Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America: The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile
Few tasks are as crucial for the future of democracy in Latin America-and, indeed, in other underdeveloped areas of the world-as strengthening the rule of law and reforming the system of taxation.In this book, Marcelo Bergman shows how success in getting citizens to pay their taxes is related intima...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University Park, PA
Penn State University Press
[2021]
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | DE-1046 DE-858 DE-859 DE-860 DE-739 DE-473 Volltext |
| Summary: | Few tasks are as crucial for the future of democracy in Latin America-and, indeed, in other underdeveloped areas of the world-as strengthening the rule of law and reforming the system of taxation.In this book, Marcelo Bergman shows how success in getting citizens to pay their taxes is related intimately to the social norms that undergird the rule of law. The threat of legal sanctions is itself insufficient to motivate compliance, he argues. That kind of deterrence works best when citizens already have other reasons to want to comply, based on their beliefs about what is fair and about how their fellow citizens are behaving. The problem of ";free riding,"; which arises when cheaters can count on enough suckers to pay their taxes so they can avoid doing so and still benefit from the government's supply of public goods, cannot be reversed just by stringent law, because the success of governmental enforcement ultimately depends on the social equilibrium that predominates in each country. Culture and state effectiveness are inherently linked.Using a wealth of new data drawn from his own multidimensional research involving game theory, statistical models, surveys, and simulations, Bergman compares Argentina and Chile to show how, in two societies that otherwise share much in common, the differing traditions of rule of law explain why so many citizens evade paying taxes in Argentina-and why, in Chile, most citizens comply with the law. In the concluding chapter, he draws implications for public policy from the empirical findings and generalizes his argument to other societies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe |
| Item Description: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 27. Sep 2021) |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (280 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780271058818 |
| DOI: | 10.1515/9780271058818 |
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| 520 | |a Few tasks are as crucial for the future of democracy in Latin America-and, indeed, in other underdeveloped areas of the world-as strengthening the rule of law and reforming the system of taxation.In this book, Marcelo Bergman shows how success in getting citizens to pay their taxes is related intimately to the social norms that undergird the rule of law. The threat of legal sanctions is itself insufficient to motivate compliance, he argues. That kind of deterrence works best when citizens already have other reasons to want to comply, based on their beliefs about what is fair and about how their fellow citizens are behaving. The problem of ";free riding,"; which arises when cheaters can count on enough suckers to pay their taxes so they can avoid doing so and still benefit from the government's supply of public goods, cannot be reversed just by stringent law, because the success of governmental enforcement ultimately depends on the social equilibrium that predominates in each country. Culture and state effectiveness are inherently linked.Using a wealth of new data drawn from his own multidimensional research involving game theory, statistical models, surveys, and simulations, Bergman compares Argentina and Chile to show how, in two societies that otherwise share much in common, the differing traditions of rule of law explain why so many citizens evade paying taxes in Argentina-and why, in Chile, most citizens comply with the law. In the concluding chapter, he draws implications for public policy from the empirical findings and generalizes his argument to other societies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe | ||
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| spelling | Bergman, Marcelo Verfasser aut Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile Marcelo Bergman University Park, PA Penn State University Press [2021] © 2009 1 online resource (280 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 27. Sep 2021) Few tasks are as crucial for the future of democracy in Latin America-and, indeed, in other underdeveloped areas of the world-as strengthening the rule of law and reforming the system of taxation.In this book, Marcelo Bergman shows how success in getting citizens to pay their taxes is related intimately to the social norms that undergird the rule of law. The threat of legal sanctions is itself insufficient to motivate compliance, he argues. That kind of deterrence works best when citizens already have other reasons to want to comply, based on their beliefs about what is fair and about how their fellow citizens are behaving. The problem of ";free riding,"; which arises when cheaters can count on enough suckers to pay their taxes so they can avoid doing so and still benefit from the government's supply of public goods, cannot be reversed just by stringent law, because the success of governmental enforcement ultimately depends on the social equilibrium that predominates in each country. Culture and state effectiveness are inherently linked.Using a wealth of new data drawn from his own multidimensional research involving game theory, statistical models, surveys, and simulations, Bergman compares Argentina and Chile to show how, in two societies that otherwise share much in common, the differing traditions of rule of law explain why so many citizens evade paying taxes in Argentina-and why, in Chile, most citizens comply with the law. In the concluding chapter, he draws implications for public policy from the empirical findings and generalizes his argument to other societies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe In English POLITICAL SCIENCE / Comparative Politics bisacsh Tax administration and procedure Argentina Tax administration and procedure Chile Tax evasion Argentina Tax evasion Chile Tax evasion Law and legislation Argentina Tax evasion Law and legislation Chile Taxation Law and legislation Argentina Taxation Law and legislation Chile Argentina Chile Argentinien Taxation Law and legislation Chile Taxation Argentina Taxation Chile Taxpayer compliance Argentina Taxpayer compliance Chile https://doi.org/10.1515/9780271058818 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bergman, Marcelo Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile POLITICAL SCIENCE / Comparative Politics bisacsh Tax administration and procedure Argentina Tax administration and procedure Chile Tax evasion Argentina Tax evasion Chile Tax evasion Law and legislation Argentina Tax evasion Law and legislation Chile Taxation Law and legislation Argentina Taxation Law and legislation Chile Argentina Chile Argentinien Taxation Law and legislation Chile Taxation Argentina Taxation Chile Taxpayer compliance Argentina Taxpayer compliance Chile |
| title | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile |
| title_auth | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile |
| title_exact_search | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile |
| title_full | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile Marcelo Bergman |
| title_fullStr | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile Marcelo Bergman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile Marcelo Bergman |
| title_short | Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America |
| title_sort | tax evasion and the rule of law in latin america the political culture of cheating and compliance in argentina and chile |
| title_sub | The Political Culture of Cheating and Compliance in Argentina and Chile |
| topic | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Comparative Politics bisacsh Tax administration and procedure Argentina Tax administration and procedure Chile Tax evasion Argentina Tax evasion Chile Tax evasion Law and legislation Argentina Tax evasion Law and legislation Chile Taxation Law and legislation Argentina Taxation Law and legislation Chile Argentina Chile Argentinien Taxation Law and legislation Chile Taxation Argentina Taxation Chile Taxpayer compliance Argentina Taxpayer compliance Chile |
| topic_facet | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Comparative Politics Tax administration and procedure Argentina Tax administration and procedure Chile Tax evasion Argentina Tax evasion Chile Tax evasion Law and legislation Argentina Tax evasion Law and legislation Chile Taxation Law and legislation Argentina Taxation Law and legislation Chile Argentina Chile Argentinien Taxation Law and legislation Chile Taxation Argentina Taxation Chile Taxpayer compliance Argentina Taxpayer compliance Chile |
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