creating escalatory risks-that have caused concern and consternation in Western capitals. 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| spelling | Charap, Samuel 1980- Verfasser (DE-588)1140057758 aut Understanding Russian coercive signaling Samuel Charap, Andrew Stravers, John J. Drenna, Dara Massicot [und 4 weitere] Santa Monica Rand Corporation 2022 XVII, 148 Seiten Illustrationen, Karten (teilweise farbig) txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Defining Coercive Signaling and Identifying Possible Drivers -- Chapter Three: Russian Strategic Thinking on Signaling -- Chapter Four: Statistical Analysis of Russian Coercive Signaling -- Chapter Five: Case Studies -- Chapter Six: Conclusion -- Appendix: Additional Statistical Data Moscow regularly uses limited military actions-far short of direct aggression but often creating escalatory risks-that have caused concern and consternation in Western capitals. It is, however, far from clear what Russia intends to signal through these actions. Different understandings of Moscow's objectives could lead to dramatically divergent interpretations of events. In the first comprehensive analysis of Russian coercive signaling toward the United States and its allies, the authors of this report analyze these activities over recent years to provide a better understanding of the drivers of Moscow's behavior and practical guidelines for assessing future events. The authors posit several hypotheses regarding Russian motives and evaluated them using three methods: an examination of Russian strategic writing and leadership statements on the topic, a quantitative modeling effort, and qualitative case studies of specific incidents. The authors found solid empirical grounds to make judgments about Russia's motives. They suggest that much of the assertive, dangerous, or unsafe Russian activity appears to be directed at shaping specific patterns of ongoing U.S. or allied behavior. Moscow appears to be using coercive signals to send targeted messages regarding activities that it finds problematic. Most Russian proactive activities, such as scheduled exercises or strategic bomber training flights, convey general deterrence signals and do not pose immediate safety concerns. Using their analysis of past Russian behavior, the authors provide tools to discern the possible motives behind future activities. The research for this report was conducted in calendar year 2020. The draft was completed in March 2021 Provokation (DE-588)4316888-7 gnd rswk-swf Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Russia (Federation) / Military policy Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / 21st century Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 s Provokation (DE-588)4316888-7 s Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g DE-604 Stravers, Andrew Verfasser (DE-588)1230073604 aut Drennan, John Verfasser (DE-588)1203094132 aut Massicot, Dara Verfasser (DE-588)1139899600 aut Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033936059&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033936059&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Charap, Samuel 1980- Stravers, Andrew Drennan, John Massicot, Dara Understanding Russian coercive signaling Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Defining Coercive Signaling and Identifying Possible Drivers -- Chapter Three: Russian Strategic Thinking on Signaling -- Chapter Four: Statistical Analysis of Russian Coercive Signaling -- Chapter Five: Case Studies -- Chapter Six: Conclusion -- Appendix: Additional Statistical Data Provokation (DE-588)4316888-7 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4316888-7 (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)4065004-2 (DE-588)4076899-5 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Understanding Russian coercive signaling |
| title_auth | Understanding Russian coercive signaling |
| title_exact_search | Understanding Russian coercive signaling |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Understanding Russian coercive signaling |
| title_full | Understanding Russian coercive signaling Samuel Charap, Andrew Stravers, John J. Drenna, Dara Massicot [und 4 weitere] |
| title_fullStr | Understanding Russian coercive signaling Samuel Charap, Andrew Stravers, John J. Drenna, Dara Massicot [und 4 weitere] |
| title_full_unstemmed | Understanding Russian coercive signaling Samuel Charap, Andrew Stravers, John J. Drenna, Dara Massicot [und 4 weitere] |
| title_short | Understanding Russian coercive signaling |
| title_sort | understanding russian coercive signaling |
| topic | Provokation (DE-588)4316888-7 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Provokation Abschreckung Militärpolitik Russland USA |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033936059&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033936059&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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