Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market:
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions...
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
Freie Universität Berlin
June 2021
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Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics Economics
2021, 11 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
Zusammenfassung: | This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten) Diagramme |
Internformat
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490 | 1 | |a Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics |v 2021, 11 |a Economics | |
520 | 3 | |a This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining | |
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id | DE-604.BV047397638 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T17:51:29Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T09:11:00Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032798805 |
oclc_num | 1263280527 |
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owner | DE-188 |
owner_facet | DE-188 |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten) Diagramme |
psigel | ebook |
publishDate | 2021 |
publishDateSearch | 2021 |
publishDateSort | 2021 |
publisher | Freie Universität Berlin |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics Economics |
spelling | Bester, Helmut 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)110706587 aut Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market Helmut Bester Berlin Freie Universität Berlin June 2021 1 Online-Ressource (32 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Discussion paper / Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics 2021, 11 Economics This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining competitive equilibrium fairness inequity aversion bargaining ultimatum game matching market search costs Fairness (DE-588)4153589-3 gnd rswk-swf Bilateraler Handel (DE-588)4145384-0 gnd rswk-swf Competitive balance (DE-588)1205385665 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlungsführung (DE-588)4187777-9 gnd rswk-swf Bilateraler Handel (DE-588)4145384-0 s Fairness (DE-588)4153589-3 s Verhandlungsführung (DE-588)4187777-9 s Competitive balance (DE-588)1205385665 s DE-188 Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business & Economics Discussion paper 2021, 11 : Economics (DE-604)BV026641400 2021,11 https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/31262 Resolving-System kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Bester, Helmut 1953- Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market competitive equilibrium fairness inequity aversion bargaining ultimatum game matching market search costs Fairness (DE-588)4153589-3 gnd Bilateraler Handel (DE-588)4145384-0 gnd Competitive balance (DE-588)1205385665 gnd Verhandlungsführung (DE-588)4187777-9 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4153589-3 (DE-588)4145384-0 (DE-588)1205385665 (DE-588)4187777-9 |
title | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market |
title_auth | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market |
title_exact_search | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market |
title_exact_search_txtP | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market |
title_full | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market Helmut Bester |
title_fullStr | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market Helmut Bester |
title_full_unstemmed | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market Helmut Bester |
title_short | Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market |
title_sort | fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market |
topic | competitive equilibrium fairness inequity aversion bargaining ultimatum game matching market search costs Fairness (DE-588)4153589-3 gnd Bilateraler Handel (DE-588)4145384-0 gnd Competitive balance (DE-588)1205385665 gnd Verhandlungsführung (DE-588)4187777-9 gnd |
topic_facet | competitive equilibrium fairness inequity aversion bargaining ultimatum game matching market search costs Fairness Bilateraler Handel Competitive balance Verhandlungsführung |
url | https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/31262 |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV026641400 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT besterhelmut fairnessandcompetitioninabilateralmatchingmarket |