Internal Models, Subordinated Debt, and Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risk:

Shortcomings make credit VaR estimates an unsuitable basis for setting bank regulatory capital requirements. If, alternatively, banks are required to issue subordinated debt that has a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default, banks must set their equity capital in a manner...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kupiec, Paul H. (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2002
Series:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 02/157
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Summary:Shortcomings make credit VaR estimates an unsuitable basis for setting bank regulatory capital requirements. If, alternatively, banks are required to issue subordinated debt that has a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default, banks must set their equity capital in a manner that limits both the probability of bank default and the expected loss on insured deposits, largely removing any safety net-related funding cost subsidy and the moral hazard incentives it creates. Required equity capital can be estimated using a modified credit-VaR framework, and supervisors can use external credit ratings to indirectly verify the accuracy of bank internal model estimates
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
ISBN:1451857500
9781451857504

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