Getting things right: fittingness, reasons, and value
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, New York
Oxford University Press
2022
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | x, 207 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780198810322 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 Reasons 2 Fittingness First 3 Preliminaries 3.1 Strategy and Limits 3.2 Ontology of Reasons 3.3 Normativity 3.4 Constitutive Accounts 3.5 Plan of the Book I 1. Reasons 1 Introduction 2 Roles and Features of Reasons: Desiderata for a Constitutive Account 3 Some Theories of Reasons 3.1 Ought-Based Theories 3.1.1 Reasons as Explanations of Oughts 3.1.2 Reasons as Evidence of Oughts 3.2 Value-Based Theories 3.3 Primitivism 4 Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning 4.1 The Account 4.2 Attractions 4.3 Developing the Account 4.3.1 Conative and Epistemic Conditions 4.3.2 Objective and Subjective Reasons 5 Challenges 5.1 Shouldn’t Good Reasoning Be Understood in Terms of Reasons? 5.2 Further Challenges 6 Conclusion 13 13 13 16 16 16 19 20 23 24 24 27 29 29 31 32 33 37 37 2. Good Reasoning 1 Introduction 2 Clarifications and Desiderata 3 The Fittingness View 4 Other Things Equal and Normality 39 39 40 42 44 1 3 6 6 7 8 10 11
vi CONTENTS 5 Objections 5.1 Reasoning to the Belief that a Fittingness Condition Obtains 5.2 Reasoning from Believing a Means is not Choiceworthy to Believing It’s Not Necessary 5.3 Necessarily Fitting Responses, Opaque Necessary Connections 6 Back to Reasons 6.1 First Objection: Very Weak Reasons for Action 6.2 Second Objection: Irrelevant Considerations 6.3 Third Objection: Bare Testimony 6.4 First Implication: The Guidance Condition 6.5 Second Implication: Incentives for Attitudes 7 Conclusion Appendix 1 Modelling Fittingness-Preservation Appendix 2 Structural Features of Reasons 3. Fittingness 1 Introduction 2 Examples of Fittingness 3 Fittingness and Deontic Status 3.1 Clarifications 3.2 Four Marks 3.2.1 Insensitivity to Incentives 3.2.2 Strength 3.2.3 Absences 3.2.4 Objectivity 4 Fittingness and Reasons 4.1 Reasons Accounts of Fittingness 4.2 Incentives 4.3 Further Problems 4.4 Fittingness and the Balance of Reasons 5 What MakesResponses Fitting? 5.1 Fittingness Conditions 5.2 Fitting Belief 5.3 Fitting Intention 5.4 Fitting Desires and Emotions 6 Conclusion 4. Value 1 Introduction 2 Preliminaries 3 Attractions of Norm-Attitude Accounts 3.1 Between Primitivism and Subjectivism 3.2 Generalizing: Specific Values, Attributive Good, Good-For 3.3 Norms and Values 48 48 49 50 56 57 58 60 62 63 64 65 67 70 70 71 72 72 74 74 75 76 78 79 79 80 81 84 86 86 88 89 91 92 93 93 94 96 96 98 99
CONTENTS Vii 4 The Wrong Kind of Reason Problem 4.1 Wrong-Kind Reasons and Buck-Passing 4.2 Wrong-Kind Reasons and the Fitting-Attitude Account 5 The Partiality Problem 5.1 The Problem 5.2 The Buck-Passers’ Response 5.3 A Fitting-Attitude Solution to the Partiality Problem 5.4 Related Challenges 6 Conclusion 102 102 107 108 109 111 113 115 117 5. The Explanatory Role of Reasons I: The Weights of Reasons 1 Introduction 2 The Simple Approach 3 The Defeasibility Approach 3.1 Introducing the Approach 3.2 Weights and Defeasible Reasoning:Outweighing 3.3 Weights and Defeasible Reasoning: Generalizing 4 Placing Weight 5 Applying the Account 5.1 Simple Outweighing 5.2 Incomparability and Equal Weight 5.3 Failure of Additivity 5.4 Holism I: Attenuating and Disabling 5.5 Holism II: Intensifying and Enabling 5.6 Are Conditions and Modifiers Reasons? Are Disabled Reasons Reasons? 6 Conclusion 119 119 121 124 124 125 128 133 137 138 139 140 141 143 6. The Explanatory Role of Reasons II: From Weights to Deontic Status 1 Introduction 2 Overall Strength and Reasons Against 2.1 An Account of Overall Strength, and a Worry 2.2 Reasons Against as Reasons for Absences 2.2.1 Reasons for Absences 2.2.2 Absences, Fittingness, and Reasoning 2.3 Reasons Against as Reasons for Alternatives 3 Strength Amended 4 From Overall Strength to Deontic Status 5 The Balancing Asymmetry 6 Pointless Responses 7 Reasons’ Explanatory Role 8 Conclusion 143 147 148 148 149 149 150 150 151 154 156 158 162 167 169 170
viii CONTENTS 7. Reasons for Belief, Action, and Emotions 1 Introduction 2 Reasons for Belief 2.1 Perceptual Reasons 2.2 Weak Reasons, Lottery Reasons 2.3 Reasons for Credences 3 Reasons for Action 3.1 The Problem of Reasons for Action and a Solution 3.2 Two Objections 3.3 The Response Condition 4 Reasons for Emotions 4.1 Emotions and Reasoning 4.2 A Challenge to Reasons for Emotions 5 Conclusion 171 171 171 171 175 176 178 178 182 184 185 185 188 190 Conclusion 191 Bibliography Index 195 209
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| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction 1 Reasons 2 Fittingness First 3 Preliminaries 3.1 Strategy and Limits 3.2 Ontology of Reasons 3.3 Normativity 3.4 Constitutive Accounts 3.5 Plan of the Book I 1. Reasons 1 Introduction 2 Roles and Features of Reasons: Desiderata for a Constitutive Account 3 Some Theories of Reasons 3.1 Ought-Based Theories 3.1.1 Reasons as Explanations of Oughts 3.1.2 Reasons as Evidence of Oughts 3.2 Value-Based Theories 3.3 Primitivism 4 Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning 4.1 The Account 4.2 Attractions 4.3 Developing the Account 4.3.1 Conative and Epistemic Conditions 4.3.2 Objective and Subjective Reasons 5 Challenges 5.1 Shouldn’t Good Reasoning Be Understood in Terms of Reasons? 5.2 Further Challenges 6 Conclusion 13 13 13 16 16 16 19 20 23 24 24 27 29 29 31 32 33 37 37 2. Good Reasoning 1 Introduction 2 Clarifications and Desiderata 3 The Fittingness View 4 Other Things Equal and Normality 39 39 40 42 44 1 3 6 6 7 8 10 11
vi CONTENTS 5 Objections 5.1 Reasoning to the Belief that a Fittingness Condition Obtains 5.2 Reasoning from Believing a Means is not Choiceworthy to Believing It’s Not Necessary 5.3 Necessarily Fitting Responses, Opaque Necessary Connections 6 Back to Reasons 6.1 First Objection: Very Weak Reasons for Action 6.2 Second Objection: Irrelevant Considerations 6.3 Third Objection: Bare Testimony 6.4 First Implication: The Guidance Condition 6.5 Second Implication: Incentives for Attitudes 7 Conclusion Appendix 1 Modelling Fittingness-Preservation Appendix 2 Structural Features of Reasons 3. Fittingness 1 Introduction 2 Examples of Fittingness 3 Fittingness and Deontic Status 3.1 Clarifications 3.2 Four Marks 3.2.1 Insensitivity to Incentives 3.2.2 Strength 3.2.3 Absences 3.2.4 Objectivity 4 Fittingness and Reasons 4.1 Reasons Accounts of Fittingness 4.2 Incentives 4.3 Further Problems 4.4 Fittingness and the Balance of Reasons 5 What MakesResponses Fitting? 5.1 Fittingness Conditions 5.2 Fitting Belief 5.3 Fitting Intention 5.4 Fitting Desires and Emotions 6 Conclusion 4. Value 1 Introduction 2 Preliminaries 3 Attractions of Norm-Attitude Accounts 3.1 Between Primitivism and Subjectivism 3.2 Generalizing: Specific Values, Attributive Good, Good-For 3.3 Norms and Values 48 48 49 50 56 57 58 60 62 63 64 65 67 70 70 71 72 72 74 74 75 76 78 79 79 80 81 84 86 86 88 89 91 92 93 93 94 96 96 98 99
CONTENTS Vii 4 The Wrong Kind of Reason Problem 4.1 Wrong-Kind Reasons and Buck-Passing 4.2 Wrong-Kind Reasons and the Fitting-Attitude Account 5 The Partiality Problem 5.1 The Problem 5.2 The Buck-Passers’ Response 5.3 A Fitting-Attitude Solution to the Partiality Problem 5.4 Related Challenges 6 Conclusion 102 102 107 108 109 111 113 115 117 5. The Explanatory Role of Reasons I: The Weights of Reasons 1 Introduction 2 The Simple Approach 3 The Defeasibility Approach 3.1 Introducing the Approach 3.2 Weights and Defeasible Reasoning:Outweighing 3.3 Weights and Defeasible Reasoning: Generalizing 4 Placing Weight 5 Applying the Account 5.1 Simple Outweighing 5.2 Incomparability and Equal Weight 5.3 Failure of Additivity 5.4 Holism I: Attenuating and Disabling 5.5 Holism II: Intensifying and Enabling 5.6 Are Conditions and Modifiers Reasons? Are Disabled Reasons Reasons? 6 Conclusion 119 119 121 124 124 125 128 133 137 138 139 140 141 143 6. The Explanatory Role of Reasons II: From Weights to Deontic Status 1 Introduction 2 Overall Strength and Reasons Against 2.1 An Account of Overall Strength, and a Worry 2.2 Reasons Against as Reasons for Absences 2.2.1 Reasons for Absences 2.2.2 Absences, Fittingness, and Reasoning 2.3 Reasons Against as Reasons for Alternatives 3 Strength Amended 4 From Overall Strength to Deontic Status 5 The Balancing Asymmetry 6 Pointless Responses 7 Reasons’ Explanatory Role 8 Conclusion 143 147 148 148 149 149 150 150 151 154 156 158 162 167 169 170
viii CONTENTS 7. Reasons for Belief, Action, and Emotions 1 Introduction 2 Reasons for Belief 2.1 Perceptual Reasons 2.2 Weak Reasons, Lottery Reasons 2.3 Reasons for Credences 3 Reasons for Action 3.1 The Problem of Reasons for Action and a Solution 3.2 Two Objections 3.3 The Response Condition 4 Reasons for Emotions 4.1 Emotions and Reasoning 4.2 A Challenge to Reasons for Emotions 5 Conclusion 171 171 171 171 175 176 178 178 182 184 185 185 188 190 Conclusion 191 Bibliography Index 195 209 |
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| spelling | McHugh, Conor Verfasser (DE-588)115379215X aut Getting things right fittingness, reasons, and value Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way First edition Oxford, New York Oxford University Press 2022 x, 207 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Wertethik (DE-588)4602196-6 gnd rswk-swf Passung (DE-588)4129334-4 gnd rswk-swf Passung (DE-588)4129334-4 s Wertethik (DE-588)4602196-6 s DE-604 Way, Jonathan Sonstige (DE-588)1153792435 oth Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033876297&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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| title | Getting things right fittingness, reasons, and value |
| title_auth | Getting things right fittingness, reasons, and value |
| title_exact_search | Getting things right fittingness, reasons, and value |
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| title_full | Getting things right fittingness, reasons, and value Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way |
| title_fullStr | Getting things right fittingness, reasons, and value Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way |
| title_full_unstemmed | Getting things right fittingness, reasons, and value Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way |
| title_short | Getting things right |
| title_sort | getting things right fittingness reasons and value |
| title_sub | fittingness, reasons, and value |
| topic | Wertethik (DE-588)4602196-6 gnd Passung (DE-588)4129334-4 gnd |
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