The Enforcement of Property Rights and Underdevelopment:

This paper formalizes the role of legal infrastructure in economic development in a general equilibrium model with endogenously determined property rights enforcement. It illustrates the mutual importance of property rights protection and market production by the model's multiplicity of equilib...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dabla-Norris, Era (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 1999
Series:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 99/127
Online Access:UBW01
UEI01
LCO01
SBR01
UER01
SBG01
UBG01
FAN01
UBT01
FKE01
UBY01
UBA01
FLA01
UBM01
UPA01
UBR01
FHA01
FNU01
BSB01
TUM01
Volltext
Summary:This paper formalizes the role of legal infrastructure in economic development in a general equilibrium model with endogenously determined property rights enforcement. It illustrates the mutual importance of property rights protection and market production by the model's multiplicity of equilibria. In one equilibrium, property rights are enforced and market activity is unhampered. In the other, property rights are not enforced, which discourages economic activity and leaves the economy without the resources and incentives to enforce property rights. Even identically endowed economies may therefore find themselves in very different equilibria
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
ISBN:145185496X
9781451854961

There is no print copy available.

Interlibrary loan Place Request Caution: Not in THWS collection! Get full text