Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market:

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Bester, Helmut 1953- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Berlin Freie Universität Berlin June 2021
Schriftenreihe:Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics Economics 2021, 11
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Zusammenfassung:This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining
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