Corruption and fraud in financial markets: malpractice, misconduct and manipulation
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2020
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| Beschreibung: | xxi, 601 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781119421771 |
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| adam_text | Contents About the Editors List of Contributors Foreword Acknowledgements Chapter 1: Introduction xv xvii xix xxi 1 Carol Alexander and Douglas Cumming PART I Chapter 2: WHAT ARE MANIPULATION AND FRAUD AND WHY DO THEY MATTER? 11 An Overview of Market Manipulation 13 Talis J. Putniņš 2.1 2.2 Introduction Definitions of Market Manipulation 2.2.1 Legal Interpretation and Provisions against Market Manipulation 2.2.2 Economics and Legal Studies Perspective 2.3 A Taxonomy of the Types of Market Manipulation 2.3.1 Categories of Market Manipulation 2.3.2 Market Manipulation Techniques 2.4 Research on Market Manipulation 2.4.1 Theoretical Literature 2.4.2 Empirical Literature 2.4.3 Conclusions from the Research on Market Manipulation 2.5 Summary and Conclusions References 14 16 16 18 19 19 22 26 27 30 35 39 40
vi CONTENTS Chapter 3: A Taxonomy of Financial Market Misconduct 45 Ai Deng and Priyank Gandhi 3.1 3.2 3.3 Introduction Challenges in Research on Financial Market Misconduct Defining Financial Market Misconduct 3.3.1 Price Manipulation 3.3.2 Circular Trading 3.3.3 Collusion and Information Sharing 3.3.4 Insideinformation 3.3.5 Reference Price Influence 3.3.6 Improper Order Handling 3.3.7 Misleading Customers 3.4 Defining Financial Fraud 3.4.1 Credit Card Fraud 3.4.2 Money Laundering 3.4.3 Financial Statement Fraud 3.4.4 Computer Intrusion Fraud 3.5 Conclusion References 46 50 51 53 54 55 56 56 57 58 59 59 60 60 61 61 61 Chapter 4: 65 Financial Misconduct and Market-Based Penalties Chelsea Liu and Alfred Yawson 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 Introduction Notable Cases of Financial Reporting Fraud Financial Reporting Misconduct and Legal Redress Evolution of US Financial Regulations 4.4.1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (1995) 4.4.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 4.4.3 Dodd-Frank Act (2010) Legal versus Market-Based Penalties for Financial Misconduct 4.5.1 Common Forms of Legal Penalties 4.5.2 Role of Market-Based Penalties Firm-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct 4.6.1 Direct Economic Costs Captured in Loss of Market Value 4.6.2 Loss of Firm Reputation 4.6.3 Spillover of Reputational Effect 4.6.4 Governance Risk and Insurance Premiums 4.6.5 Reduced Liquidity 4.6.6 Access to Financing 4.6.7 Reduced Innovation 4.6.8 Mergers and Acquisitions Individual-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct 4.7.1 Executive and Director Turnover 4.7.2 Impaired
Career Progression 4.7.3 Loss of Reputation 4.7.4 Executive Compensation 4.7.5 Strengthened Monitoring Causes, Risks, and Moderators of Financial Misconduct 4.8.1 Fraud Incentives 4.8.2 Risk Factors 66 69 70 71 72 72 73 74 74 75 75 83 83 84 85 85 85 86 86 87 87 95 96 97 97 98 98 113
Contents vii 4.8.3 Public Enforcement: Regulatory and Judicial Stringency 4.8.4 Public Enforcement: Detection and Surveillance 4.8.5 Private Enforcement 4.9 Other Non-Financial Misconduct 4.10 Concluding Remarks References 115 116 117 118 119 120 Chapter 5: 135 Insider Trading and Market Manipulation Jonathan A. Batten, Igor Lončarski, and Peter C. Szilagyi 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Regulatory Framework on Insider Trading and MarketManipulation 5.3 Recent Examples of Market Manipulation and Insider Trading 5.4 Conclusions References 135 140 145 148 149 Chapter 6: 153 Financial Fraud and Reputational Capital Jonathan M. Karpoff 6.1 6.2 Financial Frauds in the 2000s The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Firm Value and Reputational Capital 6.2.1 Market Value Losses When Financial Misconduct Is Revealed 6.2.2 Spillover Effects 6.2.3 Reputational Losses for Financial Misconduct 6.2.4 Direct Measures of Lost Reputational Capital 6.2.5 Do Misconduct Firms Always Lose Reputational Capital? 6.2.6 Rebuilding Reputational Capital 6.3 The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Shareholders and Managers 6.3.1 Should Shareholders Pay? Do Managers Pay? 6.3.2 Do Shareholders Pay Twice? 6.3.3 Are Firm-Level Penalties Efficient? 6.3.4 Consequences for Managers and Directors 6.4 Why Do Managers Do It? Motives and Constraints 6.4.1 Motives for Financial Misconduct 6.4.2 Constraints on Financial Misconduct 6.5 Proxies and Databases Used to Identify Samples of Financial Statement Misconduct 6.6 Conclusion: Reputation, Enforcement, and Culture References 154 156 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 162 162 163 163 165
165 167 168 170 171 PARTII HOW AND WHERE DOES MISCONDUCT OCCUR? 179 Chapter 7: Manipulative and Collusive Practices in FX Markets 181 Alexis Stentors 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 Introduction Different Types of FX Orders The Unique FX Market Structure Examples of Manipulative and Collusive Practices inFX Markets 7.4.1 Front Running 7.4.2 Triggering Stop-Loss Orders 7.4.3 Banging the Close 181 183 184 188 188 190 192
CONTENTS VİÜ 7.4.4 Collusion and Sharing of Confidential Information 7.4.5 Spoofing 7.4.6 Market Abuse via Electronic Trading Platforms 7.5 The Reform Process References 193 195 196 197 199 Chapter 8: 205 Fraud and Manipulation within CryptocurrencyMarkets David Twomey and Andrew Mann 8.1 8.2 Introduction Why Do fraud and Manipulation Occur in Cryptocurrency Markets? 8.2.1 Lack of Consistent Regulation 8.2.2 Relative Anonymity 8.2.3 Low Barriers to Entry 8.2.4 Exchange Standards and Sophistication 8.3 Pump and Dumps 8.3.1 CaseStudies 8.4 Inflated Trading Volume 8.4.1 Case Study: January 2017 and PBoC Involvement 8.5 Exchange DDoS Attacks 8.5.1 Case Study 8.6 Hacks and Exploitations 8.6.1 Exchange Hacks 8.6.2 Smart Contract Exploits 8.6.3 Protocol Exploitation 8.7 Flash Crashes 8.7.1 GDAX-ETH/USD Flash Crash 8.8 Order Book-Based Manipulations 8.8.1 Quote Stuffing 8.8.2 Order Spoofing 8.9 Stablecoins and Tether 8.9.1 Tether H і stori calTi meline 8.9.2 Tether Controversy and Criticism 8.9.3 Tether s Significance in Cryptocurrency Global Markets 8.10 Summary and Conclusions References 206 212 212 213 214 214 215 217 217 219 220 223 224 224 229 230 230 234 235 236 237 239 240 242 245 245 249 Chapter 9: 251 The Integrity of Closing Prices Ryan y. Davies 9.1 Why Closing Prices Matter 9.2 Painting the Tape and Portfolio Pumping 9.3 Bang-the-Close Manipulation: The Response of Financial Intermediaries 9.4 Stock Price Pinning on Option Expiration Dates 9.5 Conclusion: Lessons for the Regulation and Design of FinancialMarkets References 251 252 255 259 263 269 Chapter 10: A Trader s
Perspective on Market AbuseRegulations 275 Sam Baker 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Getting the Trading Edge 275 278
Contents ¡X 10.3 A Typical Trader s Market Window 10.4 Wash Trades 10.5 High Ticking/Low Ticking-Momentum Ignition 10.6 Spoofing 10.7 Layering 10.8 Smoking 10.9 Case Study: Raul Rotter a.k.a. The Flipper 10.10 The Innocent and the Guilty 10.11 What Are Exchanges Doing to Prevent Market Abuse? 10.11.1 CME Group 10.11.2 ICE 10.12 What Are Trading Companies Doing to Prevent Abuse? 10.13 Will There Be an End to Market Abuse? 281 282 284 286 290 292 295 299 301 301 302 302 303 PART ill 305 WHO ARE THESE SCOUNDRELS? Chapter 11: Misconduct in Banking: Governance and the Board of Directors 307 Due Duy Nguyen, Jens Hagendorff, and Arman Eshraghi 11.1 11.2 11.3 Introduction Literature Review Research Design 11.3.1 Data 11.3.2 Empirical Design 11.3.3 Variables 11.4 Empirical Results 11.4.1 Main Results 11.4.2 Results for Different Classes ofEnforcement Actions 11.4.3 Does Better Board Quality Alleviate Shareholder Wealth Losses? 11.5 Conclusion References 307 311 312 312 313 314 316 316 320 323 323 325 Chapter 12: Misconduct andFraud by Investment Managers 327 Stephen C. Dimmock, Joseph D. Farizo, and William C. Çerken 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Introduction Related Research The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Mandatory Disclosures Data 12.4.1 Investment Fraud 12.4.2 Form ADV Data and Variables 12.5 Predicting Fraud and Misconduct 12.5.1 Predicting Fraud by Investment Managers 12.5.2 Interpreting the Predictive Content of the Models 12.5.3 К-Fold Cross-Validation Tests 12.6 Predicting the Initiation vs. the Continuance ofFraud 12.7 Firm-Wide Fraud vs. Fraud by a Rogue Employee 12.8
Out-of-Sample Prediction and Model Stability 12.9 Policy Implications and Conclusions References 327 329 331 332 332 337 340 340 345 346 347 349 351 352 355
x CONTENTS Chapter 13: Options Backdating and Shareholders 359 Johan Sulaeman and Gennaro Bernile 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 Introduction Stock Return Patterns around Option Grants The Backdating Practice Media Coverage, Restatement, and Investigation Stock Market Reaction to Public Revelations of Backdating Investor Reaction to (and Anticipation of) PublicRevelations Other Types of Misbehaviour Related to Option Grants 13.7.1 Forward Dating 13.7.2 Selective Disclosure 13.7.3 Option Exercise Backdating 13.7.4 Independent Director Backdating 13.8 Connections with Questionable Practices by Corporate Executives and Other Agents 13.9 Conclusion References Chapter 14: The Strategic Behaviour of Underwriters in Valuing IPOs 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 365 366 366 366 366 367 368 371 Stefano Palean, Andrea Signori, and Silvio Vismara 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 Valuing IPOs The Underwriter s Incentives in the Valuation of IPOs Literature Review Sample, Data, and Methodology 14.4.1 Sample and Data 14.4.2 Alternative Selection Criteria of Comparable Firms 14.4.3 Valuation Bias and IPO Premium 14.5 Results 14.5.1 Algorithmic Selections 14.5.2 Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts 14.5.3 Underwriters Selection of Comparable FirmsPre- vs. Post-IPO 14.5.4 Pre-vs. Post-IPO Selections and IndustryEffects 14.6 Conclusions References Chapter 15: Governance of Financial Services Outsourcing: Managing Misconduct and Third-Party Risks 371 373 374 376 376 380 380 381 381 386 390 394 396 397 399 Joseph A. McCahery and F. Alexander de Poode 15.1 Introduction 15.2 The Four Components in
Outsourcing 15.2.1 Efficient Outsourcing 15.2.2 The Four-Factor Governance Model 15.2.3 Misconduct in Outsourcing and the Ability of Financial Institutions to Monitor 399 402 402 404 407
Contents 15.3 The Interaction between Contracting and Monitoring 15.3.1 Characterization of Financial Institutions 15.3.2 Risks in Outsourcing Services 15.4 Governance Mechanisms to Detect Misconduct in Financial Outsourcing 15.4.1 Screening and Detection 15.5 Conclusion References PART IV DETECTION AND SURVEILLANCE OF FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT Chapter 16: Identifying Security Market Manipulation XI 408 409 412 413 414 416 417 423 425 Mike Aitken, Ann Leduc, and Shan ļi 16.1 Introduction 16.2 Background Legislation 16.2.1 Australia 16.2.2 UK 16.2.3 Hongkong 16.2.4 Canada 16.2.5 Singapore 16.2.6 Malaysia 16.2.7 New Zealand 16.3 Attributes of Manipulation 16.3.1 How Traders Minimize the Resources Needed for Manipulative Trading 16.3.2 Difficulties in Determining Whether TradingBehaviour Is Manipulative 16.3.3 Surveillance Systems 16.4 Detection Algorithms 16.5 Conclusion 425 427 427 428 428 429 430 430 431 431 432 433 434 436 439 Chapter 17: The Analytics of Financial Market Misconduct 441 Ai Deng and Priyank Gandhi 17.1 Introduction 17.2 Financial Economic Analysis 17.2.1 Benchmarking to Historical or Past Data 17.2.2 Benchmarking to Alternate Proxies 1 7.2.3 Benchmarking to a Model 17.3 Quantitative Techniques 17.3.1 The Principles of Fraud Detection 17.3.2 Popular Supervised Learning Techniques for FraudDetection 17.3.3 Popular Unsupervised Learning Techniques for FraudDetection 17.3.4 Dynamic Misconduct Detection 17.4 Conclusion References 442 446 447 451 454 456 457 458 460 462 464 466
CONTENTS XII Chapter 18: Benford s Law and Its Application to Detecting Financial Fraud and Manipulation 473 Christina Bannier, Corinna Ewelt-Knauer, Johannes Lips, and Peter Winker 18.1 Introduction 18.2 Benford s Law and Generalizations 18.2.1 The Basic Principle of Benford s Law 18.2.2 Illustration of Benford s Law 18.2.3 Testing for Conformity with Benford s Law 18.2.4 Considering Further Digits with Benford s Law 18.2.5 When Do Data Conform to Benford s Law? 18.2.6 Limitations of Using Benford s Law for Identification of Manipulations 18.2.7 Generalizations of Benford s Law for Identification of Manipulations 18.3 Usage of Benford s Law for Detecting Fraud and Deviant Behaviour 18.3.1 Forensic Accounting in the Context of Auditing, Internal Control Systems, and Taxation 18.3.2 Finance 18.3.3 Surveys and Research 18.4 A Case Study: Benford s Law and the LIBOR 18.5 Policy Implications 18.6 Summary, Limitations, and Outlook References 18.A Appendix 474 476 476 477 478 480 482 483 484 485 PART V 505 REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT Chapter 19: The Enforcement of Financial Market Crimes in Canada and the United Kingdom 486 487 490 491 498 498 499 504 507 Anita Indira Anand 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Existing Scholarship 19.3 Comparative Analysis 19.3.1 Canada 19.3.2 The United Kingdom 19.4 Reform 19.4.1 Resource Allocation 19.4.2 Principles-Based Regulation 19.4.3 Targeted Regulatory Reforms 19.5 Conclusion References 507 508 512 512 513 515 515 516 518 520 520 Chapter 20: A Pyramid or a Labyrinth? Enforcement of Registrant Misconduct Requirements in Canada 527 Mary Condon 20.1
Introduction 20.2 Definitional and Institutional Quagmires 20.3 The Compliance/Enforcement Continuum 527 529 531
Contents xiii 20.4 Enforcement Options Available to Sanction Registrant Misconduct 20.5 Empirical Information Available about Registrant Misconduct in Canada 20.5.1 Criminal Enforcement 20.5.2 CSA Non-Criminal Enforcement 20.5.3 Director s Decision Data in Ontario 20.5.4 SRO Enforcement 20.6 Analysis 533 535 535 536 537 538 538 Chapter 21: Judicial Local Protectionism and Home Court Bias in Corporate Litigation 541 Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui, and Wenfeng Wu 21.1 21.2 Introduction Institutional Background 21.2.1 Decentralization and Local Protectionism 21.2.2 Judicial Independence 21.2.3 The Heterogeneity of the Legal Environment across Regions 21.3 Empirical Evidence 21.3.1 Sample 21.3.2 Basic Statistics 21.3.3 The Wealth Effect for Defendants and Plaintiffs around the Filing Announcements at Different Courts 21.3.4 The Impact of Court Location on the Wealth Effect 21.3.5 Regression Analysis of the Wealth Effects from a Filing Announcement 21.3.6 Heckman Two-Step Analysis of Sample Selection Bias 21.3.7 The Impact of Court Location on the Likelihood to Appeal 21.3.8 Sensitivity Tests 21.4 Conclusion References 542 544 544 545 548 548 549 550 556 560 560 567 573 576 579 580 Index 583
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Contents About the Editors List of Contributors Foreword Acknowledgements Chapter 1: Introduction xv xvii xix xxi 1 Carol Alexander and Douglas Cumming PART I Chapter 2: WHAT ARE MANIPULATION AND FRAUD AND WHY DO THEY MATTER? 11 An Overview of Market Manipulation 13 Talis J. Putniņš 2.1 2.2 Introduction Definitions of Market Manipulation 2.2.1 Legal Interpretation and Provisions against Market Manipulation 2.2.2 Economics and Legal Studies Perspective 2.3 A Taxonomy of the Types of Market Manipulation 2.3.1 Categories of Market Manipulation 2.3.2 Market Manipulation Techniques 2.4 Research on Market Manipulation 2.4.1 Theoretical Literature 2.4.2 Empirical Literature 2.4.3 Conclusions from the Research on Market Manipulation 2.5 Summary and Conclusions References 14 16 16 18 19 19 22 26 27 30 35 39 40
vi CONTENTS Chapter 3: A Taxonomy of Financial Market Misconduct 45 Ai Deng and Priyank Gandhi 3.1 3.2 3.3 Introduction Challenges in Research on Financial Market Misconduct Defining Financial Market Misconduct 3.3.1 Price Manipulation 3.3.2 Circular Trading 3.3.3 Collusion and Information Sharing 3.3.4 Insideinformation 3.3.5 Reference Price Influence 3.3.6 Improper Order Handling 3.3.7 Misleading Customers 3.4 Defining Financial Fraud 3.4.1 Credit Card Fraud 3.4.2 Money Laundering 3.4.3 Financial Statement Fraud 3.4.4 Computer Intrusion Fraud 3.5 Conclusion References 46 50 51 53 54 55 56 56 57 58 59 59 60 60 61 61 61 Chapter 4: 65 Financial Misconduct and Market-Based Penalties Chelsea Liu and Alfred Yawson 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 Introduction Notable Cases of Financial Reporting Fraud Financial Reporting Misconduct and Legal Redress Evolution of US Financial Regulations 4.4.1 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (1995) 4.4.2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 4.4.3 Dodd-Frank Act (2010) Legal versus Market-Based Penalties for Financial Misconduct 4.5.1 Common Forms of Legal Penalties 4.5.2 Role of Market-Based Penalties Firm-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct 4.6.1 Direct Economic Costs Captured in Loss of Market Value 4.6.2 Loss of Firm Reputation 4.6.3 Spillover of Reputational Effect 4.6.4 Governance Risk and Insurance Premiums 4.6.5 Reduced Liquidity 4.6.6 Access to Financing 4.6.7 Reduced Innovation 4.6.8 Mergers and Acquisitions Individual-Level Penalties for Corporate Financial Misconduct 4.7.1 Executive and Director Turnover 4.7.2 Impaired
Career Progression 4.7.3 Loss of Reputation 4.7.4 Executive Compensation 4.7.5 Strengthened Monitoring Causes, Risks, and Moderators of Financial Misconduct 4.8.1 Fraud Incentives 4.8.2 Risk Factors 66 69 70 71 72 72 73 74 74 75 75 83 83 84 85 85 85 86 86 87 87 95 96 97 97 98 98 113
Contents vii 4.8.3 Public Enforcement: Regulatory and Judicial Stringency 4.8.4 Public Enforcement: Detection and Surveillance 4.8.5 Private Enforcement 4.9 Other Non-Financial Misconduct 4.10 Concluding Remarks References 115 116 117 118 119 120 Chapter 5: 135 Insider Trading and Market Manipulation Jonathan A. Batten, Igor Lončarski, and Peter C. Szilagyi 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Regulatory Framework on Insider Trading and MarketManipulation 5.3 Recent Examples of Market Manipulation and Insider Trading 5.4 Conclusions References 135 140 145 148 149 Chapter 6: 153 Financial Fraud and Reputational Capital Jonathan M. Karpoff 6.1 6.2 Financial Frauds in the 2000s The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Firm Value and Reputational Capital 6.2.1 Market Value Losses When Financial Misconduct Is Revealed 6.2.2 Spillover Effects 6.2.3 Reputational Losses for Financial Misconduct 6.2.4 Direct Measures of Lost Reputational Capital 6.2.5 Do Misconduct Firms Always Lose Reputational Capital? 6.2.6 Rebuilding Reputational Capital 6.3 The Effects of Fraud Revelation on Shareholders and Managers 6.3.1 Should Shareholders Pay? Do Managers Pay? 6.3.2 Do Shareholders Pay Twice? 6.3.3 Are Firm-Level Penalties Efficient? 6.3.4 Consequences for Managers and Directors 6.4 Why Do Managers Do It? Motives and Constraints 6.4.1 Motives for Financial Misconduct 6.4.2 Constraints on Financial Misconduct 6.5 Proxies and Databases Used to Identify Samples of Financial Statement Misconduct 6.6 Conclusion: Reputation, Enforcement, and Culture References 154 156 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 162 162 163 163 165
165 167 168 170 171 PARTII HOW AND WHERE DOES MISCONDUCT OCCUR? 179 Chapter 7: Manipulative and Collusive Practices in FX Markets 181 Alexis Stentors 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 Introduction Different Types of FX Orders The Unique FX Market Structure Examples of Manipulative and Collusive Practices inFX Markets 7.4.1 Front Running 7.4.2 Triggering Stop-Loss Orders 7.4.3 'Banging the Close' 181 183 184 188 188 190 192
CONTENTS VİÜ 7.4.4 Collusion and Sharing of Confidential Information 7.4.5 Spoofing 7.4.6 Market Abuse via Electronic Trading Platforms 7.5 The Reform Process References 193 195 196 197 199 Chapter 8: 205 Fraud and Manipulation within CryptocurrencyMarkets David Twomey and Andrew Mann 8.1 8.2 Introduction Why Do fraud and Manipulation Occur in Cryptocurrency Markets? 8.2.1 Lack of Consistent Regulation 8.2.2 Relative Anonymity 8.2.3 Low Barriers to Entry 8.2.4 Exchange Standards and Sophistication 8.3 Pump and Dumps 8.3.1 CaseStudies 8.4 Inflated Trading Volume 8.4.1 Case Study: January 2017 and PBoC Involvement 8.5 Exchange DDoS Attacks 8.5.1 Case Study 8.6 Hacks and Exploitations 8.6.1 Exchange Hacks 8.6.2 Smart Contract Exploits 8.6.3 Protocol Exploitation 8.7 Flash Crashes 8.7.1 GDAX-ETH/USD Flash Crash 8.8 Order Book-Based Manipulations 8.8.1 Quote Stuffing 8.8.2 Order Spoofing 8.9 Stablecoins and Tether 8.9.1 Tether H і stori calTi meline 8.9.2 Tether Controversy and Criticism 8.9.3 Tether's Significance in Cryptocurrency Global Markets 8.10 Summary and Conclusions References 206 212 212 213 214 214 215 217 217 219 220 223 224 224 229 230 230 234 235 236 237 239 240 242 245 245 249 Chapter 9: 251 The Integrity of Closing Prices Ryan y. Davies 9.1 Why Closing Prices Matter 9.2 Painting the Tape and Portfolio Pumping 9.3 'Bang-the-Close'Manipulation: The Response of Financial Intermediaries 9.4 Stock Price Pinning on Option Expiration Dates 9.5 Conclusion: Lessons for the Regulation and Design of FinancialMarkets References 251 252 255 259 263 269 Chapter 10: A Trader's
Perspective on Market AbuseRegulations 275 Sam Baker 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Getting the Trading Edge 275 278
Contents ¡X 10.3 A Typical Trader's Market Window 10.4 Wash Trades 10.5 High Ticking/Low Ticking-Momentum Ignition 10.6 Spoofing 10.7 Layering 10.8 Smoking 10.9 Case Study: Raul Rotter a.k.a. 'The Flipper' 10.10 The Innocent and the Guilty 10.11 What Are Exchanges Doing to Prevent Market Abuse? 10.11.1 CME Group 10.11.2 ICE 10.12 What Are Trading Companies Doing to Prevent Abuse? 10.13 Will There Be an End to Market Abuse? 281 282 284 286 290 292 295 299 301 301 302 302 303 PART ill 305 WHO ARE THESE SCOUNDRELS? Chapter 11: Misconduct in Banking: Governance and the Board of Directors 307 Due Duy Nguyen, Jens Hagendorff, and Arman Eshraghi 11.1 11.2 11.3 Introduction Literature Review Research Design 11.3.1 Data 11.3.2 Empirical Design 11.3.3 Variables 11.4 Empirical Results 11.4.1 Main Results 11.4.2 Results for Different Classes ofEnforcement Actions 11.4.3 Does Better Board Quality Alleviate Shareholder Wealth Losses? 11.5 Conclusion References 307 311 312 312 313 314 316 316 320 323 323 325 Chapter 12: Misconduct andFraud by Investment Managers 327 Stephen C. Dimmock, Joseph D. Farizo, and William C. Çerken 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 Introduction Related Research The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and Mandatory Disclosures Data 12.4.1 Investment Fraud 12.4.2 Form ADV Data and Variables 12.5 Predicting Fraud and Misconduct 12.5.1 Predicting Fraud by Investment Managers 12.5.2 Interpreting the Predictive Content of the Models 12.5.3 К-Fold Cross-Validation Tests 12.6 Predicting the Initiation vs. the Continuance ofFraud 12.7 Firm-Wide Fraud vs. Fraud by a Rogue Employee 12.8
Out-of-Sample Prediction and Model Stability 12.9 Policy Implications and Conclusions References 327 329 331 332 332 337 340 340 345 346 347 349 351 352 355
x CONTENTS Chapter 13: Options Backdating and Shareholders 359 Johan Sulaeman and Gennaro Bernile 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 Introduction Stock Return Patterns around Option Grants The Backdating Practice Media Coverage, Restatement, and Investigation Stock Market Reaction to Public Revelations of Backdating Investor Reaction to (and Anticipation of) PublicRevelations Other Types of Misbehaviour Related to Option Grants 13.7.1 Forward Dating 13.7.2 Selective Disclosure 13.7.3 Option Exercise Backdating 13.7.4 Independent Director Backdating 13.8 Connections with Questionable Practices by Corporate Executives and Other Agents 13.9 Conclusion References Chapter 14: The Strategic Behaviour of Underwriters in Valuing IPOs 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 365 366 366 366 366 367 368 371 Stefano Palean, Andrea Signori, and Silvio Vismara 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 Valuing IPOs The Underwriter's Incentives in the Valuation of IPOs Literature Review Sample, Data, and Methodology 14.4.1 Sample and Data 14.4.2 Alternative Selection Criteria of Comparable Firms 14.4.3 Valuation Bias and IPO Premium 14.5 Results 14.5.1 Algorithmic Selections 14.5.2 Affiliated and Unaffiliated Analysts 14.5.3 Underwriters' Selection of Comparable FirmsPre- vs. Post-IPO 14.5.4 Pre-vs. Post-IPO Selections and IndustryEffects 14.6 Conclusions References Chapter 15: Governance of Financial Services Outsourcing: Managing Misconduct and Third-Party Risks 371 373 374 376 376 380 380 381 381 386 390 394 396 397 399 Joseph A. McCahery and F. Alexander de Poode 15.1 Introduction 15.2 The Four Components in
Outsourcing 15.2.1 Efficient Outsourcing 15.2.2 The Four-Factor Governance Model 15.2.3 Misconduct in Outsourcing and the Ability of Financial Institutions to Monitor 399 402 402 404 407
Contents 15.3 The Interaction between Contracting and Monitoring 15.3.1 Characterization of Financial Institutions 15.3.2 Risks in Outsourcing Services 15.4 Governance Mechanisms to Detect Misconduct in Financial Outsourcing 15.4.1 Screening and Detection 15.5 Conclusion References PART IV DETECTION AND SURVEILLANCE OF FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT Chapter 16: Identifying Security Market Manipulation XI 408 409 412 413 414 416 417 423 425 Mike Aitken, Ann Leduc, and Shan ļi 16.1 Introduction 16.2 Background Legislation 16.2.1 Australia 16.2.2 UK 16.2.3 Hongkong 16.2.4 Canada 16.2.5 Singapore 16.2.6 Malaysia 16.2.7 New Zealand 16.3 Attributes of Manipulation 16.3.1 How Traders Minimize the Resources Needed for Manipulative Trading 16.3.2 Difficulties in Determining Whether TradingBehaviour Is Manipulative 16.3.3 Surveillance Systems 16.4 Detection Algorithms 16.5 Conclusion 425 427 427 428 428 429 430 430 431 431 432 433 434 436 439 Chapter 17: The Analytics of Financial Market Misconduct 441 Ai Deng and Priyank Gandhi 17.1 Introduction 17.2 Financial Economic Analysis 17.2.1 Benchmarking to Historical or Past Data 17.2.2 Benchmarking to Alternate Proxies 1 7.2.3 Benchmarking to a Model 17.3 Quantitative Techniques 17.3.1 The Principles of Fraud Detection 17.3.2 Popular Supervised Learning Techniques for FraudDetection 17.3.3 Popular Unsupervised Learning Techniques for FraudDetection 17.3.4 Dynamic Misconduct Detection 17.4 Conclusion References 442 446 447 451 454 456 457 458 460 462 464 466
CONTENTS XII Chapter 18: Benford's Law and Its Application to Detecting Financial Fraud and Manipulation 473 Christina Bannier, Corinna Ewelt-Knauer, Johannes Lips, and Peter Winker 18.1 Introduction 18.2 Benford's Law and Generalizations 18.2.1 The Basic Principle of Benford's Law 18.2.2 Illustration of Benford's Law 18.2.3 Testing for Conformity with Benford's Law 18.2.4 Considering Further Digits with Benford's Law 18.2.5 When Do Data Conform to Benford's Law? 18.2.6 Limitations of Using Benford's Law for Identification of Manipulations 18.2.7 Generalizations of Benford's Law for Identification of Manipulations 18.3 Usage of Benford's Law for Detecting Fraud and Deviant Behaviour 18.3.1 Forensic Accounting in the Context of Auditing, Internal Control Systems, and Taxation 18.3.2 Finance 18.3.3 Surveys and Research 18.4 A Case Study: Benford's Law and the LIBOR 18.5 Policy Implications 18.6 Summary, Limitations, and Outlook References 18.A Appendix 474 476 476 477 478 480 482 483 484 485 PART V 505 REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT Chapter 19: The Enforcement of Financial Market Crimes in Canada and the United Kingdom 486 487 490 491 498 498 499 504 507 Anita Indira Anand 19.1 Introduction 19.2 Existing Scholarship 19.3 Comparative Analysis 19.3.1 Canada 19.3.2 The United Kingdom 19.4 Reform 19.4.1 Resource Allocation 19.4.2 Principles-Based Regulation 19.4.3 Targeted Regulatory Reforms 19.5 Conclusion References 507 508 512 512 513 515 515 516 518 520 520 Chapter 20: A Pyramid or a Labyrinth? Enforcement of Registrant Misconduct Requirements in Canada 527 Mary Condon 20.1
Introduction 20.2 Definitional and Institutional Quagmires 20.3 The Compliance/Enforcement Continuum 527 529 531
Contents xiii 20.4 Enforcement Options Available to Sanction Registrant Misconduct 20.5 Empirical Information Available about Registrant Misconduct in Canada 20.5.1 Criminal Enforcement 20.5.2 CSA Non-Criminal Enforcement 20.5.3 Director's Decision Data in Ontario 20.5.4 SRO Enforcement 20.6 Analysis 533 535 535 536 537 538 538 Chapter 21: Judicial Local Protectionism and Home Court Bias in Corporate Litigation 541 Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui, and Wenfeng Wu 21.1 21.2 Introduction Institutional Background 21.2.1 Decentralization and Local Protectionism 21.2.2 Judicial Independence 21.2.3 The Heterogeneity of the Legal Environment across Regions 21.3 Empirical Evidence 21.3.1 Sample 21.3.2 Basic Statistics 21.3.3 The Wealth Effect for Defendants and Plaintiffs around the Filing Announcements at Different Courts 21.3.4 The Impact of Court Location on the Wealth Effect 21.3.5 Regression Analysis of the Wealth Effects from a Filing Announcement 21.3.6 Heckman Two-Step Analysis of Sample Selection Bias 21.3.7 The Impact of Court Location on the Likelihood to Appeal 21.3.8 Sensitivity Tests 21.4 Conclusion References 542 544 544 545 548 548 549 550 556 560 560 567 573 576 579 580 Index 583 |
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-03T14:41:46Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:52:47Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781119421771 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation [edited by] Carol Alexander ; Douglas Cumming Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom Wiley 2020 xxi, 601 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Resilienz (DE-588)4817917-6 gnd rswk-swf Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 gnd rswk-swf Manipulation (DE-588)4037348-4 gnd rswk-swf Betrug (DE-588)4006249-1 gnd rswk-swf Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s Manipulation (DE-588)4037348-4 s Betrug (DE-588)4006249-1 s Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Resilienz (DE-588)4817917-6 s b DE-604 Alexander, Carol (DE-588)173007228 edt Cumming, Douglas J. (DE-588)171861272 edt Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032159902&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Resilienz (DE-588)4817917-6 gnd Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 gnd Manipulation (DE-588)4037348-4 gnd Betrug (DE-588)4006249-1 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd |
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| title | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation |
| title_auth | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation |
| title_exact_search | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation |
| title_full | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation [edited by] Carol Alexander ; Douglas Cumming |
| title_fullStr | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation [edited by] Carol Alexander ; Douglas Cumming |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice, misconduct and manipulation [edited by] Carol Alexander ; Douglas Cumming |
| title_short | Corruption and fraud in financial markets |
| title_sort | corruption and fraud in financial markets malpractice misconduct and manipulation |
| title_sub | malpractice, misconduct and manipulation |
| topic | Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Resilienz (DE-588)4817917-6 gnd Kreditmarkt (DE-588)4073788-3 gnd Manipulation (DE-588)4037348-4 gnd Betrug (DE-588)4006249-1 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Unternehmen Resilienz Kreditmarkt Manipulation Betrug Korruption |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=032159902&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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