Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement
Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characteris...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2013
|
| Schriftenreihe: | OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterised by concentrated ownership. On the one hand, large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance. On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors.The paper focuses particularly on the misuse of corporate vehicles, which arguably poses a major challenge to good corporate governance. Stakeholder rights (e.g. employees and creditors) cannot be properly exercised if ultimate decision- be identified. The accountability of the board may also be seriously endangered if stakeholders and the general public are unaware of decision-making and ultimate control structures. Finally, regulators and supervisory agencies have a strong interest in knowing beneficial owners - in order to determine the origin of investment flows, to prevent money laundering and tax evasion and to settle issues of corporate accountability |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm |
| DOI: | 10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV047936237 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 220413s2013 xx o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-13-SOC)061255971 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1312696412 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV047936237 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-384 |a DE-91 |a DE-473 |a DE-824 |a DE-29 |a DE-739 |a DE-355 |a DE-20 |a DE-1028 |a DE-1049 |a DE-188 |a DE-521 |a DE-861 |a DE-898 |a DE-92 |a DE-573 |a DE-19 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Vermeulen, Erik P. M... |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Beneficial Ownership and Control |b A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement |c Erik P. M. Vermeulen |
| 264 | 1 | |a Paris |b OECD Publishing |c 2013 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten) |c 21 x 29.7cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers | |
| 520 | |a Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterised by concentrated ownership. On the one hand, large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance. On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors.The paper focuses particularly on the misuse of corporate vehicles, which arguably poses a major challenge to good corporate governance. Stakeholder rights (e.g. employees and creditors) cannot be properly exercised if ultimate decision- be identified. The accountability of the board may also be seriously endangered if stakeholders and the general public are unaware of decision-making and ultimate control structures. Finally, regulators and supervisory agencies have a strong interest in knowing beneficial owners - in order to determine the origin of investment flows, to prevent money laundering and tax evasion and to settle issues of corporate accountability | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance and Investment | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Governance | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-13-SOC | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033317730 | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1818806084538728448 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Vermeulen, Erik P. M.. |
| author_facet | Vermeulen, Erik P. M.. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Vermeulen, Erik P. M.. |
| author_variant | e p m v epm epmv |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV047936237 |
| collection | ZDB-13-SOC |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-13-SOC)061255971 (OCoLC)1312696412 (DE-599)BVBBV047936237 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV047936237</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">220413s2013 xx o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-13-SOC)061255971</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1312696412</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV047936237</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-384</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-91</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-355</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-20</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1028</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1049</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-861</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-898</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-573</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Vermeulen, Erik P. M...</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Beneficial Ownership and Control</subfield><subfield code="b">A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement</subfield><subfield code="c">Erik P. M. Vermeulen</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Paris</subfield><subfield code="b">OECD Publishing</subfield><subfield code="c">2013</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten)</subfield><subfield code="c">21 x 29.7cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterised by concentrated ownership. On the one hand, large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance. On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors.The paper focuses particularly on the misuse of corporate vehicles, which arguably poses a major challenge to good corporate governance. Stakeholder rights (e.g. employees and creditors) cannot be properly exercised if ultimate decision- be identified. The accountability of the board may also be seriously endangered if stakeholders and the general public are unaware of decision-making and ultimate control structures. Finally, regulators and supervisory agencies have a strong interest in knowing beneficial owners - in order to determine the origin of investment flows, to prevent money laundering and tax evasion and to settle issues of corporate accountability</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance and Investment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Governance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-13-SOC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033317730</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV047936237 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T19:35:05Z |
| indexdate | 2024-12-18T19:04:09Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-033317730 |
| oclc_num | 1312696412 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-384 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-29 DE-739 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-20 DE-1028 DE-1049 DE-188 DE-521 DE-861 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-92 DE-573 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-384 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-824 DE-29 DE-739 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-20 DE-1028 DE-1049 DE-188 DE-521 DE-861 DE-898 DE-BY-UBR DE-92 DE-573 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm |
| psigel | ZDB-13-SOC |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | OECD Publishing |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers |
| spelling | Vermeulen, Erik P. M... Verfasser aut Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement Erik P. M. Vermeulen Paris OECD Publishing 2013 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers Investor confidence in financial markets depends in large part on the existence of an accurate disclosure regime that provides transparency in the beneficial ownership and control structures of publicly listed companies. This is particularly true for corporate governance systems that are characterised by concentrated ownership. On the one hand, large investors with significant voting and cash-flow rights may encourage long-term growth and firm performance. On the other hand, however, controlling beneficial owners with large voting blocks may have incentives to divert corporate assets and opportunities for personal gain at the expense of minority investors.The paper focuses particularly on the misuse of corporate vehicles, which arguably poses a major challenge to good corporate governance. Stakeholder rights (e.g. employees and creditors) cannot be properly exercised if ultimate decision- be identified. The accountability of the board may also be seriously endangered if stakeholders and the general public are unaware of decision-making and ultimate control structures. Finally, regulators and supervisory agencies have a strong interest in knowing beneficial owners - in order to determine the origin of investment flows, to prevent money laundering and tax evasion and to settle issues of corporate accountability Finance and Investment Governance https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Vermeulen, Erik P. M.. Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement Finance and Investment Governance |
| title | Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement |
| title_auth | Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement |
| title_exact_search | Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement |
| title_full | Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement Erik P. M. Vermeulen |
| title_fullStr | Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement Erik P. M. Vermeulen |
| title_full_unstemmed | Beneficial Ownership and Control A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement Erik P. M. Vermeulen |
| title_short | Beneficial Ownership and Control |
| title_sort | beneficial ownership and control a comparative study disclosure information and enforcement |
| title_sub | A Comparative Study - Disclosure, Information and Enforcement |
| topic | Finance and Investment Governance |
| topic_facet | Finance and Investment Governance |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT vermeulenerikpm beneficialownershipandcontrolacomparativestudydisclosureinformationandenforcement |