Innovators, firms, and markets: the organizational logic of intellectual property
"This book presents a theoretical, historical and empirical account of the relationship between intellectual property rights, organizational type and market structure. Patents expand transactional choice by enabling smaller R&D-intensive firms to compete against larger firms that wield diff...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
[2021]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | "This book presents a theoretical, historical and empirical account of the relationship between intellectual property rights, organizational type and market structure. Patents expand transactional choice by enabling smaller R&D-intensive firms to compete against larger firms that wield difficult-to-replicate financing, production and distribution capacities. In particular, patents enable upstream firms that specialize in innovation to exchange informational assets with downstream firms that specialize in commercialization, lowering capital and technical requirements that might otherwise impede entry. These theoretical expectations track a novel organizational history of the U.S. patent system during 1890-2006. Periods of strong patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which smaller innovators can monetize R&D through financing, licensing and other relationships with funding and commercialization partners. Periods of weak patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which innovation and commercialization mostly take place within the end-to-end structures of large integrated firms. The proposed link between IP rights and organizational type tracks evidence on historical and contemporary patterns in IP lobbying and advocacy activities. In general, larger and more integrated firms (outside pharmaceuticals) tend to advocate for weaker patents, while smaller and less integrated firms (and venture capitalists who back those firms) tend to advocate for stronger patents. Contrary to conventional assumptions, the economics, history and politics of the U.S. patent system suggest that weak IP rights often shelter large incumbents from the entry threat posed by smaller R&D-specialist entities"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xvi, 234 Seiten Diagramme 23,5 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780190908591 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Barnett, Jonathan M. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1243131446 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Innovators, firms, and markets |b the organizational logic of intellectual property |c Jonathan M. Barnett |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York, NY |b Oxford University Press |c [2021] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c © 2021 | |
| 300 | |a xvi, 234 Seiten |b Diagramme |c 23,5 cm | ||
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| 505 | 8 | |a Dynamic analysis of intellectual property -- Organizational Effects of intellectual property (micro-level) -- Organizational effects of intellectual property (macro-level) -- Constructing an objective history of the U.S. patent system -- An organizational history of the U.S. patent system -- Exploding the supply chain : strong patents and vertical disintegration -- Why incumbents (usually) prefer weak intellectual property rights -- Organizational perspectives on intellectual property reform | |
| 520 | 3 | |a "This book presents a theoretical, historical and empirical account of the relationship between intellectual property rights, organizational type and market structure. Patents expand transactional choice by enabling smaller R&D-intensive firms to compete against larger firms that wield difficult-to-replicate financing, production and distribution capacities. In particular, patents enable upstream firms that specialize in innovation to exchange informational assets with downstream firms that specialize in commercialization, lowering capital and technical requirements that might otherwise impede entry. These theoretical expectations track a novel organizational history of the U.S. patent system during 1890-2006. Periods of strong patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which smaller innovators can monetize R&D through financing, licensing and other relationships with funding and commercialization partners. Periods of weak patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which innovation and commercialization mostly take place within the end-to-end structures of large integrated firms. The proposed link between IP rights and organizational type tracks evidence on historical and contemporary patterns in IP lobbying and advocacy activities. In general, larger and more integrated firms (outside pharmaceuticals) tend to advocate for weaker patents, while smaller and less integrated firms (and venture capitalists who back those firms) tend to advocate for stronger patents. Contrary to conventional assumptions, the economics, history and politics of the U.S. patent system suggest that weak IP rights often shelter large incumbents from the entry threat posed by smaller R&D-specialist entities"-- | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Patent |0 (DE-588)4044874-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Patentrecht |0 (DE-588)4044884-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | 0 | |a Intellectual property | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Patent laws and legislation / United States | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Intellectual property | |
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| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Patent |0 (DE-588)4044874-5 |D s |
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| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe, PDF |z 978-0-19-09086-0-7 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Barnett, Jonathan M. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1243131446 |
| author_facet | Barnett, Jonathan M. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Barnett, Jonathan M. |
| author_variant | j m b jm jmb |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV046892755 |
| contents | Dynamic analysis of intellectual property -- Organizational Effects of intellectual property (micro-level) -- Organizational effects of intellectual property (macro-level) -- Constructing an objective history of the U.S. patent system -- An organizational history of the U.S. patent system -- Exploding the supply chain : strong patents and vertical disintegration -- Why incumbents (usually) prefer weak intellectual property rights -- Organizational perspectives on intellectual property reform |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV046892755 |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV046892755 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T15:21:54Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:56:46Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780190908591 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032302540 |
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| owner | DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 |
| physical | xvi, 234 Seiten Diagramme 23,5 cm |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateSearch | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Barnett, Jonathan M. Verfasser (DE-588)1243131446 aut Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property Jonathan M. Barnett New York, NY Oxford University Press [2021] © 2021 xvi, 234 Seiten Diagramme 23,5 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Dynamic analysis of intellectual property -- Organizational Effects of intellectual property (micro-level) -- Organizational effects of intellectual property (macro-level) -- Constructing an objective history of the U.S. patent system -- An organizational history of the U.S. patent system -- Exploding the supply chain : strong patents and vertical disintegration -- Why incumbents (usually) prefer weak intellectual property rights -- Organizational perspectives on intellectual property reform "This book presents a theoretical, historical and empirical account of the relationship between intellectual property rights, organizational type and market structure. Patents expand transactional choice by enabling smaller R&D-intensive firms to compete against larger firms that wield difficult-to-replicate financing, production and distribution capacities. In particular, patents enable upstream firms that specialize in innovation to exchange informational assets with downstream firms that specialize in commercialization, lowering capital and technical requirements that might otherwise impede entry. These theoretical expectations track a novel organizational history of the U.S. patent system during 1890-2006. Periods of strong patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which smaller innovators can monetize R&D through financing, licensing and other relationships with funding and commercialization partners. Periods of weak patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which innovation and commercialization mostly take place within the end-to-end structures of large integrated firms. The proposed link between IP rights and organizational type tracks evidence on historical and contemporary patterns in IP lobbying and advocacy activities. In general, larger and more integrated firms (outside pharmaceuticals) tend to advocate for weaker patents, while smaller and less integrated firms (and venture capitalists who back those firms) tend to advocate for stronger patents. Contrary to conventional assumptions, the economics, history and politics of the U.S. patent system suggest that weak IP rights often shelter large incumbents from the entry threat posed by smaller R&D-specialist entities"-- Patent (DE-588)4044874-5 gnd rswk-swf Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 gnd rswk-swf Patentrecht (DE-588)4044884-8 gnd rswk-swf Intellectual property Patent laws and legislation / United States Patent laws and legislation United States Patentrecht (DE-588)4044884-8 s DE-604 Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 s Patent (DE-588)4044874-5 s Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, EPUB 978-0-19-090861-4 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-090862-1 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe, PDF 978-0-19-09086-0-7 |
| spellingShingle | Barnett, Jonathan M. Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property Dynamic analysis of intellectual property -- Organizational Effects of intellectual property (micro-level) -- Organizational effects of intellectual property (macro-level) -- Constructing an objective history of the U.S. patent system -- An organizational history of the U.S. patent system -- Exploding the supply chain : strong patents and vertical disintegration -- Why incumbents (usually) prefer weak intellectual property rights -- Organizational perspectives on intellectual property reform Patent (DE-588)4044874-5 gnd Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 gnd Patentrecht (DE-588)4044884-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4044874-5 (DE-588)4027089-0 (DE-588)4044884-8 |
| title | Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property |
| title_auth | Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property |
| title_exact_search | Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property |
| title_full | Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property Jonathan M. Barnett |
| title_fullStr | Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property Jonathan M. Barnett |
| title_full_unstemmed | Innovators, firms, and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property Jonathan M. Barnett |
| title_short | Innovators, firms, and markets |
| title_sort | innovators firms and markets the organizational logic of intellectual property |
| title_sub | the organizational logic of intellectual property |
| topic | Patent (DE-588)4044874-5 gnd Innovation (DE-588)4027089-0 gnd Patentrecht (DE-588)4044884-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Patent Innovation Patentrecht |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT barnettjonathanm innovatorsfirmsandmarketstheorganizationallogicofintellectualproperty |