The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do:
Contagion risk and counterparty failure have been the main hallmarks of the current crisis. While some large diversified banks that focused mainly on commercial banking survived very well, others suffered crippling losses. Sound corporate governance and strong riskmanagement culture should enable ba...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Weitere Verfasser: | , |
Format: | Elektronisch Buchkapitel |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2010
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | DE-384 DE-473 DE-824 DE-29 DE-739 DE-355 DE-20 DE-1028 DE-1049 DE-521 DE-861 DE-898 DE-92 DE-91 DE-573 DE-19 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Contagion risk and counterparty failure have been the main hallmarks of the current crisis. While some large diversified banks that focused mainly on commercial banking survived very well, others suffered crippling losses. Sound corporate governance and strong riskmanagement culture should enable banks to avoid excessive leverage and risk taking. The question is whether there is a better way, via leverage rules or rules on the structures of large conglomerates, to ensure volatile investment banking functions do not dominate the future stability of the commercial banking and financial intermediation environment that is so critical for economic activity. While there is a main consensus on the need for reform of capital rules, dynamic provisioning, better co-operation for future crises, centralised trading of derivatives etc., the question is whether such reforms will be sufficient if they do not address contagion and counterparty risk directly. The world outside of policy making is waiting for a fundamental reassessment of banks' business models: what banks are supposed to do and how they compete with each other. It is the "elephant in the room" on which some policy makers have not yet had the time or inclination to focus. This article emphasises not only the need for transparent and comparable accounting rules and for improvements in corporate governance, but also supports the imposition of a group leverage ratio to provide a binding capital constraint (that Basel riskweighted rules have been unable to achieve) and proposes a Non- Operating Holding Company Structure (NOHC) - reforms that are essential to deal with contagion and counterparty risk that are so integral to the 'too big to fail' issue |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (27 Seiten) |
DOI: | 10.1787/fmt-v2009-art11-en |
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spelling | Blundell-Wignall, Adrian Verfasser aut The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Gert Wehinger and Patrick Slovik Paris OECD Publishing 2010 1 Online-Ressource (27 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Contagion risk and counterparty failure have been the main hallmarks of the current crisis. While some large diversified banks that focused mainly on commercial banking survived very well, others suffered crippling losses. Sound corporate governance and strong riskmanagement culture should enable banks to avoid excessive leverage and risk taking. The question is whether there is a better way, via leverage rules or rules on the structures of large conglomerates, to ensure volatile investment banking functions do not dominate the future stability of the commercial banking and financial intermediation environment that is so critical for economic activity. While there is a main consensus on the need for reform of capital rules, dynamic provisioning, better co-operation for future crises, centralised trading of derivatives etc., the question is whether such reforms will be sufficient if they do not address contagion and counterparty risk directly. The world outside of policy making is waiting for a fundamental reassessment of banks' business models: what banks are supposed to do and how they compete with each other. It is the "elephant in the room" on which some policy makers have not yet had the time or inclination to focus. This article emphasises not only the need for transparent and comparable accounting rules and for improvements in corporate governance, but also supports the imposition of a group leverage ratio to provide a binding capital constraint (that Basel riskweighted rules have been unable to achieve) and proposes a Non- Operating Holding Company Structure (NOHC) - reforms that are essential to deal with contagion and counterparty risk that are so integral to the 'too big to fail' issue Finance and Investment Wehinger, Gert ctb Slovik, Patrick ctb https://doi.org/10.1787/fmt-v2009-art11-en Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Blundell-Wignall, Adrian The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do Finance and Investment |
title | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do |
title_auth | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do |
title_exact_search | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do |
title_exact_search_txtP | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do |
title_full | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Gert Wehinger and Patrick Slovik |
title_fullStr | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Gert Wehinger and Patrick Slovik |
title_full_unstemmed | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Gert Wehinger and Patrick Slovik |
title_short | The elephant in the room: The need to deal with what banks do |
title_sort | the elephant in the room the need to deal with what banks do |
topic | Finance and Investment |
topic_facet | Finance and Investment |
url | https://doi.org/10.1787/fmt-v2009-art11-en |
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