The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models: Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence
What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and B is...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
Physica-Verlag HD
2004
|
| Edition: | 1st ed. 2004 |
| Series: | Contributions to Economics
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Summary: | What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and B is paid by a performance measure (signal). As a result, B might choose the wrong allocation of effort between tasks. Of course, the wrong allocation entails costs. A method to calculate these costs is suggested and it is explored how and when these costs occur. Some performance measures seem to be less prone to misallocation such as measures of firm performance. Consequently, one expects more use of firm performance measures when misallocation can be a problem. This hypothesis is examined empirically |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (VIII, 162 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783790827064 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-7908-2706-4 |
Staff View
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| spelling | Schnedler, Wendelin Verfasser aut The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence by Wendelin Schnedler 1st ed. 2004 Heidelberg Physica-Verlag HD 2004 1 Online-Ressource (VIII, 162 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Contributions to Economics What happens if A wants to buy a good or service from B, but not all relevant characteristics can be fixed in a contract? This book gives a non-technical overview of various models dealing with this situation. Particular emphasis is put on the problem that the service includes various tasks and B is paid by a performance measure (signal). As a result, B might choose the wrong allocation of effort between tasks. Of course, the wrong allocation entails costs. A method to calculate these costs is suggested and it is explored how and when these costs occur. Some performance measures seem to be less prone to misallocation such as measures of firm performance. Consequently, one expects more use of firm performance measures when misallocation can be a problem. This hypothesis is examined empirically Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Human Resource Management Economic theory Game theory Personnel management Stochastischer Prozess (DE-588)4057630-9 gnd rswk-swf Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd rswk-swf Statistik (DE-588)4056995-0 gnd rswk-swf Signaling (DE-588)4617594-5 gnd rswk-swf Box-Jenkins-Verfahren (DE-588)4007893-0 gnd rswk-swf Zeitreihenanalyse (DE-588)4067486-1 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Schätzung (DE-588)4193791-0 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Signaling (DE-588)4617594-5 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 s Schätzung (DE-588)4193791-0 s DE-604 Box-Jenkins-Verfahren (DE-588)4007893-0 s Zeitreihenanalyse (DE-588)4067486-1 s Stochastischer Prozess (DE-588)4057630-9 s Statistik (DE-588)4056995-0 s Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783790801736 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783790827071 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2706-4 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Schnedler, Wendelin The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Human Resource Management Economic theory Game theory Personnel management Stochastischer Prozess (DE-588)4057630-9 gnd Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Statistik (DE-588)4056995-0 gnd Signaling (DE-588)4617594-5 gnd Box-Jenkins-Verfahren (DE-588)4007893-0 gnd Zeitreihenanalyse (DE-588)4067486-1 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Schätzung (DE-588)4193791-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4057630-9 (DE-588)4120934-5 (DE-588)4056995-0 (DE-588)4617594-5 (DE-588)4007893-0 (DE-588)4067486-1 (DE-588)4126353-4 (DE-588)4193791-0 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence |
| title_auth | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence |
| title_exact_search | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence |
| title_full | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence by Wendelin Schnedler |
| title_fullStr | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence by Wendelin Schnedler |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence by Wendelin Schnedler |
| title_short | The Value of Signals in Hidden Action Models |
| title_sort | the value of signals in hidden action models concepts application and empirical evidence |
| title_sub | Concepts, Application, and Empirical Evidence |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Human Resource Management Economic theory Game theory Personnel management Stochastischer Prozess (DE-588)4057630-9 gnd Asymmetrische Information (DE-588)4120934-5 gnd Statistik (DE-588)4056995-0 gnd Signaling (DE-588)4617594-5 gnd Box-Jenkins-Verfahren (DE-588)4007893-0 gnd Zeitreihenanalyse (DE-588)4067486-1 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd Schätzung (DE-588)4193791-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences Human Resource Management Economic theory Game theory Personnel management Stochastischer Prozess Asymmetrische Information Statistik Signaling Box-Jenkins-Verfahren Zeitreihenanalyse Agency-Theorie Schätzung Hochschulschrift |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2706-4 |
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