Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality:
In principle, international financial institutions (IFIs) can use their leverage as creditors to prompt governments to undertake policy reform. Yet such lending has been frequently linked to unsustainable debt levels and little reform. This paper illustrates how the dual roles of IFIs as purveyors o...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Washington, D.C
International Monetary Fund
2003
|
| Series: | IMF Working Papers
Working Paper No. 03/192 |
| Online Access: | UBW01 UEI01 LCO01 SBR01 UER01 SBG01 UBG01 FAN01 UBT01 FKE01 UBY01 UBA01 FLA01 UBM01 UPA01 UBR01 FHA01 FNU01 BSB01 TUM01 Volltext |
| Summary: | In principle, international financial institutions (IFIs) can use their leverage as creditors to prompt governments to undertake policy reform. Yet such lending has been frequently linked to unsustainable debt levels and little reform. This paper illustrates how the dual roles of IFIs as purveyors of credit and monitors of reform may help explain these negative outcomes. When debt levels rise, the IFIs reforms goals may become subordinated to its creditor''s interest, compromising the enforcement of conditionality. Attracted by this prospect, malevolent governments strategically reform, enhancing their reputation in order to maintain lending and build their debt stock. Once debt levels are sufficiently large, such governments can stop policy reforms, assured that lending will continue |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (24 p) |
| ISBN: | 1451859783 9781451859782 |
Staff View
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| spelling | Ramcharan, Rodney Verfasser aut Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality Ramcharan, Rodney Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2003 1 Online-Ressource (24 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 03/192 In principle, international financial institutions (IFIs) can use their leverage as creditors to prompt governments to undertake policy reform. Yet such lending has been frequently linked to unsustainable debt levels and little reform. This paper illustrates how the dual roles of IFIs as purveyors of credit and monitors of reform may help explain these negative outcomes. When debt levels rise, the IFIs reforms goals may become subordinated to its creditor''s interest, compromising the enforcement of conditionality. Attracted by this prospect, malevolent governments strategically reform, enhancing their reputation in order to maintain lending and build their debt stock. Once debt levels are sufficiently large, such governments can stop policy reforms, assured that lending will continue Online-Ausg http://elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF001/05956-9781451859782/05956-9781451859782/05956-9781451859782.xml Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Ramcharan, Rodney Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality |
| title | Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality |
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| title_short | Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality |
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