Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard:
This paper develops a simple model of international lending, and calibrates it to assess quantitatively the effects of contingent IMF financial support on the risk premiums and the crisis probability. In the model, the country borrows in both short and long term; market (coordination) failure trigge...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2007
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 07/104 |
| Online Access: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Summary: | This paper develops a simple model of international lending, and calibrates it to assess quantitatively the effects of contingent IMF financial support on the risk premiums and the crisis probability. In the model, the country borrows in both short and long term; market (coordination) failure triggers a liquidity run and inefficient default; and the IMF lends unconditionally under a preferred creditor status. The model shows that IMF financial support can help prevent a liquidity crisis without causing investor moral hazard by helping to remove a distortion-effectively subsidizing ex post short-term investors (who run for the exit) at the expense of long-term investors (who are locked in). The resulting equilibrium is welfare enhancing as both the country''s borrowing costs and the likelihood of a crisis are lower. The calibration exercises suggest that IMF-induced investor moral hazard-which occurs if the IMF lends at a subsidized rate-is unlikely to be a concern in practice, particularly if the country''s economic fundamentals are strong and short-term debt is small |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (36 p) |
| ISBN: | 1451866682 9781451866681 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T20:13:23Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:35:32Z |
| institution | BVB |
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| spelling | Kim, Jun Il Verfasser aut Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard Kim, Jun Il Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2007 1 Online-Ressource (36 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 07/104 This paper develops a simple model of international lending, and calibrates it to assess quantitatively the effects of contingent IMF financial support on the risk premiums and the crisis probability. In the model, the country borrows in both short and long term; market (coordination) failure triggers a liquidity run and inefficient default; and the IMF lends unconditionally under a preferred creditor status. The model shows that IMF financial support can help prevent a liquidity crisis without causing investor moral hazard by helping to remove a distortion-effectively subsidizing ex post short-term investors (who run for the exit) at the expense of long-term investors (who are locked in). The resulting equilibrium is welfare enhancing as both the country''s borrowing costs and the likelihood of a crisis are lower. The calibration exercises suggest that IMF-induced investor moral hazard-which occurs if the IMF lends at a subsidized rate-is unlikely to be a concern in practice, particularly if the country''s economic fundamentals are strong and short-term debt is small Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07643-9781451866681/07643-9781451866681/07643-9781451866681.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kim, Jun Il Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard |
| title | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard |
| title_auth | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard |
| title_exact_search | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard |
| title_full | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard Kim, Jun Il |
| title_fullStr | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard Kim, Jun Il |
| title_full_unstemmed | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard Kim, Jun Il |
| title_short | Unconditional IMF Financial Support and Investor Moral Hazard |
| title_sort | unconditional imf financial support and investor moral hazard |
| url | http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/07643-9781451866681/07643-9781451866681/07643-9781451866681.xml |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kimjunil unconditionalimffinancialsupportandinvestormoralhazard |