The metaphysics of sensory experience:
What are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In this book David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [England] ; New York
Oxford University Press
2021
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | What are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In this book David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends a new alternative.0Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naive realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, however Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead, he argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial intuition, yet Papineau develops this qualitative theory in detail and illustrates how it can accommodate the rich structure of sensory experience. 0Papineau's qualitative account has respectable antecedents in the history of philosophy. By placing the qualitative theory on a firm footing, he shows that those curious about experience need not be restricted to the options in contemporary philosophical discourse |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 163 Seiten 23 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780198862390 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a What are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In this book David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends a new alternative.0Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naive realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, however Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead, he argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial intuition, yet Papineau develops this qualitative theory in detail and illustrates how it can accommodate the rich structure of sensory experience. 0Papineau's qualitative account has respectable antecedents in the history of philosophy. By placing the qualitative theory on a firm footing, he shows that those curious about experience need not be restricted to the options in contemporary philosophical discourse | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents Preface Introduction 1. Clearing the Ground 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 Sensation versus Perception Sensation versus Cognition Properties and Experiences Naive Realism: Outline Naïve Realism and the Time-Lag Problem Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarities Mental Contact with Reality The Instability of Naïve Realism Sense-Datum Theories Representationalism: Contingent and Essential Representationalism: Naturalists and Phenomenal Intentionalists 1.12 Representationalism: Content and Mode 1.13 Representationalism: Broadness, Supervenience, and Identity 2. Against Representationalism 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 The Metaphysical Challenge Initial Representationalist Thoughts Naturalist Theories of Representation The Implausibility of Naturalist Representationalism The Distractions of Broadness Broadness in Context The Appeal to Transparency Free-Floating Properties Mysteries of Mental Contact Here-and-Now The Efficacy of Mental Representation The Incommensurability of Conscious and Representational Properties 2.13 Pure Phenomenal Intentionalism 2.14 What Are the Truth Conditions? be 1 9 9 11 14 16 18 20 22 24 28 30 32 34 35 39 39 40 45 49 52 55 57 60 62 65 67 71 74 76
viii CONTENTS 3. The 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 Structure of Experience The Qualitative View No Problems Block, Peacocke, and Qualia Functionalism and ‘Role Semantics’ The Organization of Experience Quasi-Objects and Their Quasi-Properties Intentional Objects A Dangerous Contusion Paint That Doesn’t Point Spatial Experience 83 83 84 85 87 91 93 97 102 106 109 4. Introspection, Adverbialism, and Rich Contents 4.1 Not Sense Data 4.2 Awareness 4.3 Transparency Revisited 4.4 The Complications of Attention 4.5 Introspection of Experience 4.6 Contentful Mental States 4.7 Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument 4.8 Talking about Experience 4.9 Red Squares and Green Circles 4.10 Rich Sensory Contents 4.11 Very Rich Sensory Contents 114 114 115 117 119 121 125 129 136 141 145 148 References Index 153 161
|
| adam_txt |
Contents Preface Introduction 1. Clearing the Ground 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 Sensation versus Perception Sensation versus Cognition Properties and Experiences Naive Realism: Outline Naïve Realism and the Time-Lag Problem Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarities Mental Contact with Reality The Instability of Naïve Realism Sense-Datum Theories Representationalism: Contingent and Essential Representationalism: Naturalists and Phenomenal Intentionalists 1.12 Representationalism: Content and Mode 1.13 Representationalism: Broadness, Supervenience, and Identity 2. Against Representationalism 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 2.12 The Metaphysical Challenge Initial Representationalist Thoughts Naturalist Theories of Representation The Implausibility of Naturalist Representationalism The Distractions of Broadness Broadness in Context The Appeal to Transparency Free-Floating Properties Mysteries of Mental Contact Here-and-Now The Efficacy of Mental Representation The Incommensurability of Conscious and Representational Properties 2.13 Pure Phenomenal Intentionalism 2.14 What Are the Truth Conditions? be 1 9 9 11 14 16 18 20 22 24 28 30 32 34 35 39 39 40 45 49 52 55 57 60 62 65 67 71 74 76
viii CONTENTS 3. The 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 Structure of Experience The Qualitative View No Problems Block, Peacocke, and Qualia Functionalism and ‘Role Semantics’ The Organization of Experience Quasi-Objects and Their Quasi-Properties Intentional Objects A Dangerous Contusion Paint That Doesn’t Point Spatial Experience 83 83 84 85 87 91 93 97 102 106 109 4. Introspection, Adverbialism, and Rich Contents 4.1 Not Sense Data 4.2 Awareness 4.3 Transparency Revisited 4.4 The Complications of Attention 4.5 Introspection of Experience 4.6 Contentful Mental States 4.7 Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument 4.8 Talking about Experience 4.9 Red Squares and Green Circles 4.10 Rich Sensory Contents 4.11 Very Rich Sensory Contents 114 114 115 117 119 121 125 129 136 141 145 148 References Index 153 161 |
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| author | Papineau, David 1947- |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T18:06:43Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:12:48Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780198862390 |
| language | English |
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| physical | xi, 163 Seiten 23 cm |
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| spelling | Papineau, David 1947- Verfasser (DE-588)131460145 aut The metaphysics of sensory experience David Papineau First edition Oxford [England] ; New York Oxford University Press 2021 xi, 163 Seiten 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier What are the materials of conscious perceptual experience? What is going on when we are consciously aware of a visual scene, or hear sounds, or otherwise enjoy sensory experience? In this book David Papineau exposes the flaws in contemporary answers to this central philosophical question and defends a new alternative.0Contemporary theories of perceptual experience all hold that conscious experiences reach out into the world beyond the mind. According to naive realism, experiences literally incorporate perceived facts, while representationalism holds that experiences contain ordinary properties of the kind possessed by physical objects. These ideas might seem attractive at first sight, however Papineau shows that they do not stand up to examination. Instead, he argues for a purely qualitative account of sensory experience. Conscious sensory experiences are intrinsic states with no essential connection to external circumstances or represented properties. This might run counter to initial intuition, yet Papineau develops this qualitative theory in detail and illustrates how it can accommodate the rich structure of sensory experience. 0Papineau's qualitative account has respectable antecedents in the history of philosophy. By placing the qualitative theory on a firm footing, he shows that those curious about experience need not be restricted to the options in contemporary philosophical discourse Sensualismus (DE-588)4181004-1 gnd rswk-swf Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Senses and sensation / Philosophy Metaphysics Sensualismus (DE-588)4181004-1 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032863808&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Papineau, David 1947- The metaphysics of sensory experience Sensualismus (DE-588)4181004-1 gnd Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4181004-1 (DE-588)4038936-4 (DE-588)4070914-0 |
| title | The metaphysics of sensory experience |
| title_auth | The metaphysics of sensory experience |
| title_exact_search | The metaphysics of sensory experience |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The metaphysics of sensory experience |
| title_full | The metaphysics of sensory experience David Papineau |
| title_fullStr | The metaphysics of sensory experience David Papineau |
| title_full_unstemmed | The metaphysics of sensory experience David Papineau |
| title_short | The metaphysics of sensory experience |
| title_sort | the metaphysics of sensory experience |
| topic | Sensualismus (DE-588)4181004-1 gnd Metaphysik (DE-588)4038936-4 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Sensualismus Metaphysik Erkenntnistheorie |
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