Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations:
The financial crisis that began in 2007 has brought to the fore the issues of excesses in lending, leverage, and risk-taking as some of the fundamental causes of this crisis. At the same time, in dealing with the financial crisis there have been large scale interventions by governments, often referr...
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2009
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Schriftenreihe: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 09/233 |
Online-Zugang: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The financial crisis that began in 2007 has brought to the fore the issues of excesses in lending, leverage, and risk-taking as some of the fundamental causes of this crisis. At the same time, in dealing with the financial crisis there have been large scale interventions by governments, often referred to as bailouts of the lenders. This paper presents a framework where rational economic agents engage in ex ante excessive lending, borrowing, and risk-taking if creditors assign a positive probability to being bailed out. The paper also offers some thoughts on policy implications. It argues that it would be most productive for the long run if lending institutions were not bailed out. If the continuing existence of an institution was deemed essential, assistance should take the form of capital injections that dilute the equity of existing owners |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (25 p) |
ISBN: | 1451873808 9781451873801 |
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spelling | Georgiou, Andréas Verfasser aut Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations Georgiou, Andréas Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2009 1 Online-Ressource (25 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 09/233 The financial crisis that began in 2007 has brought to the fore the issues of excesses in lending, leverage, and risk-taking as some of the fundamental causes of this crisis. At the same time, in dealing with the financial crisis there have been large scale interventions by governments, often referred to as bailouts of the lenders. This paper presents a framework where rational economic agents engage in ex ante excessive lending, borrowing, and risk-taking if creditors assign a positive probability to being bailed out. The paper also offers some thoughts on policy implications. It argues that it would be most productive for the long run if lending institutions were not bailed out. If the continuing existence of an institution was deemed essential, assistance should take the form of capital injections that dilute the equity of existing owners Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10526-9781451873801/10526-9781451873801/10526-9781451873801.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Georgiou, Andréas Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations |
title | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations |
title_auth | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations |
title_exact_search | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations |
title_exact_search_txtP | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations |
title_full | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations Georgiou, Andréas |
title_fullStr | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations Georgiou, Andréas |
title_full_unstemmed | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations Georgiou, Andréas |
title_short | Excessive Lending, Leverage, and Risk-Taking in the Presence of Bailout Expectations |
title_sort | excessive lending leverage and risk taking in the presence of bailout expectations |
url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/10526-9781451873801/10526-9781451873801/10526-9781451873801.xml |
work_keys_str_mv | AT georgiouandreas excessivelendingleverageandrisktakinginthepresenceofbailoutexpectations |