The EU Gas Game, Time to Redefine the Rules? Case Studies of Russia and Norway and Lessons for the EU, Norway and Poland - Gawlikowska-Fyk, Aleksandra; Nowak, Zuzanna; Puka, Lidia; Parkes, Roderick; Barnett, Brien; Dołęgowska, Dorota (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2015)
The EU’s heavy reliance on imports of energy resources leaves it vulnerable to external suppliers and comes at an economic and political cost. Among the EU’s energy imports its governance vulnerability is especially visible in the gas sector. This is because pipeline infrastructure, longterm contracts, price formulas and an underdeveloped European market weaken the EU’s hand in bargaining with its major gas suppliers, principally Russia and Norway. Norwegian and Russian gas constitutes 80% of all gas imports to the EU. The European Union does have one considerable lever in dealing with Norway and Russia: it is a very attractive market for both countries. This gives the EU some scope to set the rules of the game in terms of gas. The EU assumes the establishment of a fully-fledged European internal market, as well as implementing competition law and exporting market regulations beyond its borders in a bid to reduce prices and depoliticise gas imports, but that raises a question about whether the EU is neglecting other tools available to the EU, such as brute political or financial levers. Indeed the lack of political cohesion among the Member States remains the EU’s Achilles’ heel and its financial capacity is insufficient to force the market to integrate