Limits of legal evolution: knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change
Over the last forty years, legal theory and policy advice have come to draw heavily from an 'evolutionary' jurisprudence that explains legal transformation by drawing inspiration from the theoretical successes of Darwinian natural selection. This project seeks to enrich and critique this t...
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Format: | Abschlussarbeit Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Florence
European University Institute
2019
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Schriftenreihe: | EUI PhD theses
EUI theses |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Over the last forty years, legal theory and policy advice have come to draw heavily from an 'evolutionary' jurisprudence that explains legal transformation by drawing inspiration from the theoretical successes of Darwinian natural selection. This project seeks to enrich and critique this tradition using an analytical perspective that emphasizes the material consequences of concepts and ideas. Existing theories of legal evolution depend on a positivist epistemology that strictly distinguishes the objects of social life-interests, institutions, systems-from knowledge about those objects. My dissertation explores how knowledge, and especially non-legal expertise, acts as an independent site and locus of transformation, mediating the interaction between law and social phenomena and acting as a catalyst of legal innovation. Prior work by Simon Deakin has integrated insights from systems theory to show how the interaction between law and economic institutions can only be properly understood by attending to the epistemic frame law uses to interpret economic practice. Using a case study on the impact of 'law and finance' literature on World Bank policy advice and, consequentially, on legal reforms adopted by many developing countries between 2000 and the present, I show that such attention to legal knowledge is inadequate. The case points, first, to the contingency of the intellectual tools used to understand legal institutions. Rather than deploying a determinate rationality, private and public actors address legal, economic, and ethical problems using a variety of paradigms: viewpoints are not determined by realities. More fundamentally, the cases suggest that successful paradigms, rather than economic or political realities alone, shape the dynamics of socio-legal change. My conclusions address some normative questions that arise when researchers in a social scientific mode are implicated in the processes they seek to document |
Beschreibung: | Examining Board: Professor Stefan Grundmann, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Professor Claire Kilpatrick, European University Institute; Professor Peer Zumbansen, Osgoode Hall Law School; Professor Simon Deakin, Cambridge University |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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520 | 3 | |a Over the last forty years, legal theory and policy advice have come to draw heavily from an 'evolutionary' jurisprudence that explains legal transformation by drawing inspiration from the theoretical successes of Darwinian natural selection. This project seeks to enrich and critique this tradition using an analytical perspective that emphasizes the material consequences of concepts and ideas. Existing theories of legal evolution depend on a positivist epistemology that strictly distinguishes the objects of social life-interests, institutions, systems-from knowledge about those objects. My dissertation explores how knowledge, and especially non-legal expertise, acts as an independent site and locus of transformation, mediating the interaction between law and social phenomena and acting as a catalyst of legal innovation. Prior work by Simon Deakin has integrated insights from systems theory to show how the interaction between law and economic institutions can only be properly understood by attending to the epistemic frame law uses to interpret economic practice. Using a case study on the impact of 'law and finance' literature on World Bank policy advice and, consequentially, on legal reforms adopted by many developing countries between 2000 and the present, I show that such attention to legal knowledge is inadequate. The case points, first, to the contingency of the intellectual tools used to understand legal institutions. Rather than deploying a determinate rationality, private and public actors address legal, economic, and ethical problems using a variety of paradigms: viewpoints are not determined by realities. More fundamentally, the cases suggest that successful paradigms, rather than economic or political realities alone, shape the dynamics of socio-legal change. My conclusions address some normative questions that arise when researchers in a social scientific mode are implicated in the processes they seek to document | |
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spelling | McHugh-Russell, Liam Verfasser aut Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change Liam McHugh-Russell Florence European University Institute 2019 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier EUI PhD theses EUI theses Examining Board: Professor Stefan Grundmann, European University Institute (EUI Supervisor); Professor Claire Kilpatrick, European University Institute; Professor Peer Zumbansen, Osgoode Hall Law School; Professor Simon Deakin, Cambridge University Dissertation European University Institute (LAW) 2019 Over the last forty years, legal theory and policy advice have come to draw heavily from an 'evolutionary' jurisprudence that explains legal transformation by drawing inspiration from the theoretical successes of Darwinian natural selection. This project seeks to enrich and critique this tradition using an analytical perspective that emphasizes the material consequences of concepts and ideas. Existing theories of legal evolution depend on a positivist epistemology that strictly distinguishes the objects of social life-interests, institutions, systems-from knowledge about those objects. My dissertation explores how knowledge, and especially non-legal expertise, acts as an independent site and locus of transformation, mediating the interaction between law and social phenomena and acting as a catalyst of legal innovation. Prior work by Simon Deakin has integrated insights from systems theory to show how the interaction between law and economic institutions can only be properly understood by attending to the epistemic frame law uses to interpret economic practice. Using a case study on the impact of 'law and finance' literature on World Bank policy advice and, consequentially, on legal reforms adopted by many developing countries between 2000 and the present, I show that such attention to legal knowledge is inadequate. The case points, first, to the contingency of the intellectual tools used to understand legal institutions. Rather than deploying a determinate rationality, private and public actors address legal, economic, and ethical problems using a variety of paradigms: viewpoints are not determined by realities. More fundamentally, the cases suggest that successful paradigms, rather than economic or political realities alone, shape the dynamics of socio-legal change. My conclusions address some normative questions that arise when researchers in a social scientific mode are implicated in the processes they seek to document Sociological jurisprudence Law and economics (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content European University Institute Department of Law Sonstige (DE-588)809282-5 oth http://hdl.handle.net/1814/63284 kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | McHugh-Russell, Liam Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4113937-9 |
title | Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change |
title_auth | Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change |
title_exact_search | Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change |
title_exact_search_txtP | Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change |
title_full | Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change Liam McHugh-Russell |
title_fullStr | Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change Liam McHugh-Russell |
title_full_unstemmed | Limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change Liam McHugh-Russell |
title_short | Limits of legal evolution |
title_sort | limits of legal evolution knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change |
title_sub | knowledge and normativity in theories of legal change |
topic_facet | Hochschulschrift |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1814/63284 |
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