The morality of defensive force:
When is it morally permissible to engage in self-defense or the defense of others? Jonathan Quong defends a variety of novel ideas in this book about the morality of defensive force, providing an original philosophical account of the central moral principles that should regulate its use. We cannot u...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2020
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Ausgabe: | First edition |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | When is it morally permissible to engage in self-defense or the defense of others? Jonathan Quong defends a variety of novel ideas in this book about the morality of defensive force, providing an original philosophical account of the central moral principles that should regulate its use. We cannot understand the morality of defensive force, he reasons, until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. In developing this stance, Quong presents new views on liability, proportionality, and necessity. He argues that self-defense can sometimes be justified on the basis of an agent-relative prerogative to give greater weight to one's own life and interests, contrary to the dominant view in the literature. Additionally Quong develops a novel conception of individual rights against harm. Unlike some, who believe that our rights against harm are fact-relative, he argues that our rights against being harmed by others must, in certain respects, be sensitive to the evidence that others can reasonably be expected to possess. The book concludes with Quong's extended defense of the means principle, a principle that prohibits harmfully using other persons' bodies or other rightful property unless those persons are duty bound to permit this use or have otherwise waived their claims against such use |
Beschreibung: | x, 217 Seiten 24 cm |
ISBN: | 9780198851103 |
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520 | 3 | |a When is it morally permissible to engage in self-defense or the defense of others? Jonathan Quong defends a variety of novel ideas in this book about the morality of defensive force, providing an original philosophical account of the central moral principles that should regulate its use. We cannot understand the morality of defensive force, he reasons, until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. In developing this stance, Quong presents new views on liability, proportionality, and necessity. He argues that self-defense can sometimes be justified on the basis of an agent-relative prerogative to give greater weight to one's own life and interests, contrary to the dominant view in the literature. Additionally Quong develops a novel conception of individual rights against harm. Unlike some, who believe that our rights against harm are fact-relative, he argues that our rights against being harmed by others must, in certain respects, be sensitive to the evidence that others can reasonably be expected to possess. The book concludes with Quong's extended defense of the means principle, a principle that prohibits harmfully using other persons' bodies or other rightful property unless those persons are duty bound to permit this use or have otherwise waived their claims against such use | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | Contents Acknowledgements ix 1. Introduction 1.1. Defensive Force in Context 1.2. An Overview 1.3. Scope and Method 1 1 4 12 2. Liability 2.1. Some Preliminaries 2.2. The Culpability Account 2.3. The Moral Responsibility Account 2.4. The Evidence-Relative Account 2.5. The Moral Status Account 2.6. Advantages 2.7. Objections 2.8. Conclusion 18 20 23 25 32 34 39 45 57 3. Agent-Relative Prerogatives 3.1. Expanding Liability 3.2. Revising Our Judgements About Permissibility 3.3. An Agent-Relative Prerogative 3.4. The Violinist Argument: Part I 3.5. The Violinist Argument: Part II 3.6. The Means Principle 3.7. Objections 3.8. Conclusion 58 61 67 69 71 76 80 85 95 4. Proportionality 4.1. The Responsibility Principle 4.2. Why Responsibility? 4.3. The Stringency Principle 4.4. Rights That Cannot Be Infringed 4.5. Stringency and Responsibility 4.6. Objections 4.7. Conclusion 97 98 102 107 114 116 119 123
viii CONTENTS 5. Necessity 5.1. The Simple Account 5.2. The Weighted Account 5.3. The Trade-Off Account 5.4. The Rescue Account 5.5. A Further Problem for Other Views 5.6. Rescue to the Rescue 5.7. Objections 5.8. Necessity and Liability 5.9. Further Advantages 5.10. Conclusion 125 126 127 128 130 133 137 139 145 148 149 6. Rights and Evidence 6.1, Thomson’s Case 6.2. Moral Rights and Reasonable Demands 6.3. Objections 6.4. Frowe’s Further Objections 6.5. Wrong Question? 6.6. Conclusion 151 153 154 160 166 168 172 7. The Means Principle 7.1. The Puzzling Cases 7.2. Extensional Adequacy 7.3. The Rationale 7.4. Objections 7.5. Some Implications 7.6. Intentions and Permissibility 7.7. Conclusion 175 176 178 182 189 201 203 206 Bibliography Index 209 215
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adam_txt |
Contents Acknowledgements ix 1. Introduction 1.1. Defensive Force in Context 1.2. An Overview 1.3. Scope and Method 1 1 4 12 2. Liability 2.1. Some Preliminaries 2.2. The Culpability Account 2.3. The Moral Responsibility Account 2.4. The Evidence-Relative Account 2.5. The Moral Status Account 2.6. Advantages 2.7. Objections 2.8. Conclusion 18 20 23 25 32 34 39 45 57 3. Agent-Relative Prerogatives 3.1. Expanding Liability 3.2. Revising Our Judgements About Permissibility 3.3. An Agent-Relative Prerogative 3.4. The Violinist Argument: Part I 3.5. The Violinist Argument: Part II 3.6. The Means Principle 3.7. Objections 3.8. Conclusion 58 61 67 69 71 76 80 85 95 4. Proportionality 4.1. The Responsibility Principle 4.2. Why Responsibility? 4.3. The Stringency Principle 4.4. Rights That Cannot Be Infringed 4.5. Stringency and Responsibility 4.6. Objections 4.7. Conclusion 97 98 102 107 114 116 119 123
viii CONTENTS 5. Necessity 5.1. The Simple Account 5.2. The Weighted Account 5.3. The Trade-Off Account 5.4. The Rescue Account 5.5. A Further Problem for Other Views 5.6. Rescue to the Rescue 5.7. Objections 5.8. Necessity and Liability 5.9. Further Advantages 5.10. Conclusion 125 126 127 128 130 133 137 139 145 148 149 6. Rights and Evidence 6.1, Thomson’s Case 6.2. Moral Rights and Reasonable Demands 6.3. Objections 6.4. Frowe’s Further Objections 6.5. Wrong Question? 6.6. Conclusion 151 153 154 160 166 168 172 7. The Means Principle 7.1. The Puzzling Cases 7.2. Extensional Adequacy 7.3. The Rationale 7.4. Objections 7.5. Some Implications 7.6. Intentions and Permissibility 7.7. Conclusion 175 176 178 182 189 201 203 206 Bibliography Index 209 215 |
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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T14:47:35Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:53:25Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780198851103 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-032182984 |
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physical | x, 217 Seiten 24 cm |
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publisher | Oxford University Press |
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spelling | Quong, Jonathan 1977- Verfasser (DE-588)1201609836 aut The morality of defensive force Jonathan Quong First edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2020 x, 217 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier When is it morally permissible to engage in self-defense or the defense of others? Jonathan Quong defends a variety of novel ideas in this book about the morality of defensive force, providing an original philosophical account of the central moral principles that should regulate its use. We cannot understand the morality of defensive force, he reasons, until we ask and answer deeper questions about how the use of defensive force fits with a more general account of justice and moral rights. In developing this stance, Quong presents new views on liability, proportionality, and necessity. He argues that self-defense can sometimes be justified on the basis of an agent-relative prerogative to give greater weight to one's own life and interests, contrary to the dominant view in the literature. Additionally Quong develops a novel conception of individual rights against harm. Unlike some, who believe that our rights against harm are fact-relative, he argues that our rights against being harmed by others must, in certain respects, be sensitive to the evidence that others can reasonably be expected to possess. The book concludes with Quong's extended defense of the means principle, a principle that prohibits harmfully using other persons' bodies or other rightful property unless those persons are duty bound to permit this use or have otherwise waived their claims against such use Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Selbstverteidigung (DE-588)4054440-0 gnd rswk-swf Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 gnd rswk-swf Violence / Moral and ethical aspects Self-defense / Moral and ethical aspects Self-defense (Law) Law and ethics Actions and defenses / Moral and ethical aspects Selbstverteidigung (DE-588)4054440-0 s Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 s Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032182984&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Quong, Jonathan 1977- The morality of defensive force Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Selbstverteidigung (DE-588)4054440-0 gnd Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4015602-3 (DE-588)4054440-0 (DE-588)4020832-1 |
title | The morality of defensive force |
title_auth | The morality of defensive force |
title_exact_search | The morality of defensive force |
title_exact_search_txtP | The morality of defensive force |
title_full | The morality of defensive force Jonathan Quong |
title_fullStr | The morality of defensive force Jonathan Quong |
title_full_unstemmed | The morality of defensive force Jonathan Quong |
title_short | The morality of defensive force |
title_sort | the morality of defensive force |
topic | Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Selbstverteidigung (DE-588)4054440-0 gnd Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 gnd |
topic_facet | Ethik Selbstverteidigung Gewalt |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032182984&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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