Can Short-Term Capital Controls Promote Capital Inflows?:

In an economy à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reduci...

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1. Verfasser: Cordella, Tito (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 1998
Schriftenreihe:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 98/131
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Zusammenfassung:In an economy à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if, and only if, the emerging market government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. This implies that capital controls that are effective in reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises may increase the volume of capital inflows
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
ISBN:1451855257
9781451855258