Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England
The MIT Press
[2022]
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Physical Description: | x, 398 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme, Pläne |
| ISBN: | 9780262046879 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics |c W. Bentley MacLeod |
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Contents Preface xi 1 Introduction 1.1 Price Theory 1.1.1 Commodities 1.1.2 Value 1.1.3 The Welfare Theorems of General Equilibrium Theory 1.2 Beyond Price Theory 1.2.1 The Trade Price 1.2.2 The Contract Price 1.3 The Agenda 1 2 2 3 4 6 6 8 14 2 Evidence, Models, and Decision Making 2.1 Introduction 2.1.1 “Superstition” in the Pigeon 2.2 Models for Representation 2.3 Population Models 2.3.1 The Mincer Wage Equation 2.4 Causality 2.5 Discussion 2.6 Exercises 17 17 19 20 24 26 28 32 33 3 Decision Theory 3.1 Decision Making and the Economics Paradigm 3.2 Behavior and the Rational Choice Model 3.2.1 Is the Rational Choice Model Restrictive? 3.2.2 Continuity of Preferences 3.3 Risk 3.3.1 Risk Aversion 3.4 Uncertainty and Beliefs 3.4.1 The Small World Model 3.4.2 Preferences in the Face of Uncertainty 3.4.3 The Value of Information 35 35 36 39 40 41 46 49 50 54 57
viti Contents 3.5 Discussion 3.6 Exercises 60 61 4 Game Theory 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Concept of a Strategy 4.2.1 The Monty Hall Problem 4.3 Rational Choice in a Game 4.4 Nash Equilibrium 4.5 The Problem of Commitment 4.6 Sequential Equilibria and Other Solution Concepts 4.6.1 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria 4.6.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria 4.7 Repeated Games and the Payoff Possibilities Set 4.7.1 Repeated Game Payoffs 4.7.2 Repeated Game Strategies 4.7.3 Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 4.7.4 Characterization of the Payoffs in Repeated Games 4.7.5 Infinitely Repeated Games 4.8 Discussion 4.9 Exercises 65 65 67 71 73 77 79 85 86 87 87 88 91 92 95 98 99 100 5 Bargaining and the Buyer-Seller Model 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Buyer-Seller Model 5.3 Nash Bargaining Solution 5.4 Contract Bargaining 5.4.1 The Payoffs 5.4.2 The Renegotiation Game 5.4.3 Construction of the Bargaining Equilibrium 5.4.4 Outside Options 5.5 Discussion 5.6 Exercises 103 103 105 107 111 112 113 116 118 124 126 6 Reliance, Holdup, and Breach 6.1 Introduction 6.1.1 Contract Law and the Reliance Problem 6.2 Production with Relationship Specific Investments 6.2.1 Characterizing Efficient Investment 6.2.2 The Case of General Investments 6.2.3 The Case of Relationship-SpecificInvestments 6.3 Contracting for a Good 6.3.1 The Contract Game 6.3.2 Investment with No Ex Ante Contract 6.3.3 Ex Ante Efficient Contract Design 6.4 Contracting for a Service 6.4.1 The Contracting Game 129 129 131 133 135 138 139 140 141 145 147 152 153 '
Contents 7 8 9 ix 6.4.2 Solving the Contract Game for a Service 6.4.3 Holdup and the Standard Employment Contract 6.4.4 Price and Wage Indexing 6.5 Discussion 6.6 Exercises 154 157 164 167 169 Insurance and Moral Hazard 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Basic Agency Model 7.3 Moral Hazard and Agency Theory 7.3.1 Multiple Signals and Tasks 7.3.2 The Lake Wobegone Effect: Penalties and the Probability of Detection 7.4 Career Concerns 7.4.1 Market Wage Determination 7.4.2 Incentive Contracts with Career Concerns 7.5 Discussion 7.6 Exercises 173 173 175 178 181 Trade with Asymmetric Information 8.1 Introduction 8.1.1 Trade with Asymmetric Information 8.2 The Base Model 8.2.1 Revelation Principle 8.3 The Normative Evaluation of Allocations under Asymmetric Information 8.4 Characterizing the Set of Incentive Compatible Allocations 8.4.1 The Set of Incentive-Compatible Allocations with Specific Performance 8.4.2 Voluntary Exchange 8.4.3 Implementing Ex Post Efficient Trade 8.5 Power and Asymmetric Information: Monopoly and Monopsony 8.5.1 Informed Seller and Efficient Monopoly 8.5.2 Monopsony and Uber Economics 8.6 Discussion 8.7 Exercises Relational Contracts 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Breach and Contract Design 9.3 The Production Environment 9.3.1 Normal Commodities 9.3.2 Innovative Commodities 9.3.3 Discounted Expected Payoffs 9.3.4 Feasible Allocations 9.4 Relational Contracts with Symmetric Information 9.4.1 Renegotiation 188 192 193 196 197 200 205 205 207 208 210 215 219 219 225 228 233 234 245 250 252 257 257 259 260 262 263 263 264 267 275
x Contents 9.5 9.6 9.7 Relational Contracts with Moral Hazard 9.5.1 Contracts for Normal and Innovative Commodities 9.5.2 The Market Mechanism and Efficiency Wages 9.5.3 Efficient Relational Contracts with Moral Hazard Discussion 9.6.1 What Is Reputation? Exercises 278 279 281 286 291 294 296 10 Opportunism and Conflict in Agency Relationships 10.1 Introduction 10.2 A 2 x 2 Example 10.3 Modeling Subjective Evaluation 10.3.1 The Environment 10.3.2 Contracts 10.4 The Authority Contract 10.4.1 Relational Contracts 10.4.2 Efficiency Wage Contracts 10.5 The Sales Contract with Subjective Evaluation 10.5.1 Contracting with an Uninformed Principal 10.5.2 Optimal Sales Contracts 10.5.3 Opportunism and Contract Complexity 10.5.4 Effort Neutral Information Systems 10.6 Discussion 10.7 Exercises 299 299 301 306 307 308 310 314 317 318 319 322 326 327 329 333 11 Summary 11.1 Price Theory and the Role of Evidence 11.2 Decision and Game Theory 11.3 The Theory of Exchange 11.4 Relational Contracts and Social Norms 335 336 338 340 346 Appendix A.l Constrained Optimization Theory A.2 Pareto Optimal Allocations in an Exchange Economy A.3 The Welfare Theorems of General Equilibrium Theory 353 353 355 358 Notes References Index 363 373 389 |
| adam_txt |
Contents Preface xi 1 Introduction 1.1 Price Theory 1.1.1 Commodities 1.1.2 Value 1.1.3 The Welfare Theorems of General Equilibrium Theory 1.2 Beyond Price Theory 1.2.1 The Trade Price 1.2.2 The Contract Price 1.3 The Agenda 1 2 2 3 4 6 6 8 14 2 Evidence, Models, and Decision Making 2.1 Introduction 2.1.1 “Superstition” in the Pigeon 2.2 Models for Representation 2.3 Population Models 2.3.1 The Mincer Wage Equation 2.4 Causality 2.5 Discussion 2.6 Exercises 17 17 19 20 24 26 28 32 33 3 Decision Theory 3.1 Decision Making and the Economics Paradigm 3.2 Behavior and the Rational Choice Model 3.2.1 Is the Rational Choice Model Restrictive? 3.2.2 Continuity of Preferences 3.3 Risk 3.3.1 Risk Aversion 3.4 Uncertainty and Beliefs 3.4.1 The Small World Model 3.4.2 Preferences in the Face of Uncertainty 3.4.3 The Value of Information 35 35 36 39 40 41 46 49 50 54 57
viti Contents 3.5 Discussion 3.6 Exercises 60 61 4 Game Theory 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Concept of a Strategy 4.2.1 The Monty Hall Problem 4.3 Rational Choice in a Game 4.4 Nash Equilibrium 4.5 The Problem of Commitment 4.6 Sequential Equilibria and Other Solution Concepts 4.6.1 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria 4.6.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria 4.7 Repeated Games and the Payoff Possibilities Set 4.7.1 Repeated Game Payoffs 4.7.2 Repeated Game Strategies 4.7.3 Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 4.7.4 Characterization of the Payoffs in Repeated Games 4.7.5 Infinitely Repeated Games 4.8 Discussion 4.9 Exercises 65 65 67 71 73 77 79 85 86 87 87 88 91 92 95 98 99 100 5 Bargaining and the Buyer-Seller Model 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Buyer-Seller Model 5.3 Nash Bargaining Solution 5.4 Contract Bargaining 5.4.1 The Payoffs 5.4.2 The Renegotiation Game 5.4.3 Construction of the Bargaining Equilibrium 5.4.4 Outside Options 5.5 Discussion 5.6 Exercises 103 103 105 107 111 112 113 116 118 124 126 6 Reliance, Holdup, and Breach 6.1 Introduction 6.1.1 Contract Law and the Reliance Problem 6.2 Production with Relationship Specific Investments 6.2.1 Characterizing Efficient Investment 6.2.2 The Case of General Investments 6.2.3 The Case of Relationship-SpecificInvestments 6.3 Contracting for a Good 6.3.1 The Contract Game 6.3.2 Investment with No Ex Ante Contract 6.3.3 Ex Ante Efficient Contract Design 6.4 Contracting for a Service 6.4.1 The Contracting Game 129 129 131 133 135 138 139 140 141 145 147 152 153 '
Contents 7 8 9 ix 6.4.2 Solving the Contract Game for a Service 6.4.3 Holdup and the Standard Employment Contract 6.4.4 Price and Wage Indexing 6.5 Discussion 6.6 Exercises 154 157 164 167 169 Insurance and Moral Hazard 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Basic Agency Model 7.3 Moral Hazard and Agency Theory 7.3.1 Multiple Signals and Tasks 7.3.2 The Lake Wobegone Effect: Penalties and the Probability of Detection 7.4 Career Concerns 7.4.1 Market Wage Determination 7.4.2 Incentive Contracts with Career Concerns 7.5 Discussion 7.6 Exercises 173 173 175 178 181 Trade with Asymmetric Information 8.1 Introduction 8.1.1 Trade with Asymmetric Information 8.2 The Base Model 8.2.1 Revelation Principle 8.3 The Normative Evaluation of Allocations under Asymmetric Information 8.4 Characterizing the Set of Incentive Compatible Allocations 8.4.1 The Set of Incentive-Compatible Allocations with Specific Performance 8.4.2 Voluntary Exchange 8.4.3 Implementing Ex Post Efficient Trade 8.5 Power and Asymmetric Information: Monopoly and Monopsony 8.5.1 Informed Seller and Efficient Monopoly 8.5.2 Monopsony and Uber Economics 8.6 Discussion 8.7 Exercises Relational Contracts 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Breach and Contract Design 9.3 The Production Environment 9.3.1 Normal Commodities 9.3.2 Innovative Commodities 9.3.3 Discounted Expected Payoffs 9.3.4 Feasible Allocations 9.4 Relational Contracts with Symmetric Information 9.4.1 Renegotiation 188 192 193 196 197 200 205 205 207 208 210 215 219 219 225 228 233 234 245 250 252 257 257 259 260 262 263 263 264 267 275
x Contents 9.5 9.6 9.7 Relational Contracts with Moral Hazard 9.5.1 Contracts for Normal and Innovative Commodities 9.5.2 The Market Mechanism and Efficiency Wages 9.5.3 Efficient Relational Contracts with Moral Hazard Discussion 9.6.1 What Is Reputation? Exercises 278 279 281 286 291 294 296 10 Opportunism and Conflict in Agency Relationships 10.1 Introduction 10.2 A 2 x 2 Example 10.3 Modeling Subjective Evaluation 10.3.1 The Environment 10.3.2 Contracts 10.4 The Authority Contract 10.4.1 Relational Contracts 10.4.2 Efficiency Wage Contracts 10.5 The Sales Contract with Subjective Evaluation 10.5.1 Contracting with an Uninformed Principal 10.5.2 Optimal Sales Contracts 10.5.3 Opportunism and Contract Complexity 10.5.4 Effort Neutral Information Systems 10.6 Discussion 10.7 Exercises 299 299 301 306 307 308 310 314 317 318 319 322 326 327 329 333 11 Summary 11.1 Price Theory and the Role of Evidence 11.2 Decision and Game Theory 11.3 The Theory of Exchange 11.4 Relational Contracts and Social Norms 335 336 338 340 346 Appendix A.l Constrained Optimization Theory A.2 Pareto Optimal Allocations in an Exchange Economy A.3 The Welfare Theorems of General Equilibrium Theory 353 353 355 358 Notes References Index 363 373 389 |
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| spelling | MacLeod, William Bentley 1954- Verfasser (DE-588)124510124 aut Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics W. Bentley MacLeod Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England The MIT Press [2022] © 2022 x, 398 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme, Pläne txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Empirie (DE-588)4152104-3 gnd rswk-swf Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd rswk-swf Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-588)4079348-5 gnd rswk-swf Microeconomics (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 s Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-588)4079348-5 s Empirie (DE-588)4152104-3 s Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB 978-0-262-36946-6 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=033048128&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | MacLeod, William Bentley 1954- Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics Empirie (DE-588)4152104-3 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-588)4079348-5 gnd |
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| title | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics |
| title_auth | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics |
| title_exact_search | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics |
| title_full | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics W. Bentley MacLeod |
| title_fullStr | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics W. Bentley MacLeod |
| title_full_unstemmed | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics W. Bentley MacLeod |
| title_short | Advanced microeconomics for contract, institutional, and organizational economics |
| title_sort | advanced microeconomics for contract institutional and organizational economics |
| topic | Empirie (DE-588)4152104-3 gnd Mikroökonomie (DE-588)4039225-9 gnd Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-588)4079348-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Empirie Mikroökonomie Organisation Kontrakttheorie Wirtschaftsmodell Lehrbuch |
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