Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study
We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargai...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1996
|
| Edition: | 1st ed. 1996 |
| Series: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
440 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Summary: | We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (VIII, 176 p. 7 illus) |
| ISBN: | 9783642614675 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5 |
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| spelling | Ryll, Wolfgang Verfasser aut Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study by Wolfgang Ryll 1st ed. 1996 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1996 1 Online-Ressource (VIII, 176 p. 7 illus) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 440 We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». The single-person decision theory approach to litigation assumes litigants to have a subjective estimate of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win the action. Differing views on the probability of winning the court case help to explain the fraction of cases that actually go to trial. Among others, P'ng (1983) points out the shortcomings of the single-person decision theory approach which does not take into account, for example, the different fee systems in England and the U.S. and the differences in information conflicting parties may have. P'ng constructs a model of one-sided incomplete information where the settlement terms are given exogenously. Schweizer (1989), on the other hand, extends P'ng's model and allows for two-sided asymmetric information where the settlement terms are determined endogenously Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd rswk-swf Lerntheorie (DE-588)4114402-8 gnd rswk-swf Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd rswk-swf Monte-Carlo-Simulation (DE-588)4240945-7 gnd rswk-swf Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd rswk-swf Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 s Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 s Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 s DE-604 Monte-Carlo-Simulation (DE-588)4240945-7 s Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 s Lerntheorie (DE-588)4114402-8 s Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540613046 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642614682 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Ryll, Wolfgang Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Lerntheorie (DE-588)4114402-8 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Monte-Carlo-Simulation (DE-588)4240945-7 gnd Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4139583-9 (DE-588)4114402-8 (DE-588)4140474-9 (DE-588)4240945-7 (DE-588)4191247-0 (DE-588)4015999-1 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study |
| title_auth | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study |
| title_exact_search | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study |
| title_full | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study by Wolfgang Ryll |
| title_fullStr | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study by Wolfgang Ryll |
| title_full_unstemmed | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information An Experimental Study by Wolfgang Ryll |
| title_short | Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information |
| title_sort | litigation and settlement in a game with incomplete information an experimental study |
| title_sub | An Experimental Study |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Verhandlungstheorie (DE-588)4139583-9 gnd Lerntheorie (DE-588)4114402-8 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Monte-Carlo-Simulation (DE-588)4240945-7 gnd Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Verhandlungstheorie Lerntheorie Unvollkommene Information Monte-Carlo-Simulation Zweipersonenspiel Experiment Hochschulschrift |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5 |
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