The value gap:
Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen explores the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for: he argues that these two value notions are equally important in ethics and practical deliberation. His analysis challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilem...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2022
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| Edition: | First edition |
| Series: | Oxford scholarship online
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Summary: | Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen explores the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for: he argues that these two value notions are equally important in ethics and practical deliberation. His analysis challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas |
| Item Description: | This edition also issued in print: 2021. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on November 16, 2021) |
| Physical Description: | xxii, 215 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780192848215 |
Staff View
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Contents Acknowledgements xxi PARTI: ELEMENTS 1. Value Taxonomy 1.1 Different Taxonomies 1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values 1.3 Final and Non-Final Values 1.4 Varieties of Non-Final (Extrinsic) Value 1.5 The Coherence of IE 3 3 6 8 17 20 2. Good and Good-For 2.1 Kinds of Positive Value 2.2 Less Interesting Senses of Good-For 2.3 Mooreans and Good-For Monists 2.4 Value Dualism 24 24 27 32 35 3. Challenging Mooreanism 3.1 Introducing a Debate 3.2 Overall and Pro Tanto Value 3.3 The Argument against Mooreanism 3.4 The Totality of Value 3.5 The Intuition of Neutrality and Value Monism 3.6 Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality 3.7 Non-Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality 37 37 38 39 43 44 46 46 4. Challenging Good-For Monism 4.1 Relationalist Strategies 4.2 Relationalism and Aggregation 4.3 Separating Value from Normativity 4.4 Good-For Monism and Thick Value Concepts 4.5 Reasons Provided by Relational Value 4.6 Relationalism, Supervenience, and Constitution 50 50 52 57 59 64 67 5. Good-For Unitarianism 5.1 The Background 5.2 Good-For Unitarianism 5.3 Disunitarianism 5.4 Well-being 5.5 Thin and Thick Values 5.6 The Thick- or Thinness of Good-For 5.7 Good-For and the Intuition of Neutrality 72 72 74 76 79 80 83 84
xviii CONTENTS PART II: A FITTING-ATTITUDE ANALYSIS OF VALUE 6. Fitting-Attitude Analysis 6.1 The New Agenda 6.2 FA Analysis and its Advantages 6.3 Brentano, Kriegel, Rowland, and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem 6.4 FA Analysis and the Moore/Brentano Challenge 6.5 A Reason’s Strength 6.6 The Real Agency Challenge to FA Analysis 6.7 The Value of Actuality 91 91 95 100 105 109 112 114 7. The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes 7.1 The Property of Being an Intrinsic Property 7.2 FA Analysis and Value Dualism 7.3 The Normative Approach 7.4 The Logical Consequence Argument 119 119 120 123 128 8. The Fitting-Attitude Analysis Revised 8.1 The Combinatorial Account 8.2 Challenging the Arguments 8.3 Downgrading the Logical Consequence Argument 8.4 Redefining Final Goodness 8.5 A Substantive Argument against P** 131 131 133 135 137 138 9. ‘Sake’ 9.1 For Pete’s Sake 9.2 The Untranslatability Objection 9.3 The Functional ‘Sake’ 9.4 The Non-Evaluative ‘Sake’ 9.5 Vocation and Being Struck by Personal Value 9.6 ‘Sake’ in FA Analysis 142 142 144 146 148 150 151 10. FA and Motivating Reasons 10.1 Two Issues 10.2 Introducing Some Terminology 10.3 Favourings and Motivating Reasons 153 153 154 160 11. Favourings for No Reason 11.1 Aim 11.2 Favourings Not Governed by Reason 11.3 Raz and Expressive Acts 11.4 Habits and Explanatory Reasons 11.5 The Dual-Role Requirement 11.6 Reasonm and Reasong 11.7 Two Challenging Cases: The Surprise Party and Placebo 11.8 Arguments from Intentional Overload, Complexity, and Form 166 166 166 170 171 174 174 175 177
CONTENTS ХІХ 12. Mind the Value Gap 12.1 On My Own Authority 12.2 The Width and the Proftxndity 12.3 Geachian Crossing 12.4 The Disapprovables—A Personality Response 12.5 Silencing 12.6 Incommensurable but Comparable 12.7 Two Kinds of Importance 12.8 Minding the Gap 181 181 183 184 185 189 192 195 197 References Index 199 211 |
| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgements xxi PARTI: ELEMENTS 1. Value Taxonomy 1.1 Different Taxonomies 1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values 1.3 Final and Non-Final Values 1.4 Varieties of Non-Final (Extrinsic) Value 1.5 The Coherence of IE 3 3 6 8 17 20 2. Good and Good-For 2.1 Kinds of Positive Value 2.2 Less Interesting Senses of Good-For 2.3 Mooreans and Good-For Monists 2.4 Value Dualism 24 24 27 32 35 3. Challenging Mooreanism 3.1 Introducing a Debate 3.2 Overall and Pro Tanto Value 3.3 The Argument against Mooreanism 3.4 The Totality of Value 3.5 The Intuition of Neutrality and Value Monism 3.6 Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality 3.7 Non-Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality 37 37 38 39 43 44 46 46 4. Challenging Good-For Monism 4.1 Relationalist Strategies 4.2 Relationalism and Aggregation 4.3 Separating Value from Normativity 4.4 Good-For Monism and Thick Value Concepts 4.5 Reasons Provided by Relational Value 4.6 Relationalism, Supervenience, and Constitution 50 50 52 57 59 64 67 5. Good-For Unitarianism 5.1 The Background 5.2 Good-For Unitarianism 5.3 Disunitarianism 5.4 Well-being 5.5 Thin and Thick Values 5.6 The Thick- or Thinness of Good-For 5.7 Good-For and the Intuition of Neutrality 72 72 74 76 79 80 83 84
xviii CONTENTS PART II: A FITTING-ATTITUDE ANALYSIS OF VALUE 6. Fitting-Attitude Analysis 6.1 The New Agenda 6.2 FA Analysis and its Advantages 6.3 Brentano, Kriegel, Rowland, and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem 6.4 FA Analysis and the Moore/Brentano Challenge 6.5 A Reason’s Strength 6.6 The Real Agency Challenge to FA Analysis 6.7 The Value of Actuality 91 91 95 100 105 109 112 114 7. The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes 7.1 The Property of Being an Intrinsic Property 7.2 FA Analysis and Value Dualism 7.3 The Normative Approach 7.4 The Logical Consequence Argument 119 119 120 123 128 8. The Fitting-Attitude Analysis Revised 8.1 The Combinatorial Account 8.2 Challenging the Arguments 8.3 Downgrading the Logical Consequence Argument 8.4 Redefining Final Goodness 8.5 A Substantive Argument against P** 131 131 133 135 137 138 9. ‘Sake’ 9.1 For Pete’s Sake 9.2 The Untranslatability Objection 9.3 The Functional ‘Sake’ 9.4 The Non-Evaluative ‘Sake’ 9.5 Vocation and Being Struck by Personal Value 9.6 ‘Sake’ in FA Analysis 142 142 144 146 148 150 151 10. FA and Motivating Reasons 10.1 Two Issues 10.2 Introducing Some Terminology 10.3 Favourings and Motivating Reasons 153 153 154 160 11. Favourings for No Reason 11.1 Aim 11.2 Favourings Not Governed by Reason 11.3 Raz and Expressive Acts 11.4 Habits and Explanatory Reasons 11.5 The Dual-Role Requirement 11.6 Reasonm and Reasong 11.7 Two Challenging Cases: The Surprise Party and Placebo 11.8 Arguments from Intentional Overload, Complexity, and Form 166 166 166 170 171 174 174 175 177
CONTENTS ХІХ 12. Mind the Value Gap 12.1 On My Own Authority 12.2 The Width and the Proftxndity 12.3 Geachian Crossing 12.4 The Disapprovables—A Personality Response 12.5 Silencing 12.6 Incommensurable but Comparable 12.7 Two Kinds of Importance 12.8 Minding the Gap 181 181 183 184 185 189 192 195 197 References Index 199 211 |
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| spelling | Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni Verfasser (DE-588)1157343597 aut The value gap Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen First edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2022 xxii, 215 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Oxford scholarship online This edition also issued in print: 2021. - Includes bibliographical references and index. - Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on November 16, 2021) Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen explores the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for: he argues that these two value notions are equally important in ethics and practical deliberation. His analysis challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas Teleologie (DE-588)4059367-8 gnd rswk-swf Wertethik (DE-588)4602196-6 gnd rswk-swf Values Wertethik (DE-588)4602196-6 s Teleologie (DE-588)4059367-8 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-194351-5 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033224701&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni The value gap Teleologie (DE-588)4059367-8 gnd Wertethik (DE-588)4602196-6 gnd |
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| title | The value gap |
| title_auth | The value gap |
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