Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion:
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Warszawa [Poland]
Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych
2015
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 |
Beschreibung: | The sanctions are not about democracy promotion in Russia, rather they aim to give a chance for a deeper democracy to take root and thrive in Ukraine, in tune with the popular demands expressed in 2013-2014. The sanctions do not seek to weaken Russia per se. Their reversibility shows that the main goal is to help Ukrainian statehood survive in the context of Russia’s military aggression. As the West has ruled out direct use of lethal means to protect Ukraine, the sanctions came to represent an efficient, low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and constrain Russia’s power. It was pivotal that the West responded as it did in 2014. Had it delayed, the Russian aggression, unopposed, would have threatened not only Ukraine’s existence but some of its neighbours as well. In this case, the West would have been forced to design a response anyway, although one ultimately riskier and costlier |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (1 p. 89) |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV047450056 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 210902s2015 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
035 | |a (ZDB-45-CGR)ceeol568556 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)1268193990 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV047450056 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
049 | |a DE-12 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Secrieru, Stanislav |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion |c Stanislav Secrieru |
264 | 1 | |a Warszawa [Poland] |b Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych |c 2015 | |
264 | 2 | |a Frankfurt M. |b CEEOL |c 2015 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (1 p. 89) | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
500 | |a The sanctions are not about democracy promotion in Russia, rather they aim to give a chance for a deeper democracy to take root and thrive in Ukraine, in tune with the popular demands expressed in 2013-2014. The sanctions do not seek to weaken Russia per se. Their reversibility shows that the main goal is to help Ukrainian statehood survive in the context of Russia’s military aggression. As the West has ruled out direct use of lethal means to protect Ukraine, the sanctions came to represent an efficient, low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and constrain Russia’s power. It was pivotal that the West responded as it did in 2014. Had it delayed, the Russian aggression, unopposed, would have threatened not only Ukraine’s existence but some of its neighbours as well. In this case, the West would have been forced to design a response anyway, although one ultimately riskier and costlier | ||
650 | 4 | |a Economic policy | |
650 | 4 | |a International relations/trade | |
650 | 4 | |a Developing nations | |
650 | 4 | |a EU-Accession / EU-DEvelopment | |
650 | 4 | |a Geopolitics | |
710 | 2 | |a Central and Eastern European Online Library |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
912 | |a ZDB-45-CGR | ||
940 | 1 | |n oe | |
940 | 1 | |q BSB_OE_CEEOL | |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032852054 | ||
966 | e | |u https://www.ceeol.com/search/book-detail?id=568556 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-45-CGR |x Verlag |3 Volltext |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804182747541929984 |
---|---|
adam_txt | |
any_adam_object | |
any_adam_object_boolean | |
author | Secrieru, Stanislav |
author_facet | Secrieru, Stanislav |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Secrieru, Stanislav |
author_variant | s s ss |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV047450056 |
collection | ZDB-45-CGR |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-45-CGR)ceeol568556 (OCoLC)1268193990 (DE-599)BVBBV047450056 |
format | Electronic eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02201nmm a2200397zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV047450056</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">210902s2015 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-45-CGR)ceeol568556</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1268193990</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV047450056</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Secrieru, Stanislav</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion</subfield><subfield code="c">Stanislav Secrieru</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Warszawa [Poland]</subfield><subfield code="b">Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych</subfield><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Frankfurt M.</subfield><subfield code="b">CEEOL</subfield><subfield code="c">2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (1 p. 89)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The sanctions are not about democracy promotion in Russia, rather they aim to give a chance for a deeper democracy to take root and thrive in Ukraine, in tune with the popular demands expressed in 2013-2014. The sanctions do not seek to weaken Russia per se. Their reversibility shows that the main goal is to help Ukrainian statehood survive in the context of Russia’s military aggression. As the West has ruled out direct use of lethal means to protect Ukraine, the sanctions came to represent an efficient, low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and constrain Russia’s power. It was pivotal that the West responded as it did in 2014. Had it delayed, the Russian aggression, unopposed, would have threatened not only Ukraine’s existence but some of its neighbours as well. In this case, the West would have been forced to design a response anyway, although one ultimately riskier and costlier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic policy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">International relations/trade</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Developing nations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">EU-Accession / EU-DEvelopment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geopolitics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Central and Eastern European Online Library</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-45-CGR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">BSB_OE_CEEOL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032852054</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.ceeol.com/search/book-detail?id=568556</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-45-CGR</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV047450056 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T18:03:11Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:12:28Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032852054 |
oclc_num | 1268193990 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (1 p. 89) |
psigel | ZDB-45-CGR BSB_OE_CEEOL |
publishDate | 2015 |
publishDateSearch | 2015 |
publishDateSort | 2015 |
publisher | Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Secrieru, Stanislav Verfasser aut Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion Stanislav Secrieru Warszawa [Poland] Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych 2015 Frankfurt M. CEEOL 2015 1 Online-Ressource (1 p. 89) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier The sanctions are not about democracy promotion in Russia, rather they aim to give a chance for a deeper democracy to take root and thrive in Ukraine, in tune with the popular demands expressed in 2013-2014. The sanctions do not seek to weaken Russia per se. Their reversibility shows that the main goal is to help Ukrainian statehood survive in the context of Russia’s military aggression. As the West has ruled out direct use of lethal means to protect Ukraine, the sanctions came to represent an efficient, low-cost tool to shelter Ukraine and constrain Russia’s power. It was pivotal that the West responded as it did in 2014. Had it delayed, the Russian aggression, unopposed, would have threatened not only Ukraine’s existence but some of its neighbours as well. In this case, the West would have been forced to design a response anyway, although one ultimately riskier and costlier Economic policy International relations/trade Developing nations EU-Accession / EU-DEvelopment Geopolitics Central and Eastern European Online Library Sonstige oth |
spellingShingle | Secrieru, Stanislav Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion Economic policy International relations/trade Developing nations EU-Accession / EU-DEvelopment Geopolitics |
title | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion |
title_auth | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion |
title_exact_search | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion |
title_exact_search_txtP | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion |
title_full | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion Stanislav Secrieru |
title_fullStr | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion Stanislav Secrieru |
title_full_unstemmed | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion Stanislav Secrieru |
title_short | Russia under Sanctions, Assessing the Damage, Scrutinising Adaptation and Evasion |
title_sort | russia under sanctions assessing the damage scrutinising adaptation and evasion |
topic | Economic policy International relations/trade Developing nations EU-Accession / EU-DEvelopment Geopolitics |
topic_facet | Economic policy International relations/trade Developing nations EU-Accession / EU-DEvelopment Geopolitics |
work_keys_str_mv | AT secrierustanislav russiaundersanctionsassessingthedamagescrutinisingadaptationandevasion AT centralandeasterneuropeanonlinelibrary russiaundersanctionsassessingthedamagescrutinisingadaptationandevasion |