Learning from our mistakes: epistemology for the real world
"In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses that framework to propose a new way of understanding rational belief. His proposal makes epistemology relevant to the real world, whic...
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2021]
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| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses that framework to propose a new way of understanding rational belief. His proposal makes epistemology relevant to the real world, which he illustrates with a new theory of racial, gender and other kinds of prejudice, a new diagnosis of the sources of the inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, and insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth. Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics. It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires sensitivity to clues, the maginative ability to generate alternative explanatory narratives that fit the clues, and the ability to select the most coherent explanatory narrative. Sensitivity to clues requires sensitivity not only to evidence that supports one's own beliefs, but also to evidence that casts doubt on them. One of the most important characteristics of a good learner is the ability to correct mistakes. Talbott articulates nine principles that help to explain the difference between rational and irrational belief. Talbott contrasts his approach with the approach of historically important philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn. He also contrasts his approach with a variety of contemporary approaches, including pragmatism, Bayesianism, and naturalism. He responds to the main criticisms of his method from the experimental philosophy literature"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 348 Seiten 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780197567654 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses that framework to propose a new way of understanding rational belief. His proposal makes epistemology relevant to the real world, which he illustrates with a new theory of racial, gender and other kinds of prejudice, a new diagnosis of the sources of the inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, and insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth. Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics. It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires sensitivity to clues, the maginative ability to generate alternative explanatory narratives that fit the clues, and the ability to select the most coherent explanatory narrative. Sensitivity to clues requires sensitivity not only to evidence that supports one's own beliefs, but also to evidence that casts doubt on them. One of the most important characteristics of a good learner is the ability to correct mistakes. Talbott articulates nine principles that help to explain the difference between rational and irrational belief. Talbott contrasts his approach with the approach of historically important philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn. He also contrasts his approach with a variety of contemporary approaches, including pragmatism, Bayesianism, and naturalism. He responds to the main criticisms of his method from the experimental philosophy literature"-- | |
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| adam_text | Contents Acknowledgments ix I. THE PROOF PARADIGM AND THE CAUSAL REVOLUTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY Introduction 3 1. The Proof Paradigm 19 2. Two Crises for the Proof Paradigm in the Enlightenment 34 3. The End of the Proof Paradigm? 59 4. The Causal Revolution in Epistemology 82 II. A NEW WAY OF UNDERSTANDING EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 5. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Ground-Level Rationality 101 6. Two More Principles of Epistemic Rationality 125 III. AND EPISTEMIC IRRATIONALITY 7. Epistemology for the Real World: Prejudiced Beliefs and Other Kinds of Epistemically Irrational Biased Beliefs 149 8. Internally Inconsistent, Self-Refuting, and Self-Undermining Views 171 IV. MORE ON EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 9. Bayesian Accounts of Epistemic Rationality 183 10. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Metacognitive Rationality 202 11. Necessity and Universality 228
viii CONTENTS 12. The Evolutionary Naturalist Challenge to Non-Naturalist Normative Epistemic Realism 243 V. CLARIFICATIONS, RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS, AND CONCLUSION 13. Clarifications and Objections Conclusion Appendix A: Two Principles ofEpistemic Rationality Appendix B: The General Metacognitive Expected Relative Frequency (MERF) Principle Notes References Index 269 299 307 311 313 335 345
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| adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgments ix I. THE PROOF PARADIGM AND THE CAUSAL REVOLUTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY Introduction 3 1. The Proof Paradigm 19 2. Two Crises for the Proof Paradigm in the Enlightenment 34 3. The End of the Proof Paradigm? 59 4. The Causal Revolution in Epistemology 82 II. A NEW WAY OF UNDERSTANDING EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 5. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Ground-Level Rationality 101 6. Two More Principles of Epistemic Rationality 125 III. AND EPISTEMIC IRRATIONALITY 7. Epistemology for the Real World: Prejudiced Beliefs and Other Kinds of Epistemically Irrational Biased Beliefs 149 8. Internally Inconsistent, Self-Refuting, and Self-Undermining Views 171 IV. MORE ON EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 9. Bayesian Accounts of Epistemic Rationality 183 10. An Alternative to the Proof Paradigm for Metacognitive Rationality 202 11. Necessity and Universality 228
viii CONTENTS 12. The Evolutionary Naturalist Challenge to Non-Naturalist Normative Epistemic Realism 243 V. CLARIFICATIONS, RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS, AND CONCLUSION 13. Clarifications and Objections Conclusion Appendix A: Two Principles ofEpistemic Rationality Appendix B: The General Metacognitive Expected Relative Frequency (MERF) Principle Notes References Index 269 299 307 311 313 335 345 |
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| author | Talbott, William J. |
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| bvnumber | BV047552127 |
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| discipline | Philosophie |
| discipline_str_mv | Philosophie |
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| isbn | 9780197567654 |
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| spelling | Talbott, William J. Verfasser (DE-588)1229292705 aut Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world William J. Talbott New York, NY Oxford University Press [2021] © 2021 xi, 348 Seiten 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "In Learning from Our Mistakes: Epistemology for the Real World, Talbott provides a new framework for understanding the history of Western epistemology and uses that framework to propose a new way of understanding rational belief. His proposal makes epistemology relevant to the real world, which he illustrates with a new theory of racial, gender and other kinds of prejudice, a new diagnosis of the sources of the inequity in the U.S. criminal justice system, and insight into the proliferation of tribal and fascist epistemologies based on alt-facts and alt-truth. Talbott's new model of rational belief is not a model of a theorem prover in mathematics. It is a model of a good learner. Being a good learner requires sensitivity to clues, the maginative ability to generate alternative explanatory narratives that fit the clues, and the ability to select the most coherent explanatory narrative. Sensitivity to clues requires sensitivity not only to evidence that supports one's own beliefs, but also to evidence that casts doubt on them. One of the most important characteristics of a good learner is the ability to correct mistakes. Talbott articulates nine principles that help to explain the difference between rational and irrational belief. Talbott contrasts his approach with the approach of historically important philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn. He also contrasts his approach with a variety of contemporary approaches, including pragmatism, Bayesianism, and naturalism. He responds to the main criticisms of his method from the experimental philosophy literature"-- Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Knowledge, Theory of / History Knowledge, Theory of History Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 s Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032927739&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Talbott, William J. Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4129164-5 (DE-588)4070914-0 |
| title | Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world |
| title_auth | Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world |
| title_exact_search | Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world |
| title_full | Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world William J. Talbott |
| title_fullStr | Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world William J. Talbott |
| title_full_unstemmed | Learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world William J. Talbott |
| title_short | Learning from our mistakes |
| title_sort | learning from our mistakes epistemology for the real world |
| title_sub | epistemology for the real world |
| topic | Rationalismus (DE-588)4129164-5 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Rationalismus Erkenntnistheorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032927739&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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