Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-Off Measures and Creative Accounting

Accounting conventions usually leave some room for judgment, which governments may be tempted to take advantage of, especially when fiscal rules bite or threaten to do so. The European experience over the past decade -- documented here in great detail -- illustrates that fiscal gimmicks come in many...

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1. Verfasser: Koen, Vincent (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: van den Noord, Paul (MitwirkendeR)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Paris OECD Publishing 2005
Schriftenreihe:OECD Economics Department Working Papers
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Zusammenfassung:Accounting conventions usually leave some room for judgment, which governments may be tempted to take advantage of, especially when fiscal rules bite or threaten to do so. The European experience over the past decade -- documented here in great detail -- illustrates that fiscal gimmicks come in many different guises, but also that some are less mischievous than others. Logit regression analysis confirms that when deficit rules or, to a lesser extent, debt thresholds tend to become more binding, recourse to gimmicks is more likely. It also suggests that more centralised budget systems are less prone to such gimmickry. The policy implications are clear as regards the virtues of transparent and consistent accounting practices, but more ambiguous regarding the merits or otherwise of one-off measures ...
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm
DOI:10.1787/237714513517

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