Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information:
Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gros...
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| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
1994
|
| Edition: | 1st ed. 1994 |
| Series: | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
412 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | BTU01 Volltext |
| Summary: | Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O. |
| Physical Description: | 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 293 p) |
| ISBN: | 9783642487774 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4 |
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| spelling | Kuon, Bettina Verfasser aut Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information by Bettina Kuon 1st ed. 1994 Berlin, Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1994 1 Online-Ressource (IX, 293 p) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 412 Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O. Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd rswk-swf Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 gnd rswk-swf Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd rswk-swf Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd rswk-swf Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 s Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 s Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 s DE-604 Information (DE-588)4026899-8 s Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 s Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783540579205 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9783642487781 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kuon, Bettina Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 gnd Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4191247-0 (DE-588)4062875-9 (DE-588)4187779-2 (DE-588)4026899-8 (DE-588)4113446-1 (DE-588)4140474-9 (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information |
| title_auth | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information |
| title_exact_search | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information |
| title_full | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information by Bettina Kuon |
| title_fullStr | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information by Bettina Kuon |
| title_full_unstemmed | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information by Bettina Kuon |
| title_short | Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information |
| title_sort | two person bargaining experiments with incomplete information |
| topic | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Zweipersonenspiel (DE-588)4191247-0 gnd Verhandlung (DE-588)4062875-9 gnd Verhandlungsspiel (DE-588)4187779-2 gnd Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economic theory Zweipersonenspiel Verhandlung Verhandlungsspiel Information Entscheidungsfindung Unvollkommene Information Mathematisches Modell Hochschulschrift |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48777-4 |
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