Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical?:
This paper provides empirical analysis that measures the cyclical properties of intergovernmental transfers (or grants). Modelling a fiscal policy reaction function this paper tests whether the transfers systems in OECD countries are pro- or counter-cyclical, i.e. whether they offset cyclical fluctu...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2013
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| Series: | OECD Economics Department Working Papers
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | This paper provides empirical analysis that measures the cyclical properties of intergovernmental transfers (or grants). Modelling a fiscal policy reaction function this paper tests whether the transfers systems in OECD countries are pro- or counter-cyclical, i.e. whether they offset cyclical fluctuations of sub-central economies or, on the contrary, exacerbate them. Regression results suggest that transfer systems tend to be pro-cyclical in general and in more than half of OECD countries they tend to destabilise sub-central budgets. Transfer pro-cyclicality may be the result of several factors: Transfer spending is often determined as a share of central government tax revenue, which itself tends to fluctuate with the cycle. Moreover, many grants are matching sub-central spending and hence tend to exacerbate fluctuations of that sub-central spending. Pro-cyclical grants could partly explain the often observed pro-cyclicality of subcentral government fiscal policy |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (15 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm |
| DOI: | 10.1787/5k43nxqrlmtf-en |
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| spelling | Blöchliger, Hansjörg Verfasser aut Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? Hansjörg Blöchliger and Balázs Égert = Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ? / Hansjörg Blöchliger et Balázs Égert Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ? Paris OECD Publishing 2013 1 Online-Ressource (15 Seiten) 21 x 29.7cm txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier OECD Economics Department Working Papers This paper provides empirical analysis that measures the cyclical properties of intergovernmental transfers (or grants). Modelling a fiscal policy reaction function this paper tests whether the transfers systems in OECD countries are pro- or counter-cyclical, i.e. whether they offset cyclical fluctuations of sub-central economies or, on the contrary, exacerbate them. Regression results suggest that transfer systems tend to be pro-cyclical in general and in more than half of OECD countries they tend to destabilise sub-central budgets. Transfer pro-cyclicality may be the result of several factors: Transfer spending is often determined as a share of central government tax revenue, which itself tends to fluctuate with the cycle. Moreover, many grants are matching sub-central spending and hence tend to exacerbate fluctuations of that sub-central spending. Pro-cyclical grants could partly explain the often observed pro-cyclicality of subcentral government fiscal policy Taxation Economics Égert, Balázs ctb https://doi.org/10.1787/5k43nxqrlmtf-en Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Blöchliger, Hansjörg Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? Taxation Economics |
| title | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? |
| title_alt | Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ? |
| title_auth | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? |
| title_exact_search | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? |
| title_full | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? Hansjörg Blöchliger and Balázs Égert = Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ? / Hansjörg Blöchliger et Balázs Égert |
| title_fullStr | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? Hansjörg Blöchliger and Balázs Égert = Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ? / Hansjörg Blöchliger et Balázs Égert |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? Hansjörg Blöchliger and Balázs Égert = Assainissement budgétaire aux différents niveaux d'administration - Partie 3. Les dons interadministrations ont-ils un effet pro ou anticyclique ? / Hansjörg Blöchliger et Balázs Égert |
| title_short | Fiscal Consolidation Across Government Levels - Part 3. Intergovernmental Grants, Pro- or Counter-cyclical? |
| title_sort | fiscal consolidation across government levels part 3 intergovernmental grants pro or counter cyclical |
| topic | Taxation Economics |
| topic_facet | Taxation Economics |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/5k43nxqrlmtf-en |
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