Presidential power in Latin America: examining the cases of Argentina and Chile
"What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory. Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democr...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York ; London
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
2022
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in Latin American politics
34 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | "What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory. Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) alongside interviews with high-level figures in politics, the judiciary, the public administration, NGOs, and academia in Argentina and Chile, Berbecel argues that constitutional presidential power (formal power) is a very poor predictor of presidential power in practice (informal power). Given the poor predictive value of formal rules, he provides an explanation why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not in others. Berbecel attributes the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables (weak state institutions, the size of the president's party in congress, and a history of economic crises) which together determine how likely it is that a president will be able to concentrate power. Presidential Power in Latin America will be of key interest to scholars and students of executive politics, Latin American politics and more broadly comparative politics"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xxiv, 249 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780367690557 9780367696917 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Defining hyperpresidentialism and presenting my question -- The weak explanatory powers of constitutional presidential powers for determining presidential powers in practice -- Introducing the theoretical argument behind the emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- How my book fits into the literature -- Structure of the book and roadmap of the argument -- Modern political history of Argentina and Chile -- Comparing presidential power in theory vs. presidential power in practice in Argentina and Chile -- Formal presidential power in Argentina -- Hyperpresidentialism in practice in Argentina -- Formal presidential power in Chile -- Nohyperpresidentialism in practice in Chile -- The impact of the strength of state institutions on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of severe institutional weakness -- Chile: a case of institutional strength -- Generalizing my theory through a large-N analysis -- The impact of the size of the president's working majority in congress on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of strong majoritarianism -- Chile: a case of weak majoritarianism -- Reinforcing the importance of majoritarianism for hyperpresidentialism using the case of Mexico -- Three institutional mechanisms that reduce hyperpresidentialism -- The impact of economic crises on presidential power -- Theoretical analysis of the role of economic crises in helping a president concentrate power -- Assessing the role of economic crises in promoting hyperpresidentialism in Argentina -- Growth patterns in post-democratic Chile and the non-emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- Using a survey to understand whether the first and third independent variables in this book work through a bottom-up or top-down process | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory. Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) alongside interviews with high-level figures in politics, the judiciary, the public administration, NGOs, and academia in Argentina and Chile, Berbecel argues that constitutional presidential power (formal power) is a very poor predictor of presidential power in practice (informal power). Given the poor predictive value of formal rules, he provides an explanation why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not in others. Berbecel attributes the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables (weak state institutions, the size of the president's party in congress, and a history of economic crises) which together determine how likely it is that a president will be able to concentrate power. Presidential Power in Latin America will be of key interest to scholars and students of executive politics, Latin American politics and more broadly comparative politics"-- | |
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| author | Berbecel, Dan |
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| contents | Defining hyperpresidentialism and presenting my question -- The weak explanatory powers of constitutional presidential powers for determining presidential powers in practice -- Introducing the theoretical argument behind the emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- How my book fits into the literature -- Structure of the book and roadmap of the argument -- Modern political history of Argentina and Chile -- Comparing presidential power in theory vs. presidential power in practice in Argentina and Chile -- Formal presidential power in Argentina -- Hyperpresidentialism in practice in Argentina -- Formal presidential power in Chile -- Nohyperpresidentialism in practice in Chile -- The impact of the strength of state institutions on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of severe institutional weakness -- Chile: a case of institutional strength -- Generalizing my theory through a large-N analysis -- The impact of the size of the president's working majority in congress on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of strong majoritarianism -- Chile: a case of weak majoritarianism -- Reinforcing the importance of majoritarianism for hyperpresidentialism using the case of Mexico -- Three institutional mechanisms that reduce hyperpresidentialism -- The impact of economic crises on presidential power -- Theoretical analysis of the role of economic crises in helping a president concentrate power -- Assessing the role of economic crises in promoting hyperpresidentialism in Argentina -- Growth patterns in post-democratic Chile and the non-emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- Using a survey to understand whether the first and third independent variables in this book work through a bottom-up or top-down process |
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| geographic | Argentinien (DE-588)4002890-2 gnd Chile (DE-588)4009929-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Argentinien Chile |
| id | DE-604.BV048214123 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:49:28Z |
| indexdate | 2024-08-10T00:40:12Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780367690557 9780367696917 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033594917 |
| oclc_num | 1334024765 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | xxiv, 249 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateSearch | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Routledge studies in Latin American politics |
| spelling | Berbecel, Dan Verfasser (DE-588)1260666220 aut Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile Dan Berbecel New York ; London Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2022 xxiv, 249 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Routledge studies in Latin American politics 34 Defining hyperpresidentialism and presenting my question -- The weak explanatory powers of constitutional presidential powers for determining presidential powers in practice -- Introducing the theoretical argument behind the emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- How my book fits into the literature -- Structure of the book and roadmap of the argument -- Modern political history of Argentina and Chile -- Comparing presidential power in theory vs. presidential power in practice in Argentina and Chile -- Formal presidential power in Argentina -- Hyperpresidentialism in practice in Argentina -- Formal presidential power in Chile -- Nohyperpresidentialism in practice in Chile -- The impact of the strength of state institutions on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of severe institutional weakness -- Chile: a case of institutional strength -- Generalizing my theory through a large-N analysis -- The impact of the size of the president's working majority in congress on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of strong majoritarianism -- Chile: a case of weak majoritarianism -- Reinforcing the importance of majoritarianism for hyperpresidentialism using the case of Mexico -- Three institutional mechanisms that reduce hyperpresidentialism -- The impact of economic crises on presidential power -- Theoretical analysis of the role of economic crises in helping a president concentrate power -- Assessing the role of economic crises in promoting hyperpresidentialism in Argentina -- Growth patterns in post-democratic Chile and the non-emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- Using a survey to understand whether the first and third independent variables in this book work through a bottom-up or top-down process "What explains variance in presidential power between countries? In Presidential Power in Latin America, Dan Berbecel provides a general, systematic theory for explaining presidential power in practice as opposed to presidential power in theory. Using expert survey data from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) alongside interviews with high-level figures in politics, the judiciary, the public administration, NGOs, and academia in Argentina and Chile, Berbecel argues that constitutional presidential power (formal power) is a very poor predictor of presidential power in practice (informal power). Given the poor predictive value of formal rules, he provides an explanation why hyperpresidentialism emerges in some countries but not in others. Berbecel attributes the root causes of hyperpresidentialism to three independent variables (weak state institutions, the size of the president's party in congress, and a history of economic crises) which together determine how likely it is that a president will be able to concentrate power. Presidential Power in Latin America will be of key interest to scholars and students of executive politics, Latin American politics and more broadly comparative politics"-- Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 gnd rswk-swf Befugnis (DE-588)4333792-2 gnd rswk-swf Präsident (DE-588)4115611-0 gnd rswk-swf Macht (DE-588)4036824-5 gnd rswk-swf Argentinien (DE-588)4002890-2 gnd rswk-swf Chile (DE-588)4009929-5 gnd rswk-swf Executive power / Latin America Executive power / Argentina Executive power / Chile Presidents / Argentina Presidents / Chile Political corruption / Argentina Political corruption / Chile Latin America / Politics and government Pouvoir exécutif / Amérique latine Pouvoir exécutif / Argentine Pouvoir exécutif / Chili Présidents / Argentine Présidents / Chili Corruption (Politique) / Argentine Corruption (Politique) / Chili Amérique latine / Politique et gouvernement Executive power Political corruption Politics and government Presidents Argentina Chile Latin America Argentinien (DE-588)4002890-2 g Chile (DE-588)4009929-5 g Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 s Präsident (DE-588)4115611-0 s Macht (DE-588)4036824-5 s Befugnis (DE-588)4333792-2 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, ebk. 978-1-00-314290-4 |
| spellingShingle | Berbecel, Dan Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile Defining hyperpresidentialism and presenting my question -- The weak explanatory powers of constitutional presidential powers for determining presidential powers in practice -- Introducing the theoretical argument behind the emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- How my book fits into the literature -- Structure of the book and roadmap of the argument -- Modern political history of Argentina and Chile -- Comparing presidential power in theory vs. presidential power in practice in Argentina and Chile -- Formal presidential power in Argentina -- Hyperpresidentialism in practice in Argentina -- Formal presidential power in Chile -- Nohyperpresidentialism in practice in Chile -- The impact of the strength of state institutions on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of severe institutional weakness -- Chile: a case of institutional strength -- Generalizing my theory through a large-N analysis -- The impact of the size of the president's working majority in congress on presidential power -- Argentina: a case of strong majoritarianism -- Chile: a case of weak majoritarianism -- Reinforcing the importance of majoritarianism for hyperpresidentialism using the case of Mexico -- Three institutional mechanisms that reduce hyperpresidentialism -- The impact of economic crises on presidential power -- Theoretical analysis of the role of economic crises in helping a president concentrate power -- Assessing the role of economic crises in promoting hyperpresidentialism in Argentina -- Growth patterns in post-democratic Chile and the non-emergence of hyperpresidentialism -- Using a survey to understand whether the first and third independent variables in this book work through a bottom-up or top-down process Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 gnd Befugnis (DE-588)4333792-2 gnd Präsident (DE-588)4115611-0 gnd Macht (DE-588)4036824-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4062801-2 (DE-588)4333792-2 (DE-588)4115611-0 (DE-588)4036824-5 (DE-588)4002890-2 (DE-588)4009929-5 |
| title | Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile |
| title_auth | Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile |
| title_exact_search | Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile |
| title_full | Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile Dan Berbecel |
| title_fullStr | Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile Dan Berbecel |
| title_full_unstemmed | Presidential power in Latin America examining the cases of Argentina and Chile Dan Berbecel |
| title_short | Presidential power in Latin America |
| title_sort | presidential power in latin america examining the cases of argentina and chile |
| title_sub | examining the cases of Argentina and Chile |
| topic | Verfassungsrecht (DE-588)4062801-2 gnd Befugnis (DE-588)4333792-2 gnd Präsident (DE-588)4115611-0 gnd Macht (DE-588)4036824-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Verfassungsrecht Befugnis Präsident Macht Argentinien Chile |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT berbeceldan presidentialpowerinlatinamericaexaminingthecasesofargentinaandchile |