From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance: Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Tokyo
Springer Japan
2020
|
| Series: | Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science Ser.
v.20 |
| Subjects: | |
| Item Description: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (198 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9784431549987 |
Staff View
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| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Editor and Contributors -- About the Editor -- About the Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I: Political Economy -- Chapter 1: From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance -- 1.1 Individuals in a Society -- 1.2 Reproduction View in Economics -- 1.2.1 Main Features of Reproduction -- 1.2.1.1 Trend Embedded in the Present and the Possibility of Change Based on It -- 1.2.1.2 Depersonalization of Interdependent Relations, Their Emergence as Macroeconomic Factors -- 1.2.1.3 Reproduction of Actors and Their Social Relations -- 1.2.1.4 Rationality That Corresponds to the Reproduction -- 1.2.1.5 Historical Path Dependence and Evolutionary Development -- 1.3 Evolutionary View of Social Change -- 1.4 Formation and Evolution of Governance -- References -- Chapter 2: Approval Theory and Social Contract -- 2.1 The Debate on Property and Civil Society -- 2.2 Approval Theory of Social Order -- 2.2.1 The Stable State of Civil Order -- 2.2.2 Autonomous Approval and Synchronous Approval on the Normative Domain -- 2.2.3 Solidarity and Generality of the Interest in the Substantial Domain -- 2.3 Range and Depth of Social Contract Reconsidered -- 2.3.1 Modern Questions for the Revival of Social Contract Theory -- 2.3.2 Introduction of the Dialectic of Master and Servant -- 2.3.3 Hidden Domain of the Sentiment -- 2.4 Discourse Ethics and Naturalized Social Contract -- 2.4.1 Discourse Ethics and the Kantian Imperative -- 2.4.2 Naturalized Social Contracts -- 2.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Economic Exchange and Social Exchange -- 3.1 Social Exchange Reconsidered -- 3.2 Approval as the Precondition of Exchange -- 3.3 Micro and Macro in the Social Exchange -- 3.4 Market and Organization as the Complex of the Micro-Macro Linkage -- 3.5 Complex System of Exchange and Its Governance -- References | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter 4: Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy -- 4.1 Division of Labor Generates Money and Capital -- 4.1.1 Division of Labor as the Source of Evolution -- 4.1.2 Emergence of Money as an Unintended Consequence -- 4.2 Transactions Under Capitalism -- 4.3 Voice, Exit, and Loyalty in the Industrial Relations -- References -- Chapter 5: Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism -- 5.1 Merchants and Commercial Society -- 5.2 Money and Time in Commerce and Finance -- 5.2.1 Money Is Time? -- 5.2.2 Financial Market -- 5.3 Evolution and Governance of the Financial Structure: Japanese Experience -- 5.3.1 Japanese Financial System Under the Structural Change -- 5.3.2 Institutional Reforms -- 5.3.3 Structural Changes -- 5.3.4 The Governance of National Economy -- 5.3.5 The Shift in FSA's Governance -- References -- Chapter 6: System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.1 "Transition" Theory of Socialists Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall -- 6.2 From Institutional Economics to the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.3 Endogeneity and Exogeneity in the Transition -- References -- Part I: Appendices -- Road to Evolutionary and Institutional Economics in Japan: A Personal Memoire of the Decade of Founding the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 1: Foundation of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 2: Personal Recollections -- Appendix 3: General Judgment in the Early Twenty-First Century -- Part II: Further Explorations -- Chapter 7: Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.1.1 Approval Theory on Norms and Interests -- 7.1.2 Normative Domain -- 7.1.3 Practical Domain -- 7.1.4 Social State | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 7.2 Image Score as a Norm: "Individual Norm = General Norm" Model -- 7.2.1 Image Score Model -- 7.2.2 The Region of General Norm in the Image Score Model -- 7.3 Individual Norm Dynamics -- 7.3.1 Reputation and Norm -- 7.3.2 Gap Between General Norms and Individual Norms -- 7.3.3 "Leading Eight" as a General Norm and Its Region -- 7.3.3.1 Maintain a Cooperative Relationship -- 7.3.3.2 Identification of Deviant -- 7.3.3.3 Punishment and Justification for Punishment -- 7.3.3.4 Apologies and Acceptance -- 7.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 8: On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher's FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Rediscovery of FTNS by Fisher-Price-Frank -- 8.2.1 Examination of FTNS by G. Price -- 8.2.2 Construction by Frank -- 8.2.3 Natural Selection as an Agent Applying Statistical Inference -- 8.2.4 Into the Market -- 8.2.5 Comparison Between Biological System and Market -- 8.3 Metcalfe's Theory -- 8.3.1 Metcalfe's Key Concepts and Construction -- 8.3.2 'Fisher's Principle' as Reinterpretation of FTNS by Metcalfe -- 8.3.3 The Case of Interference -- 8.3.4 Postscript to Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.4 Discussion: Search for Dynamic Efficiency and for Evolutionary Market Analysis -- 8.4.1 Implication of 'Fisher's Principle' -- 8.4.2 FTNS and Two Frames of Reference for the Dynamical System -- 8.4.3 On the Several Norms of Efficiency -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References | |
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| contents | Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Editor and Contributors -- About the Editor -- About the Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I: Political Economy -- Chapter 1: From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance -- 1.1 Individuals in a Society -- 1.2 Reproduction View in Economics -- 1.2.1 Main Features of Reproduction -- 1.2.1.1 Trend Embedded in the Present and the Possibility of Change Based on It -- 1.2.1.2 Depersonalization of Interdependent Relations, Their Emergence as Macroeconomic Factors -- 1.2.1.3 Reproduction of Actors and Their Social Relations -- 1.2.1.4 Rationality That Corresponds to the Reproduction -- 1.2.1.5 Historical Path Dependence and Evolutionary Development -- 1.3 Evolutionary View of Social Change -- 1.4 Formation and Evolution of Governance -- References -- Chapter 2: Approval Theory and Social Contract -- 2.1 The Debate on Property and Civil Society -- 2.2 Approval Theory of Social Order -- 2.2.1 The Stable State of Civil Order -- 2.2.2 Autonomous Approval and Synchronous Approval on the Normative Domain -- 2.2.3 Solidarity and Generality of the Interest in the Substantial Domain -- 2.3 Range and Depth of Social Contract Reconsidered -- 2.3.1 Modern Questions for the Revival of Social Contract Theory -- 2.3.2 Introduction of the Dialectic of Master and Servant -- 2.3.3 Hidden Domain of the Sentiment -- 2.4 Discourse Ethics and Naturalized Social Contract -- 2.4.1 Discourse Ethics and the Kantian Imperative -- 2.4.2 Naturalized Social Contracts -- 2.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Economic Exchange and Social Exchange -- 3.1 Social Exchange Reconsidered -- 3.2 Approval as the Precondition of Exchange -- 3.3 Micro and Macro in the Social Exchange -- 3.4 Market and Organization as the Complex of the Micro-Macro Linkage -- 3.5 Complex System of Exchange and Its Governance -- References Chapter 4: Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy -- 4.1 Division of Labor Generates Money and Capital -- 4.1.1 Division of Labor as the Source of Evolution -- 4.1.2 Emergence of Money as an Unintended Consequence -- 4.2 Transactions Under Capitalism -- 4.3 Voice, Exit, and Loyalty in the Industrial Relations -- References -- Chapter 5: Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism -- 5.1 Merchants and Commercial Society -- 5.2 Money and Time in Commerce and Finance -- 5.2.1 Money Is Time? -- 5.2.2 Financial Market -- 5.3 Evolution and Governance of the Financial Structure: Japanese Experience -- 5.3.1 Japanese Financial System Under the Structural Change -- 5.3.2 Institutional Reforms -- 5.3.3 Structural Changes -- 5.3.4 The Governance of National Economy -- 5.3.5 The Shift in FSA's Governance -- References -- Chapter 6: System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.1 "Transition" Theory of Socialists Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall -- 6.2 From Institutional Economics to the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.3 Endogeneity and Exogeneity in the Transition -- References -- Part I: Appendices -- Road to Evolutionary and Institutional Economics in Japan: A Personal Memoire of the Decade of Founding the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 1: Foundation of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 2: Personal Recollections -- Appendix 3: General Judgment in the Early Twenty-First Century -- Part II: Further Explorations -- Chapter 7: Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.1.1 Approval Theory on Norms and Interests -- 7.1.2 Normative Domain -- 7.1.3 Practical Domain -- 7.1.4 Social State 7.2 Image Score as a Norm: "Individual Norm = General Norm" Model -- 7.2.1 Image Score Model -- 7.2.2 The Region of General Norm in the Image Score Model -- 7.3 Individual Norm Dynamics -- 7.3.1 Reputation and Norm -- 7.3.2 Gap Between General Norms and Individual Norms -- 7.3.3 "Leading Eight" as a General Norm and Its Region -- 7.3.3.1 Maintain a Cooperative Relationship -- 7.3.3.2 Identification of Deviant -- 7.3.3.3 Punishment and Justification for Punishment -- 7.3.3.4 Apologies and Acceptance -- 7.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 8: On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher's FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Rediscovery of FTNS by Fisher-Price-Frank -- 8.2.1 Examination of FTNS by G. Price -- 8.2.2 Construction by Frank -- 8.2.3 Natural Selection as an Agent Applying Statistical Inference -- 8.2.4 Into the Market -- 8.2.5 Comparison Between Biological System and Market -- 8.3 Metcalfe's Theory -- 8.3.1 Metcalfe's Key Concepts and Construction -- 8.3.2 'Fisher's Principle' as Reinterpretation of FTNS by Metcalfe -- 8.3.3 The Case of Interference -- 8.3.4 Postscript to Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.4 Discussion: Search for Dynamic Efficiency and for Evolutionary Market Analysis -- 8.4.1 Implication of 'Fisher's Principle' -- 8.4.2 FTNS and Two Frames of Reference for the Dynamical System -- 8.4.3 On the Several Norms of Efficiency -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References |
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| isbn | 9784431549987 |
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| spelling | Yagi, Kiichiro Verfasser aut From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy Tokyo Springer Japan 2020 ©2020 1 Online-Ressource (198 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science Ser. v.20 Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Editor and Contributors -- About the Editor -- About the Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I: Political Economy -- Chapter 1: From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance -- 1.1 Individuals in a Society -- 1.2 Reproduction View in Economics -- 1.2.1 Main Features of Reproduction -- 1.2.1.1 Trend Embedded in the Present and the Possibility of Change Based on It -- 1.2.1.2 Depersonalization of Interdependent Relations, Their Emergence as Macroeconomic Factors -- 1.2.1.3 Reproduction of Actors and Their Social Relations -- 1.2.1.4 Rationality That Corresponds to the Reproduction -- 1.2.1.5 Historical Path Dependence and Evolutionary Development -- 1.3 Evolutionary View of Social Change -- 1.4 Formation and Evolution of Governance -- References -- Chapter 2: Approval Theory and Social Contract -- 2.1 The Debate on Property and Civil Society -- 2.2 Approval Theory of Social Order -- 2.2.1 The Stable State of Civil Order -- 2.2.2 Autonomous Approval and Synchronous Approval on the Normative Domain -- 2.2.3 Solidarity and Generality of the Interest in the Substantial Domain -- 2.3 Range and Depth of Social Contract Reconsidered -- 2.3.1 Modern Questions for the Revival of Social Contract Theory -- 2.3.2 Introduction of the Dialectic of Master and Servant -- 2.3.3 Hidden Domain of the Sentiment -- 2.4 Discourse Ethics and Naturalized Social Contract -- 2.4.1 Discourse Ethics and the Kantian Imperative -- 2.4.2 Naturalized Social Contracts -- 2.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Economic Exchange and Social Exchange -- 3.1 Social Exchange Reconsidered -- 3.2 Approval as the Precondition of Exchange -- 3.3 Micro and Macro in the Social Exchange -- 3.4 Market and Organization as the Complex of the Micro-Macro Linkage -- 3.5 Complex System of Exchange and Its Governance -- References Chapter 4: Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy -- 4.1 Division of Labor Generates Money and Capital -- 4.1.1 Division of Labor as the Source of Evolution -- 4.1.2 Emergence of Money as an Unintended Consequence -- 4.2 Transactions Under Capitalism -- 4.3 Voice, Exit, and Loyalty in the Industrial Relations -- References -- Chapter 5: Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism -- 5.1 Merchants and Commercial Society -- 5.2 Money and Time in Commerce and Finance -- 5.2.1 Money Is Time? -- 5.2.2 Financial Market -- 5.3 Evolution and Governance of the Financial Structure: Japanese Experience -- 5.3.1 Japanese Financial System Under the Structural Change -- 5.3.2 Institutional Reforms -- 5.3.3 Structural Changes -- 5.3.4 The Governance of National Economy -- 5.3.5 The Shift in FSA's Governance -- References -- Chapter 6: System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.1 "Transition" Theory of Socialists Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall -- 6.2 From Institutional Economics to the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.3 Endogeneity and Exogeneity in the Transition -- References -- Part I: Appendices -- Road to Evolutionary and Institutional Economics in Japan: A Personal Memoire of the Decade of Founding the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 1: Foundation of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 2: Personal Recollections -- Appendix 3: General Judgment in the Early Twenty-First Century -- Part II: Further Explorations -- Chapter 7: Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.1.1 Approval Theory on Norms and Interests -- 7.1.2 Normative Domain -- 7.1.3 Practical Domain -- 7.1.4 Social State 7.2 Image Score as a Norm: "Individual Norm = General Norm" Model -- 7.2.1 Image Score Model -- 7.2.2 The Region of General Norm in the Image Score Model -- 7.3 Individual Norm Dynamics -- 7.3.1 Reputation and Norm -- 7.3.2 Gap Between General Norms and Individual Norms -- 7.3.3 "Leading Eight" as a General Norm and Its Region -- 7.3.3.1 Maintain a Cooperative Relationship -- 7.3.3.2 Identification of Deviant -- 7.3.3.3 Punishment and Justification for Punishment -- 7.3.3.4 Apologies and Acceptance -- 7.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 8: On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher's FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Rediscovery of FTNS by Fisher-Price-Frank -- 8.2.1 Examination of FTNS by G. Price -- 8.2.2 Construction by Frank -- 8.2.3 Natural Selection as an Agent Applying Statistical Inference -- 8.2.4 Into the Market -- 8.2.5 Comparison Between Biological System and Market -- 8.3 Metcalfe's Theory -- 8.3.1 Metcalfe's Key Concepts and Construction -- 8.3.2 'Fisher's Principle' as Reinterpretation of FTNS by Metcalfe -- 8.3.3 The Case of Interference -- 8.3.4 Postscript to Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.4 Discussion: Search for Dynamic Efficiency and for Evolutionary Market Analysis -- 8.4.1 Implication of 'Fisher's Principle' -- 8.4.2 FTNS and Two Frames of Reference for the Dynamical System -- 8.4.3 On the Several Norms of Efficiency -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References Evolutionary economics Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Yagi, Kiichiro From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Tokyo : Springer Japan,c2020 9784431549970 |
| spellingShingle | Yagi, Kiichiro From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Editor and Contributors -- About the Editor -- About the Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I: Political Economy -- Chapter 1: From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance -- 1.1 Individuals in a Society -- 1.2 Reproduction View in Economics -- 1.2.1 Main Features of Reproduction -- 1.2.1.1 Trend Embedded in the Present and the Possibility of Change Based on It -- 1.2.1.2 Depersonalization of Interdependent Relations, Their Emergence as Macroeconomic Factors -- 1.2.1.3 Reproduction of Actors and Their Social Relations -- 1.2.1.4 Rationality That Corresponds to the Reproduction -- 1.2.1.5 Historical Path Dependence and Evolutionary Development -- 1.3 Evolutionary View of Social Change -- 1.4 Formation and Evolution of Governance -- References -- Chapter 2: Approval Theory and Social Contract -- 2.1 The Debate on Property and Civil Society -- 2.2 Approval Theory of Social Order -- 2.2.1 The Stable State of Civil Order -- 2.2.2 Autonomous Approval and Synchronous Approval on the Normative Domain -- 2.2.3 Solidarity and Generality of the Interest in the Substantial Domain -- 2.3 Range and Depth of Social Contract Reconsidered -- 2.3.1 Modern Questions for the Revival of Social Contract Theory -- 2.3.2 Introduction of the Dialectic of Master and Servant -- 2.3.3 Hidden Domain of the Sentiment -- 2.4 Discourse Ethics and Naturalized Social Contract -- 2.4.1 Discourse Ethics and the Kantian Imperative -- 2.4.2 Naturalized Social Contracts -- 2.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Economic Exchange and Social Exchange -- 3.1 Social Exchange Reconsidered -- 3.2 Approval as the Precondition of Exchange -- 3.3 Micro and Macro in the Social Exchange -- 3.4 Market and Organization as the Complex of the Micro-Macro Linkage -- 3.5 Complex System of Exchange and Its Governance -- References Chapter 4: Institutional Dynamics of the Capitalist Market Economy -- 4.1 Division of Labor Generates Money and Capital -- 4.1.1 Division of Labor as the Source of Evolution -- 4.1.2 Emergence of Money as an Unintended Consequence -- 4.2 Transactions Under Capitalism -- 4.3 Voice, Exit, and Loyalty in the Industrial Relations -- References -- Chapter 5: Evolution of Commercial and Financial Structures of Capitalism -- 5.1 Merchants and Commercial Society -- 5.2 Money and Time in Commerce and Finance -- 5.2.1 Money Is Time? -- 5.2.2 Financial Market -- 5.3 Evolution and Governance of the Financial Structure: Japanese Experience -- 5.3.1 Japanese Financial System Under the Structural Change -- 5.3.2 Institutional Reforms -- 5.3.3 Structural Changes -- 5.3.4 The Governance of National Economy -- 5.3.5 The Shift in FSA's Governance -- References -- Chapter 6: System Transition and the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.1 "Transition" Theory of Socialists Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall -- 6.2 From Institutional Economics to the Institutional Political Economy -- 6.3 Endogeneity and Exogeneity in the Transition -- References -- Part I: Appendices -- Road to Evolutionary and Institutional Economics in Japan: A Personal Memoire of the Decade of Founding the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 1: Foundation of the Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics -- Appendix 2: Personal Recollections -- Appendix 3: General Judgment in the Early Twenty-First Century -- Part II: Further Explorations -- Chapter 7: Interpretation of Approval Theory Related to Norms and Interests: Interpretation by Image Score Model and Reputation Dynamics -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.1.1 Approval Theory on Norms and Interests -- 7.1.2 Normative Domain -- 7.1.3 Practical Domain -- 7.1.4 Social State 7.2 Image Score as a Norm: "Individual Norm = General Norm" Model -- 7.2.1 Image Score Model -- 7.2.2 The Region of General Norm in the Image Score Model -- 7.3 Individual Norm Dynamics -- 7.3.1 Reputation and Norm -- 7.3.2 Gap Between General Norms and Individual Norms -- 7.3.3 "Leading Eight" as a General Norm and Its Region -- 7.3.3.1 Maintain a Cooperative Relationship -- 7.3.3.2 Identification of Deviant -- 7.3.3.3 Punishment and Justification for Punishment -- 7.3.3.4 Apologies and Acceptance -- 7.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 8: On the Relatedness Between R. A. Fisher's FTNS and J. S. Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Rediscovery of FTNS by Fisher-Price-Frank -- 8.2.1 Examination of FTNS by G. Price -- 8.2.2 Construction by Frank -- 8.2.3 Natural Selection as an Agent Applying Statistical Inference -- 8.2.4 Into the Market -- 8.2.5 Comparison Between Biological System and Market -- 8.3 Metcalfe's Theory -- 8.3.1 Metcalfe's Key Concepts and Construction -- 8.3.2 'Fisher's Principle' as Reinterpretation of FTNS by Metcalfe -- 8.3.3 The Case of Interference -- 8.3.4 Postscript to Metcalfe's Construction -- 8.4 Discussion: Search for Dynamic Efficiency and for Evolutionary Market Analysis -- 8.4.1 Implication of 'Fisher's Principle' -- 8.4.2 FTNS and Two Frames of Reference for the Dynamical System -- 8.4.3 On the Several Norms of Efficiency -- 8.5 Conclusion -- References Evolutionary economics |
| title | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| title_auth | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| title_exact_search | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| title_full | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| title_fullStr | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| title_full_unstemmed | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| title_short | From Reproduction to Evolutionary Governance |
| title_sort | from reproduction to evolutionary governance toward an evolutionary political economy |
| title_sub | Toward an Evolutionary Political Economy |
| topic | Evolutionary economics |
| topic_facet | Evolutionary economics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yagikiichiro fromreproductiontoevolutionarygovernancetowardanevolutionarypoliticaleconomy |