Taking Frege at his word:
Frege is widely regarded as having set much of the agenda of contemporary analytic philosophy. As standardly read, he meant to introduce-and make crucial contributions to-the project of giving an account of the workings of (an improved version of) natural language. Yet, despite the great admiration...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY
Oxford University Press
2020
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Frege is widely regarded as having set much of the agenda of contemporary analytic philosophy. As standardly read, he meant to introduce-and make crucial contributions to-the project of giving an account of the workings of (an improved version of) natural language. Yet, despite the great admiration most contemporary philosophers feel for Frege, it is widely believed that he committed a large number of serious, and inexplicable, blunders. For, if Frege really meant to be constructing a theory of the workings of (some version of) natural language, then a significant number of his stated views-including views that he claimed to be central to his philosophical picture-are straightforwardly wrong. But did Frege mean to be giving an account of the workings of0language? He himself never actually claimed to be doing this, and, indeed, never even described such a project.0Taking Frege at his Word offers an interpretation that is based on a different approach to his writings. Rather than using the contributions he is taken to have made to contemporary work in the philosophy of language to infer what his projects were, Joan Weiner gives priority to Frege's own accounts of what he means to be doing. She provides a very different view of Frege's project. One might suspect that, on such a reading, Frege's writings would have purely antiquarian interest, but this would be a mistake. The final two chapters show that Frege offers us new ways of addressing some of the philosophical problems that worry us today |
| Beschreibung: | xxvii, 317 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780198865476 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Frege is widely regarded as having set much of the agenda of contemporary analytic philosophy. As standardly read, he meant to introduce-and make crucial contributions to-the project of giving an account of the workings of (an improved version of) natural language. Yet, despite the great admiration most contemporary philosophers feel for Frege, it is widely believed that he committed a large number of serious, and inexplicable, blunders. For, if Frege really meant to be constructing a theory of the workings of (some version of) natural language, then a significant number of his stated views-including views that he claimed to be central to his philosophical picture-are straightforwardly wrong. But did Frege mean to be giving an account of the workings of0language? He himself never actually claimed to be doing this, and, indeed, never even described such a project.0Taking Frege at his Word offers an interpretation that is based on a different approach to his writings. Rather than using the contributions he is taken to have made to contemporary work in the philosophy of language to infer what his projects were, Joan Weiner gives priority to Frege's own accounts of what he means to be doing. She provides a very different view of Frege's project. One might suspect that, on such a reading, Frege's writings would have purely antiquarian interest, but this would be a mistake. The final two chapters show that Frege offers us new ways of addressing some of the philosophical problems that worry us today | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Contents A Note on Citations, Translations, and Abbreviations Representation of Frege’s Logical Symboh xxi xxv PART I. NATURAL LANGUAGE AND THEORIES OF MEANING 1. Language and the Standard Interpretation I. Reportage and the Theory of Meaning la. Reportage and the Treatment of the Logical Language in Basic Laws lb. Reportage and “On Sinn and Bedeutung” II. Some General Remarks about Interpretation III. The Standard Interpretation and “On Sinn and Bedeutung” Ilia. Dummett and Truth-values as Objects Illb. Logical Language and Natural Language IV. A Theory of Meaning for What Language? ГѴа. Natural Language IVb. Must the Improved Version of Natural Language be Free of Logical Imperfections? ГѴс. Could Frege Want a Theory of Natural Language as it Is? IVd. Why Should Ambiguity be a Problem? IVe. Why Does Frege Analyze (some) Imperfect Parts of Natural Language? V. So Where Are We Now? 2. Frege’s New Logic and the Function/Argument Regimentation I. Why Does Frege Need a Microscope? la. What Are Logical Truths? The Begriffsschrift Answer II. The First Version of Frege’s Microscope Ila. The Begriffsschrift Notion of Function lib. Functions and How We Regard an Expression He. Do Functions and Arguments Differ in Kind? lid. Some Problems with the Linguistic-expression View of Function III. Two Problems with the Begriffsschrift Account of Identity Ilia. The First Identity Problem Illb. A Second Identity Problem IV. Frege’s Introduction of Sinn and Bedeutung as a Solution to the Identity Problems 3 4 6 8 10 13 13 16 20 20 24 28 29 30 32 34 34 36 39 40 41 43 45 48 49 51 53
xviii CONTENTS IVa. The Modified Begriffsschrift View of Identity IVb. The New View of Identity V. Functions, Arguments, and Objects VI. Frege’s View of Sentences as Truth-value Names Via. Sentences in Begrffsschrift VIb. Sentences in “On Sinn and Bedeutung” 54 56 60 62 62 64 PART II. METAPHYSICS AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION 3. Metaphysics and the Standard Interpretation I. Frege’s Logical Notion of Function la. Familiar Function-expressions and Functions lb. Unsaturatedness and some Unfamiliar Function-names and Functions lc. Concept and Object II. Function and Object as Metaphysical or Ontological Categories Ha. Functions and the Problem of Predication lib. Platonism and Frege: Burge’s “Literal” Interpretation Ilb.i. What Does Frege Say about Non-spatio-temporal Entities? Ilb.ii. Does Frege Qualify these Remarks? Ilb.iii. Can There be a Literal Statement that Functions Are Atemporal? Ис. What Work Does Frege’s Function/Object Distinction Do? lid. “Function” and “Object” in Statements of Literal Truths He. Elucidation, its Uses and Evaluation Ilf. The Concept Horse Revisited 73 74 74 78 80 85 87 92 93 95 97 100 102 104 109 PART III. METATHEORY AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION 4. Soundness, Epistemology, and Frege’s Project I. Logical Laws and Metatheory la. Quine’s Argument for Semantic Ascent lb. Schemata and Logical Laws II. Modus Ponens, Logical Laws, and Metatheory Ha. The Justification of Modus Ponens lib. Concepts as Functions; Why “is the True” Is not a Truth Predicate He. Metalinguistic Variables lid. Modus Ponens: Metatheory and Elucidation He. Elucidation and
the Justification of Modus Ponens and Basic Law I III. Soundness and Frege’s Epistemological Project Ilia. Does Frege Need a Soundness Proof? Illb. Epistemology, Best Proof, and Generality 115 117 117 119 122 122 123 128 130 133 135 135 137
CONTENTS IIIc. What is Required of a Primitive Logical Law? Hid. Basic Law V, Epistemology, and Semantic Proof Hie. An Alternative Epistemological-semantic Story: Analyticity as Truth by Virtue of Meaning Illf. But did Frege Give a Semantic Proof of Basic Law V? IHg. Is Basic Law V a Primitive Logical Law? ГѴ. Soundness and the New Science: Did Frege Envision a Soundness Proof? V. Conclusion 5. Reference, the Context Principle, and the Significance of Sentential Priority I. Realism and Extra-linguistic Entities II. The Metaphysical Requirement, the Context Principle, and the Sentential Priority View Ila. Identity and the Metaphysical Requirement lib. The Context Principle and the Sentential Priority View in Foundations He. The Sentential Priority View and Basic Laws lid. §10 and the Significance of Identity Statements III. §§28-31 of Basic Laws Ilia. §31 and Metatheory lllb. The Inductive Proof Interpretation and §29 lllc. §§28-31 and the Circularity Puzzle Hid. The VR (value-range) Function-name IV. §10 of Basic Laws IVa. §10 and the Standard Interpretation: Three Difficulties IVb. Solving the Three Difficulties of §10 IVc. The Sentential Priority View, Realism, and Personal Epistemology 6. The Context Principle, Sentential Priority, and the Pursuit of Truth I. Changing the Subject and the Logicist Project: What makes Logicism about our Arithmetic? la. Why Define the Number One and Concept Number? lb. Why Frege Would Reject the Apparently Obvious Faithfulness Requirement lc. What Are Frege’s Actual Faithfulness Requirements? II. How Does this Square with the View that the
Sentences Expressing the “Well Known Properties of the Numbers” are True? Ha. The Sentential Priority View Revisited lib. Methodology: Natural Language and Inquiry XIX 143 147 154 158 160 164 168 170 170 173 173 178 181 185 188 188 193 195 199 200 200 202 206 211 213 216 220 226 228 228 234
) XX CONTENTS PART IV. PUTTING FREGE’S LESSONS TO WORK 7. Why Frege’s Apparently Absurd View Is not Absurd at All 239 I. Vagueness la. Vagueness and Deference to Experts lb. Vague Predicates, Semantics, and Empirical Investigation II. Precisification Ha. Supervaluationism, Precisification, and the “Homophonie” Objection lib. “Obese”: A Case Study Ilb.i. Is “Obese” a Technical Scientific Term? Ilb.ii. Precisification and Empirical Studies Ilb.iii. The Binaries Objection Ilb.iv. Changing the Subject—the Homophonie Objection Revisited III. Explication and Vagueness as a Logical Defect 239 240 243 247 8. Mathematical Knowledge and Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority 270 I. The Logical Notion of Objecthood II. Metaphysical Objecthood and Subsentential vs. Sentential Priority Ila. Predicates and Carving Nature at the Joints lib. Another Example: The Case Definition of AIDS III. Frege’s Alternative Ilia. Benacerraf’s Problem and Subsentential Priority lllb. Frege’s Realism and the Significance of Sentential Priority lllc. Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority IV. Conclusion 271 Bibliography Index 247 250 250 251 254 257 262 276 277 280 284 284 285 289 292 297 305
|
| adam_txt |
Contents A Note on Citations, Translations, and Abbreviations Representation of Frege’s Logical Symboh xxi xxv PART I. NATURAL LANGUAGE AND THEORIES OF MEANING 1. Language and the Standard Interpretation I. Reportage and the Theory of Meaning la. Reportage and the Treatment of the Logical Language in Basic Laws lb. Reportage and “On Sinn and Bedeutung” II. Some General Remarks about Interpretation III. The Standard Interpretation and “On Sinn and Bedeutung” Ilia. Dummett and Truth-values as Objects Illb. Logical Language and Natural Language IV. A Theory of Meaning for What Language? ГѴа. Natural Language IVb. Must the Improved Version of Natural Language be Free of Logical Imperfections? ГѴс. Could Frege Want a Theory of Natural Language as it Is? IVd. Why Should Ambiguity be a Problem? IVe. Why Does Frege Analyze (some) Imperfect Parts of Natural Language? V. So Where Are We Now? 2. Frege’s New Logic and the Function/Argument Regimentation I. Why Does Frege Need a Microscope? la. What Are Logical Truths? The Begriffsschrift Answer II. The First Version of Frege’s Microscope Ila. The Begriffsschrift Notion of Function lib. Functions and How We Regard an Expression He. Do Functions and Arguments Differ in Kind? lid. Some Problems with the Linguistic-expression View of Function III. Two Problems with the Begriffsschrift Account of Identity Ilia. The First Identity Problem Illb. A Second Identity Problem IV. Frege’s Introduction of Sinn and Bedeutung as a Solution to the Identity Problems 3 4 6 8 10 13 13 16 20 20 24 28 29 30 32 34 34 36 39 40 41 43 45 48 49 51 53
xviii CONTENTS IVa. The Modified Begriffsschrift View of Identity IVb. The New View of Identity V. Functions, Arguments, and Objects VI. Frege’s View of Sentences as Truth-value Names Via. Sentences in Begrffsschrift VIb. Sentences in “On Sinn and Bedeutung” 54 56 60 62 62 64 PART II. METAPHYSICS AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION 3. Metaphysics and the Standard Interpretation I. Frege’s Logical Notion of Function la. Familiar Function-expressions and Functions lb. Unsaturatedness and some Unfamiliar Function-names and Functions lc. Concept and Object II. Function and Object as Metaphysical or Ontological Categories Ha. Functions and the Problem of Predication lib. Platonism and Frege: Burge’s “Literal” Interpretation Ilb.i. What Does Frege Say about Non-spatio-temporal Entities? Ilb.ii. Does Frege Qualify these Remarks? Ilb.iii. Can There be a Literal Statement that Functions Are Atemporal? Ис. What Work Does Frege’s Function/Object Distinction Do? lid. “Function” and “Object” in Statements of Literal Truths He. Elucidation, its Uses and Evaluation Ilf. The Concept Horse Revisited 73 74 74 78 80 85 87 92 93 95 97 100 102 104 109 PART III. METATHEORY AND THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION 4. Soundness, Epistemology, and Frege’s Project I. Logical Laws and Metatheory la. Quine’s Argument for Semantic Ascent lb. Schemata and Logical Laws II. Modus Ponens, Logical Laws, and Metatheory Ha. The Justification of Modus Ponens lib. Concepts as Functions; Why “is the True” Is not a Truth Predicate He. Metalinguistic Variables lid. Modus Ponens: Metatheory and Elucidation He. Elucidation and
the Justification of Modus Ponens and Basic Law I III. Soundness and Frege’s Epistemological Project Ilia. Does Frege Need a Soundness Proof? Illb. Epistemology, Best Proof, and Generality 115 117 117 119 122 122 123 128 130 133 135 135 137
CONTENTS IIIc. What is Required of a Primitive Logical Law? Hid. Basic Law V, Epistemology, and Semantic Proof Hie. An Alternative Epistemological-semantic Story: Analyticity as Truth by Virtue of Meaning Illf. But did Frege Give a Semantic Proof of Basic Law V? IHg. Is Basic Law V a Primitive Logical Law? ГѴ. Soundness and the New Science: Did Frege Envision a Soundness Proof? V. Conclusion 5. Reference, the Context Principle, and the Significance of Sentential Priority I. Realism and Extra-linguistic Entities II. The Metaphysical Requirement, the Context Principle, and the Sentential Priority View Ila. Identity and the Metaphysical Requirement lib. The Context Principle and the Sentential Priority View in Foundations He. The Sentential Priority View and Basic Laws lid. §10 and the Significance of Identity Statements III. §§28-31 of Basic Laws Ilia. §31 and Metatheory lllb. The Inductive Proof Interpretation and §29 lllc. §§28-31 and the Circularity Puzzle Hid. The VR (value-range) Function-name IV. §10 of Basic Laws IVa. §10 and the Standard Interpretation: Three Difficulties IVb. Solving the Three Difficulties of §10 IVc. The Sentential Priority View, Realism, and Personal Epistemology 6. The Context Principle, Sentential Priority, and the Pursuit of Truth I. Changing the Subject and the Logicist Project: What makes Logicism about our Arithmetic? la. Why Define the Number One and Concept Number? lb. Why Frege Would Reject the Apparently Obvious Faithfulness Requirement lc. What Are Frege’s Actual Faithfulness Requirements? II. How Does this Square with the View that the
Sentences Expressing the “Well Known Properties of the Numbers” are True? Ha. The Sentential Priority View Revisited lib. Methodology: Natural Language and Inquiry XIX 143 147 154 158 160 164 168 170 170 173 173 178 181 185 188 188 193 195 199 200 200 202 206 211 213 216 220 226 228 228 234
) XX CONTENTS PART IV. PUTTING FREGE’S LESSONS TO WORK 7. Why Frege’s Apparently Absurd View Is not Absurd at All 239 I. Vagueness la. Vagueness and Deference to Experts lb. Vague Predicates, Semantics, and Empirical Investigation II. Precisification Ha. Supervaluationism, Precisification, and the “Homophonie” Objection lib. “Obese”: A Case Study Ilb.i. Is “Obese” a Technical Scientific Term? Ilb.ii. Precisification and Empirical Studies Ilb.iii. The Binaries Objection Ilb.iv. Changing the Subject—the Homophonie Objection Revisited III. Explication and Vagueness as a Logical Defect 239 240 243 247 8. Mathematical Knowledge and Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority 270 I. The Logical Notion of Objecthood II. Metaphysical Objecthood and Subsentential vs. Sentential Priority Ila. Predicates and Carving Nature at the Joints lib. Another Example: The Case Definition of AIDS III. Frege’s Alternative Ilia. Benacerraf’s Problem and Subsentential Priority lllb. Frege’s Realism and the Significance of Sentential Priority lllc. Sentential vs. Subsentential Priority IV. Conclusion 271 Bibliography Index 247 250 250 251 254 257 262 276 277 280 284 284 285 289 292 297 305 |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press |
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| spelling | Weiner, Joan Verfasser (DE-588)133407128 aut Taking Frege at his word Joan Weiner First edition Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY Oxford University Press 2020 xxvii, 317 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Frege is widely regarded as having set much of the agenda of contemporary analytic philosophy. As standardly read, he meant to introduce-and make crucial contributions to-the project of giving an account of the workings of (an improved version of) natural language. Yet, despite the great admiration most contemporary philosophers feel for Frege, it is widely believed that he committed a large number of serious, and inexplicable, blunders. For, if Frege really meant to be constructing a theory of the workings of (some version of) natural language, then a significant number of his stated views-including views that he claimed to be central to his philosophical picture-are straightforwardly wrong. But did Frege mean to be giving an account of the workings of0language? He himself never actually claimed to be doing this, and, indeed, never even described such a project.0Taking Frege at his Word offers an interpretation that is based on a different approach to his writings. Rather than using the contributions he is taken to have made to contemporary work in the philosophy of language to infer what his projects were, Joan Weiner gives priority to Frege's own accounts of what he means to be doing. She provides a very different view of Frege's project. One might suspect that, on such a reading, Frege's writings would have purely antiquarian interest, but this would be a mistake. The final two chapters show that Frege offers us new ways of addressing some of the philosophical problems that worry us today Frege, Gottlob 1848-1925 (DE-588)118535161 gnd rswk-swf Sprachlogik (DE-588)4182527-5 gnd rswk-swf Frege, Gottlob / 1848-1925 / Criticism and interpretation Logic, Symbolic and mathematical Analysis (Philosophy) Frege, Gottlob / 1848-1925 Criticism, interpretation, etc Frege, Gottlob 1848-1925 (DE-588)118535161 p Sprachlogik (DE-588)4182527-5 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032578127&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Weiner, Joan Taking Frege at his word Frege, Gottlob 1848-1925 (DE-588)118535161 gnd Sprachlogik (DE-588)4182527-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)118535161 (DE-588)4182527-5 |
| title | Taking Frege at his word |
| title_auth | Taking Frege at his word |
| title_exact_search | Taking Frege at his word |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Taking Frege at his word |
| title_full | Taking Frege at his word Joan Weiner |
| title_fullStr | Taking Frege at his word Joan Weiner |
| title_full_unstemmed | Taking Frege at his word Joan Weiner |
| title_short | Taking Frege at his word |
| title_sort | taking frege at his word |
| topic | Frege, Gottlob 1848-1925 (DE-588)118535161 gnd Sprachlogik (DE-588)4182527-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Frege, Gottlob 1848-1925 Sprachlogik |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032578127&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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