A Political-Economic Model of the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime:

Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of reelect...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sun, Yan (Author)
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C International Monetary Fund 2002
Series:IMF Working Papers Working Paper No. 02/212
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Summary:Facing electoral uncertainty, a government chooses its exchange regime in a trade-off among three incentives: (i) tying the hands of its opponent should it lose the election; (ii) facilitating its own future policy implementation should it win the election; and (iii) increasing its chance of reelection
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
ISBN:1451874901
9781451874907

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