Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong: Ten Years Later
Much of what has been heard, read, or taught about the 2008 financial crisis is incorrect. It was not caused by free market capitalism run amok. The crisis was not created by deregulatory zeal. It wasn't primarily due to greed on Wall Street. The crisis was not simply created by people's &...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Cambridge Scholars Publisher
2018
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | HWR01 |
| Summary: | Much of what has been heard, read, or taught about the 2008 financial crisis is incorrect. It was not caused by free market capitalism run amok. The crisis was not created by deregulatory zeal. It wasn't primarily due to greed on Wall Street. The crisis was not simply created by people's "irrational exuberance" or "animal spirits." Perhaps most importantly, it did not require bailouts and thousands of pages of new regulations to fix. Instead, it came about because of significant market distortions created by government subsidies, misregulation, and perverse incentives.The conventional wisdom blames unbridled markets for mortgage fraud, imprudent risks, and extreme leverage in financial institutions. Policy makers told us that the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the near failure of American International Group and many large banks, would have resulted in catastrophic decline and perhaps another Great Depression. After the crisis, thousands of pages of new regulations were written to limit the types of risk banks can take and the kinds of investments they can make so that a financial crisis of this magnitude can't happen again. But what if this conventional wisdom was wrong?If the problem wasn't unregulated, unrestrained markets leading to fraud and excessive risk-taking, if instead it was perverted incentives and distorted market signals due to numerous regulations and mandates in the first place, then the thousands of new pages of regulations haven't solved the fundamental problem. In fact, they have made it worse. This book shows that it is time to reassess the conventional wisdom. Perhaps there is still time to reverse the faulty solutions based upon it before another financial crisis breaks out |
| Item Description: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (197 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9781527522961 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Intro -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter One -- Part I -- Chapter Two -- Chapter Three -- Chapter Four -- Chapter Five -- Part II -- Chapter Six -- Chapter Seven -- Chapter Eight -- Part III -- Chapter Nine -- Chapter Ten -- Conclusion -- Glossary / Appendix -- References -- Index | |
| 520 | |a Much of what has been heard, read, or taught about the 2008 financial crisis is incorrect. It was not caused by free market capitalism run amok. The crisis was not created by deregulatory zeal. It wasn't primarily due to greed on Wall Street. The crisis was not simply created by people's "irrational exuberance" or "animal spirits." Perhaps most importantly, it did not require bailouts and thousands of pages of new regulations to fix. Instead, it came about because of significant market distortions created by government subsidies, misregulation, and perverse incentives.The conventional wisdom blames unbridled markets for mortgage fraud, imprudent risks, and extreme leverage in financial institutions. Policy makers told us that the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the near failure of American International Group and many large banks, would have resulted in catastrophic decline and perhaps another Great Depression. After the crisis, thousands of pages of new regulations were written to limit the types of risk banks can take and the kinds of investments they can make so that a financial crisis of this magnitude can't happen again. But what if this conventional wisdom was wrong?If the problem wasn't unregulated, unrestrained markets leading to fraud and excessive risk-taking, if instead it was perverted incentives and distorted market signals due to numerous regulations and mandates in the first place, then the thousands of new pages of regulations haven't solved the fundamental problem. In fact, they have made it worse. This book shows that it is time to reassess the conventional wisdom. Perhaps there is still time to reverse the faulty solutions based upon it before another financial crisis breaks out | ||
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| contents | Intro -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter One -- Part I -- Chapter Two -- Chapter Three -- Chapter Four -- Chapter Five -- Part II -- Chapter Six -- Chapter Seven -- Chapter Eight -- Part III -- Chapter Nine -- Chapter Ten -- Conclusion -- Glossary / Appendix -- References -- Index |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| spelling | Mueller, Paul Verfasser aut Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later Newcastle-upon-Tyne Cambridge Scholars Publisher 2018 ©2018 1 Online-Ressource (197 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources Intro -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter One -- Part I -- Chapter Two -- Chapter Three -- Chapter Four -- Chapter Five -- Part II -- Chapter Six -- Chapter Seven -- Chapter Eight -- Part III -- Chapter Nine -- Chapter Ten -- Conclusion -- Glossary / Appendix -- References -- Index Much of what has been heard, read, or taught about the 2008 financial crisis is incorrect. It was not caused by free market capitalism run amok. The crisis was not created by deregulatory zeal. It wasn't primarily due to greed on Wall Street. The crisis was not simply created by people's "irrational exuberance" or "animal spirits." Perhaps most importantly, it did not require bailouts and thousands of pages of new regulations to fix. Instead, it came about because of significant market distortions created by government subsidies, misregulation, and perverse incentives.The conventional wisdom blames unbridled markets for mortgage fraud, imprudent risks, and extreme leverage in financial institutions. Policy makers told us that the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the near failure of American International Group and many large banks, would have resulted in catastrophic decline and perhaps another Great Depression. After the crisis, thousands of pages of new regulations were written to limit the types of risk banks can take and the kinds of investments they can make so that a financial crisis of this magnitude can't happen again. But what if this conventional wisdom was wrong?If the problem wasn't unregulated, unrestrained markets leading to fraud and excessive risk-taking, if instead it was perverted incentives and distorted market signals due to numerous regulations and mandates in the first place, then the thousands of new pages of regulations haven't solved the fundamental problem. In fact, they have made it worse. This book shows that it is time to reassess the conventional wisdom. Perhaps there is still time to reverse the faulty solutions based upon it before another financial crisis breaks out Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.. Financial crises-Prevention Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe Mueller, Paul Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Newcastle-upon-Tyne : Cambridge Scholars Publisher,c2018 |
| spellingShingle | Mueller, Paul Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later Intro -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter One -- Part I -- Chapter Two -- Chapter Three -- Chapter Four -- Chapter Five -- Part II -- Chapter Six -- Chapter Seven -- Chapter Eight -- Part III -- Chapter Nine -- Chapter Ten -- Conclusion -- Glossary / Appendix -- References -- Index Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.. Financial crises-Prevention |
| title | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later |
| title_auth | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later |
| title_exact_search | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later |
| title_full | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later |
| title_fullStr | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong Ten Years Later |
| title_short | Why the Conventional Wisdom about the 2008 Financial Crisis Is Still Wrong |
| title_sort | why the conventional wisdom about the 2008 financial crisis is still wrong ten years later |
| title_sub | Ten Years Later |
| topic | Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.. Financial crises-Prevention |
| topic_facet | Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.. Financial crises-Prevention |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT muellerpaul whytheconventionalwisdomaboutthe2008financialcrisisisstillwrongtenyearslater |