Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cham
Springer International Publishing AG
2020
|
| Series: | Lecture Notes in Energy Ser.
v.79 |
| Subjects: | |
| Item Description: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (590 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9783030479299 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Contents -- An Introduction to Transmission Network Investment in the New Market Regime -- Basic Economics and Engineering of Transmission Network Investment -- Definition and Theory of Transmission Network Planning -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Factors Affecting Transmission Expansion Planning -- 1.2 Transmission Investment Financing and Coordination -- 2 Literature Survey -- 2.1 Solution Methods -- 2.2 Power System Adequacy and Reliability -- 2.3 Uncertainties -- 3 Transmission Expansion Planning Formulation and Decomposition Techniques -- 3.1 Two-Stage Stochastic TEP Formulation -- 3.2 Robust Optimization TEP Formulation -- 3.3 Constraint Filtering and Optimization Problem Size Reduction -- 3.4 Decomposition Techniques -- 4 A Generalized Framework for Stochastic TEP Studies -- 4.1 Framework Overview -- 4.2 Scenario Bundling -- 4.3 Model Performance Discussion -- 5 Case Study and Numerical Results -- 5.1 13-Bus Test System -- 5.2 Reduced ERCOT System -- 5.3 Full ERCOT System-High Load Growth Area Project -- References -- Regulated Expansion of the Power Transmission Grid -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Story in Words -- 2.1 A New Set of Problems -- 2.2 Locational Marginal Prices -- 2.3 Regulated Transmission Expansion -- 2.4 Fixed Cost Recovery -- 2.5 Governance Issues -- 3 Short-Term Congestion Management -- 3.1 Setup -- 3.2 Interconnection Unconstrained -- 3.3 Locational Marginal Pricing -- 3.4 Countertrading -- 4 Transmission Grid Expansion Under Different Regimes -- 4.1 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 4.2 The Congestion Rent Does Not Induce Optimal Grid Expansion -- 4.3 Optimal Regulation of a Monopoly Transmission Company -- 5 Extension to a General Network -- 5.1 Setup -- 5.2 Characterization of the Optimal Dispatch -- 5.3 Merchandizing Surplus -- 5.4 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 5.5 Optimal Regulatory Contract | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 6 Concluding Observations -- References -- Transmission Planning and Operation in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Grid Reliability in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3 Optimal Configuration of Transmission Network in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3.1 Second-Best Solutions for Monopoly and Wholesale Market Regimes -- 3.2 Why Wholesale Market Regime Is Likely to Require More Transmission Capacity? -- 4 Consequences of Continuing to Rely on Methodologies from the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Regime -- 5 A Methodology for Evaluating Transmission Expansions in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.1 Modeling Challenges in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.2 A General Forward-Looking Methodology -- 5.3 Implementing a Forward-Looking Transmission Planning Process -- 5.4 Modeling Policy-Driven Future Entry Decisions -- 6 Increased Sophistication of Transmission Planning Process -- 6.1 The Downside of Open Access -- 6.2 The Form of Congestion Management Matters for Benefits Measurement -- 6.3 Expanded Geographic and Industry Scope -- 6.4 The Viability of Market-Based Transmission Expansions -- 7 The Insurance Value of Transmission Expansions -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Cost Allocation Issues in Transmission Network Investment -- 1 Why Does Transmission Network Cost Allocation Matter? -- 1.1 Relationship with Other Aspects of Transmission Regulation -- 1.2 Cost Allocation for Regulated Investments: Completing the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 1.3 Cost Allocation for Investments Promoted by Private Parties -- 2 Guidelines to Complete the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 2.1 Fundamentals of Transmission Network Charges Design: Main Principles. Discussing the Relationship Between Cost-Causality and Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2.2 Some Practical Implementation Issues in the Design of Transmission Charges -- 3 Benefit-Driven Network Cost Allocation: The "Beneficiary-Pays" Approach -- 3.1 Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation and the "Cost-Causality" Principle -- 3.2 Main Open Issues and Implementation Difficulties -- 4 Other Approaches to Transmission Network Cost Allocation -- 4.1 Network Cost Allocation Methods Based on Usage -- 4.2 Tariffs Without a Locational Component -- 5 Transmission Network Cost Allocation in Regional Power Systems -- 5.1 The Need for Coordination and Orthodoxy in Inter-system and Intra-system Transmission Pricing -- 5.2 Case Examples of Cost Allocation Approaches in Regional Markets -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Transmission Planning, Investment, and Cost Allocation in US ISO Markets -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 'Reliable and Economically Efficient' -- 2.1 Co-Optimization -- 2.2 Price-Responsive Demand -- 2.3 Market Power -- 2.4 Siting and Eminent Domain -- 3 Uncertainty -- 3.1 Natural Gas Price Uncertainty -- 3.2 Weather Uncertainty -- 3.3 Technology Innovation Uncertainty -- 3.4 Risk Management -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Models -- 4.1 Literature Review of Models -- 4.2 Hydro-Dominated Systems Models -- 4.3 Production Cost Models -- 4.4 Reliability Models -- 4.5 Model Size and Approximations -- 5 Transmission Competition Models -- 5.1 The Merchant Transmission Model -- 5.2 The Competitive Solicitation Model -- 5.3 The Sponsorship Model -- 5.4 Cost Caps -- 6 Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- 6.1 Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.2 Theory of Cost Allocation -- 6.3 Two-Node Example of Cost Allocation -- 6.4 Transmission Rights and Allocation -- 6.5 Numerical Examples of Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.6 Efficient Incentives -- 7 Transmission Expansion Process -- 7.1 Scenarios -- 7.2 Strawman Transmission Expansion and Interconnection Process for ISOs | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Study -- 8.1 Summary -- 8.2 Recommendations for Study of Modeling Process, Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- References -- Transmission Planning and Co-optimization with Market-Based Generation and Storage Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Interactions Among Transmission, Generation, and Storage -- 2.2 Using Co-optimization to Support Transmission Expansion Planning -- 2.3 Quantify the Economic Value of Considering Storage Expansion in Transmission Expansion Planning -- 3 Detailed Formulation -- 4 Example -- 4.1 Test Case Description: 54-Node System for WECC -- 4.2 Questions to Be Answered and the Experimental Design -- 4.3 The Impact of Storage on Transmission Expansion Plans -- 4.4 Value of Considering Storage in Co-optimized Transmission Expansion Planning -- 4.5 Sources of VoMES in Transmission Planning -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- A Parametric Programming Approach to Bilevel Merchant Electricity Transmission Investment Problems -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Literature Review -- 3 The Bilevel Transmission Expansion Problem -- 4 The Parametric Programming Method -- 4.1 Continuous Upper Level -- 4.2 Binary Upper Level -- 4.3 Non-linear Programming -- 5 Numerical Results -- 5.1 Data -- 5.2 Implementation -- 5.3 Optimal Investments -- 5.4 Comparison of Solution Methods -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Merchant Investment in Transmission Network -- Market Versus Planning Approaches to Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Dominant Engineering and Economic Framework for Transmission and Distribution -- 3 The Market's Nose Under the Planning Tent -- 3.1 Competitive Supply of Power Purchase Agreements for Generation -- 3.2 Generation Development and Transmission and Distribution Interconnections -- 3.3 Markets for Transmission Investment | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.4 Markets for Distribution Investment -- 4 What Policymakers Are Really Trying to Achieve: Regulatory Competition and Strategic Behavior in the Context of Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 5 Conclusions and Questions for Further Research -- References -- Competition for Electric Transmission Projects in the USA: FERC Order 1000 -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 Transmission Planning, Project Selection, and Economic Regulation in the USA -- 3 FERC Order 1000 -- 4 Why Competitive Procurement? -- 5 Competitive Procurement for Transmission Projects Before Order 1000 -- 5.1 Other Countries -- 5.2 The USA -- 6 Early Experience with Order 1000 Competitive Procurement Programs: Overview -- 7 Experience in Each ISO -- 7.1 CAISO -- 7.2 MISO -- 7.3 SPP -- 7.4 NYISO -- 7.5 PJM -- 7.6 ISO-NE -- 8 Discussion -- 9 Conclusions -- Data Appendix -- References -- Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalized Financial Transmission Rights -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Introduction to Hedging and Generalized FTRs -- 2.1 Supply and Demand Curves -- 2.2 The Design of Typical Hedge Contracts -- 2.3 The Design of Inter-nodal Hedging Instruments -- 3 Hedging Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.1 The Theoretical Minimum Level of Risk -- 3.2 Are Fixed-Volume FTRs an Effective Inter-nodal Hedging Instrument? -- 3.3 Hedging Inter-nodal Pricing Risk Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.4 Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalised FTRs -- 4 Simple Network Examples -- 4.1 Two-Node Network Example -- 4.2 Three-Node Network Example -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 Appendix -- References -- A Simple Merchant-Regulatory Incentive Mechanism Applied to Electricity Transmission Pricing and Investment: The Case of H-R-G-V -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Incentive Regulation for Transcos -- 1.2 Merchant Investment and the H-R-G-V Incentive Mechanism -- 2 How Does H-R-G-V Work? | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3 Literature Review: H-R-G-V in Contrast to Other Approaches | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Electric power transmission-Equipment and supplies | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Electric utilities-Management | |
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| contents | Intro -- Contents -- An Introduction to Transmission Network Investment in the New Market Regime -- Basic Economics and Engineering of Transmission Network Investment -- Definition and Theory of Transmission Network Planning -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Factors Affecting Transmission Expansion Planning -- 1.2 Transmission Investment Financing and Coordination -- 2 Literature Survey -- 2.1 Solution Methods -- 2.2 Power System Adequacy and Reliability -- 2.3 Uncertainties -- 3 Transmission Expansion Planning Formulation and Decomposition Techniques -- 3.1 Two-Stage Stochastic TEP Formulation -- 3.2 Robust Optimization TEP Formulation -- 3.3 Constraint Filtering and Optimization Problem Size Reduction -- 3.4 Decomposition Techniques -- 4 A Generalized Framework for Stochastic TEP Studies -- 4.1 Framework Overview -- 4.2 Scenario Bundling -- 4.3 Model Performance Discussion -- 5 Case Study and Numerical Results -- 5.1 13-Bus Test System -- 5.2 Reduced ERCOT System -- 5.3 Full ERCOT System-High Load Growth Area Project -- References -- Regulated Expansion of the Power Transmission Grid -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Story in Words -- 2.1 A New Set of Problems -- 2.2 Locational Marginal Prices -- 2.3 Regulated Transmission Expansion -- 2.4 Fixed Cost Recovery -- 2.5 Governance Issues -- 3 Short-Term Congestion Management -- 3.1 Setup -- 3.2 Interconnection Unconstrained -- 3.3 Locational Marginal Pricing -- 3.4 Countertrading -- 4 Transmission Grid Expansion Under Different Regimes -- 4.1 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 4.2 The Congestion Rent Does Not Induce Optimal Grid Expansion -- 4.3 Optimal Regulation of a Monopoly Transmission Company -- 5 Extension to a General Network -- 5.1 Setup -- 5.2 Characterization of the Optimal Dispatch -- 5.3 Merchandizing Surplus -- 5.4 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 5.5 Optimal Regulatory Contract 6 Concluding Observations -- References -- Transmission Planning and Operation in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Grid Reliability in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3 Optimal Configuration of Transmission Network in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3.1 Second-Best Solutions for Monopoly and Wholesale Market Regimes -- 3.2 Why Wholesale Market Regime Is Likely to Require More Transmission Capacity? -- 4 Consequences of Continuing to Rely on Methodologies from the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Regime -- 5 A Methodology for Evaluating Transmission Expansions in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.1 Modeling Challenges in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.2 A General Forward-Looking Methodology -- 5.3 Implementing a Forward-Looking Transmission Planning Process -- 5.4 Modeling Policy-Driven Future Entry Decisions -- 6 Increased Sophistication of Transmission Planning Process -- 6.1 The Downside of Open Access -- 6.2 The Form of Congestion Management Matters for Benefits Measurement -- 6.3 Expanded Geographic and Industry Scope -- 6.4 The Viability of Market-Based Transmission Expansions -- 7 The Insurance Value of Transmission Expansions -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Cost Allocation Issues in Transmission Network Investment -- 1 Why Does Transmission Network Cost Allocation Matter? -- 1.1 Relationship with Other Aspects of Transmission Regulation -- 1.2 Cost Allocation for Regulated Investments: Completing the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 1.3 Cost Allocation for Investments Promoted by Private Parties -- 2 Guidelines to Complete the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 2.1 Fundamentals of Transmission Network Charges Design: Main Principles. Discussing the Relationship Between Cost-Causality and Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation 2.2 Some Practical Implementation Issues in the Design of Transmission Charges -- 3 Benefit-Driven Network Cost Allocation: The "Beneficiary-Pays" Approach -- 3.1 Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation and the "Cost-Causality" Principle -- 3.2 Main Open Issues and Implementation Difficulties -- 4 Other Approaches to Transmission Network Cost Allocation -- 4.1 Network Cost Allocation Methods Based on Usage -- 4.2 Tariffs Without a Locational Component -- 5 Transmission Network Cost Allocation in Regional Power Systems -- 5.1 The Need for Coordination and Orthodoxy in Inter-system and Intra-system Transmission Pricing -- 5.2 Case Examples of Cost Allocation Approaches in Regional Markets -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Transmission Planning, Investment, and Cost Allocation in US ISO Markets -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 'Reliable and Economically Efficient' -- 2.1 Co-Optimization -- 2.2 Price-Responsive Demand -- 2.3 Market Power -- 2.4 Siting and Eminent Domain -- 3 Uncertainty -- 3.1 Natural Gas Price Uncertainty -- 3.2 Weather Uncertainty -- 3.3 Technology Innovation Uncertainty -- 3.4 Risk Management -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Models -- 4.1 Literature Review of Models -- 4.2 Hydro-Dominated Systems Models -- 4.3 Production Cost Models -- 4.4 Reliability Models -- 4.5 Model Size and Approximations -- 5 Transmission Competition Models -- 5.1 The Merchant Transmission Model -- 5.2 The Competitive Solicitation Model -- 5.3 The Sponsorship Model -- 5.4 Cost Caps -- 6 Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- 6.1 Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.2 Theory of Cost Allocation -- 6.3 Two-Node Example of Cost Allocation -- 6.4 Transmission Rights and Allocation -- 6.5 Numerical Examples of Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.6 Efficient Incentives -- 7 Transmission Expansion Process -- 7.1 Scenarios -- 7.2 Strawman Transmission Expansion and Interconnection Process for ISOs 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Study -- 8.1 Summary -- 8.2 Recommendations for Study of Modeling Process, Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- References -- Transmission Planning and Co-optimization with Market-Based Generation and Storage Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Interactions Among Transmission, Generation, and Storage -- 2.2 Using Co-optimization to Support Transmission Expansion Planning -- 2.3 Quantify the Economic Value of Considering Storage Expansion in Transmission Expansion Planning -- 3 Detailed Formulation -- 4 Example -- 4.1 Test Case Description: 54-Node System for WECC -- 4.2 Questions to Be Answered and the Experimental Design -- 4.3 The Impact of Storage on Transmission Expansion Plans -- 4.4 Value of Considering Storage in Co-optimized Transmission Expansion Planning -- 4.5 Sources of VoMES in Transmission Planning -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- A Parametric Programming Approach to Bilevel Merchant Electricity Transmission Investment Problems -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Literature Review -- 3 The Bilevel Transmission Expansion Problem -- 4 The Parametric Programming Method -- 4.1 Continuous Upper Level -- 4.2 Binary Upper Level -- 4.3 Non-linear Programming -- 5 Numerical Results -- 5.1 Data -- 5.2 Implementation -- 5.3 Optimal Investments -- 5.4 Comparison of Solution Methods -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Merchant Investment in Transmission Network -- Market Versus Planning Approaches to Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Dominant Engineering and Economic Framework for Transmission and Distribution -- 3 The Market's Nose Under the Planning Tent -- 3.1 Competitive Supply of Power Purchase Agreements for Generation -- 3.2 Generation Development and Transmission and Distribution Interconnections -- 3.3 Markets for Transmission Investment 3.4 Markets for Distribution Investment -- 4 What Policymakers Are Really Trying to Achieve: Regulatory Competition and Strategic Behavior in the Context of Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 5 Conclusions and Questions for Further Research -- References -- Competition for Electric Transmission Projects in the USA: FERC Order 1000 -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 Transmission Planning, Project Selection, and Economic Regulation in the USA -- 3 FERC Order 1000 -- 4 Why Competitive Procurement? -- 5 Competitive Procurement for Transmission Projects Before Order 1000 -- 5.1 Other Countries -- 5.2 The USA -- 6 Early Experience with Order 1000 Competitive Procurement Programs: Overview -- 7 Experience in Each ISO -- 7.1 CAISO -- 7.2 MISO -- 7.3 SPP -- 7.4 NYISO -- 7.5 PJM -- 7.6 ISO-NE -- 8 Discussion -- 9 Conclusions -- Data Appendix -- References -- Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalized Financial Transmission Rights -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Introduction to Hedging and Generalized FTRs -- 2.1 Supply and Demand Curves -- 2.2 The Design of Typical Hedge Contracts -- 2.3 The Design of Inter-nodal Hedging Instruments -- 3 Hedging Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.1 The Theoretical Minimum Level of Risk -- 3.2 Are Fixed-Volume FTRs an Effective Inter-nodal Hedging Instrument? -- 3.3 Hedging Inter-nodal Pricing Risk Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.4 Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalised FTRs -- 4 Simple Network Examples -- 4.1 Two-Node Network Example -- 4.2 Three-Node Network Example -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 Appendix -- References -- A Simple Merchant-Regulatory Incentive Mechanism Applied to Electricity Transmission Pricing and Investment: The Case of H-R-G-V -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Incentive Regulation for Transcos -- 1.2 Merchant Investment and the H-R-G-V Incentive Mechanism -- 2 How Does H-R-G-V Work? 3 Literature Review: H-R-G-V in Contrast to Other Approaches |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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Wholesale Market Regime -- 3 Optimal Configuration of Transmission Network in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3.1 Second-Best Solutions for Monopoly and Wholesale Market Regimes -- 3.2 Why Wholesale Market Regime Is Likely to Require More Transmission Capacity? -- 4 Consequences of Continuing to Rely on Methodologies from the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Regime -- 5 A Methodology for Evaluating Transmission Expansions in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.1 Modeling Challenges in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.2 A General Forward-Looking Methodology -- 5.3 Implementing a Forward-Looking Transmission Planning Process -- 5.4 Modeling Policy-Driven Future Entry Decisions -- 6 Increased Sophistication of Transmission Planning Process -- 6.1 The Downside of Open Access -- 6.2 The Form of Congestion Management Matters for Benefits Measurement -- 6.3 Expanded Geographic and Industry Scope -- 6.4 The Viability of Market-Based Transmission Expansions -- 7 The Insurance Value of Transmission Expansions -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Cost Allocation Issues in Transmission Network Investment -- 1 Why Does Transmission Network Cost Allocation Matter? -- 1.1 Relationship with Other Aspects of Transmission Regulation -- 1.2 Cost Allocation for Regulated Investments: Completing the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 1.3 Cost Allocation for Investments Promoted by Private Parties -- 2 Guidelines to Complete the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 2.1 Fundamentals of Transmission Network Charges Design: Main Principles. Discussing the Relationship Between Cost-Causality and Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2.2 Some Practical Implementation Issues in the Design of Transmission Charges -- 3 Benefit-Driven Network Cost Allocation: The "Beneficiary-Pays" Approach -- 3.1 Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation and the "Cost-Causality" Principle -- 3.2 Main Open Issues and Implementation Difficulties -- 4 Other Approaches to Transmission Network Cost Allocation -- 4.1 Network Cost Allocation Methods Based on Usage -- 4.2 Tariffs Without a Locational Component -- 5 Transmission Network Cost Allocation in Regional Power Systems -- 5.1 The Need for Coordination and Orthodoxy in Inter-system and Intra-system Transmission Pricing -- 5.2 Case Examples of Cost Allocation Approaches in Regional Markets -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Transmission Planning, Investment, and Cost Allocation in US ISO Markets -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 'Reliable and Economically Efficient' -- 2.1 Co-Optimization -- 2.2 Price-Responsive Demand -- 2.3 Market Power -- 2.4 Siting and Eminent Domain -- 3 Uncertainty -- 3.1 Natural Gas Price Uncertainty -- 3.2 Weather Uncertainty -- 3.3 Technology Innovation Uncertainty -- 3.4 Risk Management -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Models -- 4.1 Literature Review of Models -- 4.2 Hydro-Dominated Systems Models -- 4.3 Production Cost Models -- 4.4 Reliability Models -- 4.5 Model Size and Approximations -- 5 Transmission Competition Models -- 5.1 The Merchant Transmission Model -- 5.2 The Competitive Solicitation Model -- 5.3 The Sponsorship Model -- 5.4 Cost Caps -- 6 Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- 6.1 Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.2 Theory of Cost Allocation -- 6.3 Two-Node Example of Cost Allocation -- 6.4 Transmission Rights and Allocation -- 6.5 Numerical Examples of Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.6 Efficient Incentives -- 7 Transmission Expansion Process -- 7.1 Scenarios -- 7.2 Strawman Transmission Expansion and Interconnection Process for ISOs</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">8 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Study -- 8.1 Summary -- 8.2 Recommendations for Study of Modeling Process, Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- References -- Transmission Planning and Co-optimization with Market-Based Generation and Storage Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Interactions Among Transmission, Generation, and Storage -- 2.2 Using Co-optimization to Support Transmission Expansion Planning -- 2.3 Quantify the Economic Value of Considering Storage Expansion in Transmission Expansion Planning -- 3 Detailed Formulation -- 4 Example -- 4.1 Test Case Description: 54-Node System for WECC -- 4.2 Questions to Be Answered and the Experimental Design -- 4.3 The Impact of Storage on Transmission Expansion Plans -- 4.4 Value of Considering Storage in Co-optimized Transmission Expansion Planning -- 4.5 Sources of VoMES in Transmission Planning -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- A Parametric Programming Approach to Bilevel Merchant Electricity Transmission Investment Problems -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Literature Review -- 3 The Bilevel Transmission Expansion Problem -- 4 The Parametric Programming Method -- 4.1 Continuous Upper Level -- 4.2 Binary Upper Level -- 4.3 Non-linear Programming -- 5 Numerical Results -- 5.1 Data -- 5.2 Implementation -- 5.3 Optimal Investments -- 5.4 Comparison of Solution Methods -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Merchant Investment in Transmission Network -- Market Versus Planning Approaches to Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Dominant Engineering and Economic Framework for Transmission and Distribution -- 3 The Market's Nose Under the Planning Tent -- 3.1 Competitive Supply of Power Purchase Agreements for Generation -- 3.2 Generation Development and Transmission and Distribution Interconnections -- 3.3 Markets for Transmission Investment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3.4 Markets for Distribution Investment -- 4 What Policymakers Are Really Trying to Achieve: Regulatory Competition and Strategic Behavior in the Context of Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 5 Conclusions and Questions for Further Research -- References -- Competition for Electric Transmission Projects in the USA: FERC Order 1000 -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 Transmission Planning, Project Selection, and Economic Regulation in the USA -- 3 FERC Order 1000 -- 4 Why Competitive Procurement? -- 5 Competitive Procurement for Transmission Projects Before Order 1000 -- 5.1 Other Countries -- 5.2 The USA -- 6 Early Experience with Order 1000 Competitive Procurement Programs: Overview -- 7 Experience in Each ISO -- 7.1 CAISO -- 7.2 MISO -- 7.3 SPP -- 7.4 NYISO -- 7.5 PJM -- 7.6 ISO-NE -- 8 Discussion -- 9 Conclusions -- Data Appendix -- References -- Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalized Financial Transmission Rights -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Introduction to Hedging and Generalized FTRs -- 2.1 Supply and Demand Curves -- 2.2 The Design of Typical Hedge Contracts -- 2.3 The Design of Inter-nodal Hedging Instruments -- 3 Hedging Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.1 The Theoretical Minimum Level of Risk -- 3.2 Are Fixed-Volume FTRs an Effective Inter-nodal Hedging Instrument? -- 3.3 Hedging Inter-nodal Pricing Risk Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.4 Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalised FTRs -- 4 Simple Network Examples -- 4.1 Two-Node Network Example -- 4.2 Three-Node Network Example -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 Appendix -- References -- A Simple Merchant-Regulatory Incentive Mechanism Applied to Electricity Transmission Pricing and Investment: The Case of H-R-G-V -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Incentive Regulation for Transcos -- 1.2 Merchant Investment and the H-R-G-V Incentive Mechanism -- 2 How Does H-R-G-V Work?</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3 Literature Review: H-R-G-V in Contrast to Other Approaches</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Electric power transmission-Equipment and supplies</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Electric utilities-Management</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rosellón, Juan</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Vogelsang, Ingo</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="a">Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza</subfield><subfield code="t">Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets</subfield><subfield code="d">Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020</subfield><subfield code="z">9783030479282</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-30-PQE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033604871</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV048224138 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:50:39Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:32:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783030479299 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033604871 |
| oclc_num | 1195495336 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (590 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-30-PQE |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSearch | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Springer International Publishing AG |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Lecture Notes in Energy Ser. |
| spelling | Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza Verfasser aut Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets Cham Springer International Publishing AG 2020 ©2020 1 Online-Ressource (590 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Energy Ser. v.79 Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Contents -- An Introduction to Transmission Network Investment in the New Market Regime -- Basic Economics and Engineering of Transmission Network Investment -- Definition and Theory of Transmission Network Planning -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Factors Affecting Transmission Expansion Planning -- 1.2 Transmission Investment Financing and Coordination -- 2 Literature Survey -- 2.1 Solution Methods -- 2.2 Power System Adequacy and Reliability -- 2.3 Uncertainties -- 3 Transmission Expansion Planning Formulation and Decomposition Techniques -- 3.1 Two-Stage Stochastic TEP Formulation -- 3.2 Robust Optimization TEP Formulation -- 3.3 Constraint Filtering and Optimization Problem Size Reduction -- 3.4 Decomposition Techniques -- 4 A Generalized Framework for Stochastic TEP Studies -- 4.1 Framework Overview -- 4.2 Scenario Bundling -- 4.3 Model Performance Discussion -- 5 Case Study and Numerical Results -- 5.1 13-Bus Test System -- 5.2 Reduced ERCOT System -- 5.3 Full ERCOT System-High Load Growth Area Project -- References -- Regulated Expansion of the Power Transmission Grid -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Story in Words -- 2.1 A New Set of Problems -- 2.2 Locational Marginal Prices -- 2.3 Regulated Transmission Expansion -- 2.4 Fixed Cost Recovery -- 2.5 Governance Issues -- 3 Short-Term Congestion Management -- 3.1 Setup -- 3.2 Interconnection Unconstrained -- 3.3 Locational Marginal Pricing -- 3.4 Countertrading -- 4 Transmission Grid Expansion Under Different Regimes -- 4.1 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 4.2 The Congestion Rent Does Not Induce Optimal Grid Expansion -- 4.3 Optimal Regulation of a Monopoly Transmission Company -- 5 Extension to a General Network -- 5.1 Setup -- 5.2 Characterization of the Optimal Dispatch -- 5.3 Merchandizing Surplus -- 5.4 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 5.5 Optimal Regulatory Contract 6 Concluding Observations -- References -- Transmission Planning and Operation in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Grid Reliability in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3 Optimal Configuration of Transmission Network in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3.1 Second-Best Solutions for Monopoly and Wholesale Market Regimes -- 3.2 Why Wholesale Market Regime Is Likely to Require More Transmission Capacity? -- 4 Consequences of Continuing to Rely on Methodologies from the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Regime -- 5 A Methodology for Evaluating Transmission Expansions in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.1 Modeling Challenges in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.2 A General Forward-Looking Methodology -- 5.3 Implementing a Forward-Looking Transmission Planning Process -- 5.4 Modeling Policy-Driven Future Entry Decisions -- 6 Increased Sophistication of Transmission Planning Process -- 6.1 The Downside of Open Access -- 6.2 The Form of Congestion Management Matters for Benefits Measurement -- 6.3 Expanded Geographic and Industry Scope -- 6.4 The Viability of Market-Based Transmission Expansions -- 7 The Insurance Value of Transmission Expansions -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Cost Allocation Issues in Transmission Network Investment -- 1 Why Does Transmission Network Cost Allocation Matter? -- 1.1 Relationship with Other Aspects of Transmission Regulation -- 1.2 Cost Allocation for Regulated Investments: Completing the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 1.3 Cost Allocation for Investments Promoted by Private Parties -- 2 Guidelines to Complete the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 2.1 Fundamentals of Transmission Network Charges Design: Main Principles. Discussing the Relationship Between Cost-Causality and Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation 2.2 Some Practical Implementation Issues in the Design of Transmission Charges -- 3 Benefit-Driven Network Cost Allocation: The "Beneficiary-Pays" Approach -- 3.1 Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation and the "Cost-Causality" Principle -- 3.2 Main Open Issues and Implementation Difficulties -- 4 Other Approaches to Transmission Network Cost Allocation -- 4.1 Network Cost Allocation Methods Based on Usage -- 4.2 Tariffs Without a Locational Component -- 5 Transmission Network Cost Allocation in Regional Power Systems -- 5.1 The Need for Coordination and Orthodoxy in Inter-system and Intra-system Transmission Pricing -- 5.2 Case Examples of Cost Allocation Approaches in Regional Markets -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Transmission Planning, Investment, and Cost Allocation in US ISO Markets -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 'Reliable and Economically Efficient' -- 2.1 Co-Optimization -- 2.2 Price-Responsive Demand -- 2.3 Market Power -- 2.4 Siting and Eminent Domain -- 3 Uncertainty -- 3.1 Natural Gas Price Uncertainty -- 3.2 Weather Uncertainty -- 3.3 Technology Innovation Uncertainty -- 3.4 Risk Management -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Models -- 4.1 Literature Review of Models -- 4.2 Hydro-Dominated Systems Models -- 4.3 Production Cost Models -- 4.4 Reliability Models -- 4.5 Model Size and Approximations -- 5 Transmission Competition Models -- 5.1 The Merchant Transmission Model -- 5.2 The Competitive Solicitation Model -- 5.3 The Sponsorship Model -- 5.4 Cost Caps -- 6 Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- 6.1 Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.2 Theory of Cost Allocation -- 6.3 Two-Node Example of Cost Allocation -- 6.4 Transmission Rights and Allocation -- 6.5 Numerical Examples of Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.6 Efficient Incentives -- 7 Transmission Expansion Process -- 7.1 Scenarios -- 7.2 Strawman Transmission Expansion and Interconnection Process for ISOs 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Study -- 8.1 Summary -- 8.2 Recommendations for Study of Modeling Process, Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- References -- Transmission Planning and Co-optimization with Market-Based Generation and Storage Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Interactions Among Transmission, Generation, and Storage -- 2.2 Using Co-optimization to Support Transmission Expansion Planning -- 2.3 Quantify the Economic Value of Considering Storage Expansion in Transmission Expansion Planning -- 3 Detailed Formulation -- 4 Example -- 4.1 Test Case Description: 54-Node System for WECC -- 4.2 Questions to Be Answered and the Experimental Design -- 4.3 The Impact of Storage on Transmission Expansion Plans -- 4.4 Value of Considering Storage in Co-optimized Transmission Expansion Planning -- 4.5 Sources of VoMES in Transmission Planning -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- A Parametric Programming Approach to Bilevel Merchant Electricity Transmission Investment Problems -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Literature Review -- 3 The Bilevel Transmission Expansion Problem -- 4 The Parametric Programming Method -- 4.1 Continuous Upper Level -- 4.2 Binary Upper Level -- 4.3 Non-linear Programming -- 5 Numerical Results -- 5.1 Data -- 5.2 Implementation -- 5.3 Optimal Investments -- 5.4 Comparison of Solution Methods -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Merchant Investment in Transmission Network -- Market Versus Planning Approaches to Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Dominant Engineering and Economic Framework for Transmission and Distribution -- 3 The Market's Nose Under the Planning Tent -- 3.1 Competitive Supply of Power Purchase Agreements for Generation -- 3.2 Generation Development and Transmission and Distribution Interconnections -- 3.3 Markets for Transmission Investment 3.4 Markets for Distribution Investment -- 4 What Policymakers Are Really Trying to Achieve: Regulatory Competition and Strategic Behavior in the Context of Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 5 Conclusions and Questions for Further Research -- References -- Competition for Electric Transmission Projects in the USA: FERC Order 1000 -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 Transmission Planning, Project Selection, and Economic Regulation in the USA -- 3 FERC Order 1000 -- 4 Why Competitive Procurement? -- 5 Competitive Procurement for Transmission Projects Before Order 1000 -- 5.1 Other Countries -- 5.2 The USA -- 6 Early Experience with Order 1000 Competitive Procurement Programs: Overview -- 7 Experience in Each ISO -- 7.1 CAISO -- 7.2 MISO -- 7.3 SPP -- 7.4 NYISO -- 7.5 PJM -- 7.6 ISO-NE -- 8 Discussion -- 9 Conclusions -- Data Appendix -- References -- Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalized Financial Transmission Rights -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Introduction to Hedging and Generalized FTRs -- 2.1 Supply and Demand Curves -- 2.2 The Design of Typical Hedge Contracts -- 2.3 The Design of Inter-nodal Hedging Instruments -- 3 Hedging Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.1 The Theoretical Minimum Level of Risk -- 3.2 Are Fixed-Volume FTRs an Effective Inter-nodal Hedging Instrument? -- 3.3 Hedging Inter-nodal Pricing Risk Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.4 Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalised FTRs -- 4 Simple Network Examples -- 4.1 Two-Node Network Example -- 4.2 Three-Node Network Example -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 Appendix -- References -- A Simple Merchant-Regulatory Incentive Mechanism Applied to Electricity Transmission Pricing and Investment: The Case of H-R-G-V -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Incentive Regulation for Transcos -- 1.2 Merchant Investment and the H-R-G-V Incentive Mechanism -- 2 How Does H-R-G-V Work? 3 Literature Review: H-R-G-V in Contrast to Other Approaches Electric power transmission-Equipment and supplies Electric utilities-Management Rosellón, Juan Sonstige oth Vogelsang, Ingo Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2020 9783030479282 |
| spellingShingle | Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets Intro -- Contents -- An Introduction to Transmission Network Investment in the New Market Regime -- Basic Economics and Engineering of Transmission Network Investment -- Definition and Theory of Transmission Network Planning -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Factors Affecting Transmission Expansion Planning -- 1.2 Transmission Investment Financing and Coordination -- 2 Literature Survey -- 2.1 Solution Methods -- 2.2 Power System Adequacy and Reliability -- 2.3 Uncertainties -- 3 Transmission Expansion Planning Formulation and Decomposition Techniques -- 3.1 Two-Stage Stochastic TEP Formulation -- 3.2 Robust Optimization TEP Formulation -- 3.3 Constraint Filtering and Optimization Problem Size Reduction -- 3.4 Decomposition Techniques -- 4 A Generalized Framework for Stochastic TEP Studies -- 4.1 Framework Overview -- 4.2 Scenario Bundling -- 4.3 Model Performance Discussion -- 5 Case Study and Numerical Results -- 5.1 13-Bus Test System -- 5.2 Reduced ERCOT System -- 5.3 Full ERCOT System-High Load Growth Area Project -- References -- Regulated Expansion of the Power Transmission Grid -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Story in Words -- 2.1 A New Set of Problems -- 2.2 Locational Marginal Prices -- 2.3 Regulated Transmission Expansion -- 2.4 Fixed Cost Recovery -- 2.5 Governance Issues -- 3 Short-Term Congestion Management -- 3.1 Setup -- 3.2 Interconnection Unconstrained -- 3.3 Locational Marginal Pricing -- 3.4 Countertrading -- 4 Transmission Grid Expansion Under Different Regimes -- 4.1 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 4.2 The Congestion Rent Does Not Induce Optimal Grid Expansion -- 4.3 Optimal Regulation of a Monopoly Transmission Company -- 5 Extension to a General Network -- 5.1 Setup -- 5.2 Characterization of the Optimal Dispatch -- 5.3 Merchandizing Surplus -- 5.4 Optimal Transmission Capacity -- 5.5 Optimal Regulatory Contract 6 Concluding Observations -- References -- Transmission Planning and Operation in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Grid Reliability in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3 Optimal Configuration of Transmission Network in the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Versus Wholesale Market Regime -- 3.1 Second-Best Solutions for Monopoly and Wholesale Market Regimes -- 3.2 Why Wholesale Market Regime Is Likely to Require More Transmission Capacity? -- 4 Consequences of Continuing to Rely on Methodologies from the Vertically-Integrated Monopoly Regime -- 5 A Methodology for Evaluating Transmission Expansions in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.1 Modeling Challenges in the Wholesale Market Regime -- 5.2 A General Forward-Looking Methodology -- 5.3 Implementing a Forward-Looking Transmission Planning Process -- 5.4 Modeling Policy-Driven Future Entry Decisions -- 6 Increased Sophistication of Transmission Planning Process -- 6.1 The Downside of Open Access -- 6.2 The Form of Congestion Management Matters for Benefits Measurement -- 6.3 Expanded Geographic and Industry Scope -- 6.4 The Viability of Market-Based Transmission Expansions -- 7 The Insurance Value of Transmission Expansions -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Cost Allocation Issues in Transmission Network Investment -- 1 Why Does Transmission Network Cost Allocation Matter? -- 1.1 Relationship with Other Aspects of Transmission Regulation -- 1.2 Cost Allocation for Regulated Investments: Completing the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 1.3 Cost Allocation for Investments Promoted by Private Parties -- 2 Guidelines to Complete the Recovery of the Allowed Regulated Revenue -- 2.1 Fundamentals of Transmission Network Charges Design: Main Principles. Discussing the Relationship Between Cost-Causality and Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation 2.2 Some Practical Implementation Issues in the Design of Transmission Charges -- 3 Benefit-Driven Network Cost Allocation: The "Beneficiary-Pays" Approach -- 3.1 Benefit-Driven Cost Allocation and the "Cost-Causality" Principle -- 3.2 Main Open Issues and Implementation Difficulties -- 4 Other Approaches to Transmission Network Cost Allocation -- 4.1 Network Cost Allocation Methods Based on Usage -- 4.2 Tariffs Without a Locational Component -- 5 Transmission Network Cost Allocation in Regional Power Systems -- 5.1 The Need for Coordination and Orthodoxy in Inter-system and Intra-system Transmission Pricing -- 5.2 Case Examples of Cost Allocation Approaches in Regional Markets -- 6 Conclusions -- References -- Transmission Planning, Investment, and Cost Allocation in US ISO Markets -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 'Reliable and Economically Efficient' -- 2.1 Co-Optimization -- 2.2 Price-Responsive Demand -- 2.3 Market Power -- 2.4 Siting and Eminent Domain -- 3 Uncertainty -- 3.1 Natural Gas Price Uncertainty -- 3.2 Weather Uncertainty -- 3.3 Technology Innovation Uncertainty -- 3.4 Risk Management -- 3.5 Summary -- 4 Models -- 4.1 Literature Review of Models -- 4.2 Hydro-Dominated Systems Models -- 4.3 Production Cost Models -- 4.4 Reliability Models -- 4.5 Model Size and Approximations -- 5 Transmission Competition Models -- 5.1 The Merchant Transmission Model -- 5.2 The Competitive Solicitation Model -- 5.3 The Sponsorship Model -- 5.4 Cost Caps -- 6 Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- 6.1 Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.2 Theory of Cost Allocation -- 6.3 Two-Node Example of Cost Allocation -- 6.4 Transmission Rights and Allocation -- 6.5 Numerical Examples of Beneficiaries Pay -- 6.6 Efficient Incentives -- 7 Transmission Expansion Process -- 7.1 Scenarios -- 7.2 Strawman Transmission Expansion and Interconnection Process for ISOs 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations for Further Study -- 8.1 Summary -- 8.2 Recommendations for Study of Modeling Process, Cost and Transmission Rights Allocation -- References -- Transmission Planning and Co-optimization with Market-Based Generation and Storage Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Interactions Among Transmission, Generation, and Storage -- 2.2 Using Co-optimization to Support Transmission Expansion Planning -- 2.3 Quantify the Economic Value of Considering Storage Expansion in Transmission Expansion Planning -- 3 Detailed Formulation -- 4 Example -- 4.1 Test Case Description: 54-Node System for WECC -- 4.2 Questions to Be Answered and the Experimental Design -- 4.3 The Impact of Storage on Transmission Expansion Plans -- 4.4 Value of Considering Storage in Co-optimized Transmission Expansion Planning -- 4.5 Sources of VoMES in Transmission Planning -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- A Parametric Programming Approach to Bilevel Merchant Electricity Transmission Investment Problems -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Literature Review -- 3 The Bilevel Transmission Expansion Problem -- 4 The Parametric Programming Method -- 4.1 Continuous Upper Level -- 4.2 Binary Upper Level -- 4.3 Non-linear Programming -- 5 Numerical Results -- 5.1 Data -- 5.2 Implementation -- 5.3 Optimal Investments -- 5.4 Comparison of Solution Methods -- 6 Conclusion -- References -- Merchant Investment in Transmission Network -- Market Versus Planning Approaches to Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Dominant Engineering and Economic Framework for Transmission and Distribution -- 3 The Market's Nose Under the Planning Tent -- 3.1 Competitive Supply of Power Purchase Agreements for Generation -- 3.2 Generation Development and Transmission and Distribution Interconnections -- 3.3 Markets for Transmission Investment 3.4 Markets for Distribution Investment -- 4 What Policymakers Are Really Trying to Achieve: Regulatory Competition and Strategic Behavior in the Context of Transmission and Distribution Investment -- 5 Conclusions and Questions for Further Research -- References -- Competition for Electric Transmission Projects in the USA: FERC Order 1000 -- 1 Introduction and Background -- 2 Transmission Planning, Project Selection, and Economic Regulation in the USA -- 3 FERC Order 1000 -- 4 Why Competitive Procurement? -- 5 Competitive Procurement for Transmission Projects Before Order 1000 -- 5.1 Other Countries -- 5.2 The USA -- 6 Early Experience with Order 1000 Competitive Procurement Programs: Overview -- 7 Experience in Each ISO -- 7.1 CAISO -- 7.2 MISO -- 7.3 SPP -- 7.4 NYISO -- 7.5 PJM -- 7.6 ISO-NE -- 8 Discussion -- 9 Conclusions -- Data Appendix -- References -- Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalized Financial Transmission Rights -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Introduction to Hedging and Generalized FTRs -- 2.1 Supply and Demand Curves -- 2.2 The Design of Typical Hedge Contracts -- 2.3 The Design of Inter-nodal Hedging Instruments -- 3 Hedging Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.1 The Theoretical Minimum Level of Risk -- 3.2 Are Fixed-Volume FTRs an Effective Inter-nodal Hedging Instrument? -- 3.3 Hedging Inter-nodal Pricing Risk Using Generalized FTRs -- 3.4 Merchant Transmission Investment Using Generalised FTRs -- 4 Simple Network Examples -- 4.1 Two-Node Network Example -- 4.2 Three-Node Network Example -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- 7 Appendix -- References -- A Simple Merchant-Regulatory Incentive Mechanism Applied to Electricity Transmission Pricing and Investment: The Case of H-R-G-V -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Incentive Regulation for Transcos -- 1.2 Merchant Investment and the H-R-G-V Incentive Mechanism -- 2 How Does H-R-G-V Work? 3 Literature Review: H-R-G-V in Contrast to Other Approaches Electric power transmission-Equipment and supplies Electric utilities-Management |
| title | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_auth | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_exact_search | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_full | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_fullStr | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_full_unstemmed | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_short | Transmission Network Investment in Liberalized Power Markets |
| title_sort | transmission network investment in liberalized power markets |
| topic | Electric power transmission-Equipment and supplies Electric utilities-Management |
| topic_facet | Electric power transmission-Equipment and supplies Electric utilities-Management |
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