Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions
This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Princeton, NJ
Princeton University Press
[2022]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 DE-859 DE-860 DE-739 DE-473 Volltext |
| Summary: | This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility |
| Item Description: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2022) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (324 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780691227825 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9780691227825 |
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| spelling | Martin, Lisa L. Verfasser aut Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press [2022] © 1992 1 online resource (324 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2022) This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility In English POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / Economic Policy bisacsh Economic sanctions Case studies Economic sanctions International cooperation International economic relations World politics https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691227825?locatt=mode:legacy Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Martin, Lisa L. Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / Economic Policy bisacsh Economic sanctions Case studies Economic sanctions International cooperation International economic relations World politics |
| title | Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions |
| title_auth | Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions |
| title_exact_search | Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions |
| title_full | Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin |
| title_fullStr | Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coercive Cooperation Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin |
| title_short | Coercive Cooperation |
| title_sort | coercive cooperation explaining multilateral economic sanctions |
| title_sub | Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions |
| topic | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / Economic Policy bisacsh Economic sanctions Case studies Economic sanctions International cooperation International economic relations World politics |
| topic_facet | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / Economic Policy Economic sanctions Case studies Economic sanctions International cooperation International economic relations World politics |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691227825?locatt=mode:legacy |
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