Free will, responsibility, and crime: an introduction
In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we have both-that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are neither determined nor undetermined but r...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York ; London
Routledge
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Summary: | In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we have both-that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are neither determined nor undetermined but rather fully self-determined. By contrast, most philosophers understand just how difficult it is to defend this "metaphysical libertarian" position. So they tend to opt for two other theories: "Responsibility skepticism" (which denies the very possibility of free will and responsibility) and "compatibilism" (which reduces free will and responsibility to properties that are compatible with determinism). In opposition to both of these theories, Levy explains how free will and responsibility are indeed metaphysically possible. But he also cautions against the dogma that metaphysical libertarianism is actually true, a widespread belief that continues to cause serious social, political, and legal harms. Levy's book presents a crisp, tight, historically informed discussion, with fresh clarity, insight, and originality. It will become one of the definitive resources for students, academics, and general readers in this critical intersection among metaphysics, ethics, and criminal law |
| Physical Description: | xiii, 197 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780815369653 9780815369660 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we have both-that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are neither determined nor undetermined but rather fully self-determined. By contrast, most philosophers understand just how difficult it is to defend this "metaphysical libertarian" position. So they tend to opt for two other theories: "Responsibility skepticism" (which denies the very possibility of free will and responsibility) and "compatibilism" (which reduces free will and responsibility to properties that are compatible with determinism). In opposition to both of these theories, Levy explains how free will and responsibility are indeed metaphysically possible. But he also cautions against the dogma that metaphysical libertarianism is actually true, a widespread belief that continues to cause serious social, political, and legal harms. Levy's book presents a crisp, tight, historically informed discussion, with fresh clarity, insight, and originality. It will become one of the definitive resources for students, academics, and general readers in this critical intersection among metaphysics, ethics, and criminal law | |
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CONTENTS Acknowledgments Introduction 1 Incompatibilism versus Compatibilism Introduction 8 I. Incompatibilism 9 II. Indeterminism І0 III. Compatibilists’ First Objection to Incompatibilism 11 IV. Metaphysical Libertarianism 12 V. Three Possible Locations for Indeterminism 13 VI. Metaphysical Libertarianism’s Underlying Theory of the Self as Pure Substance 14 VII. Compatibilists’ Renewed Randomness Objection 15 VIII. Two Problems with Metaphysical Libertarianism 15 IX. Compatibilism and the Harmony Condition 17 X. Frankfurt’s Identification Theory 18 XI. Incompatibilists: Identification Is Insufficient for Free Will 20 XII. Traditional Compatibilism and the Ability to Do Otherwise 21 XIII. Rationality Compatibilism 24 XIV. Compatibilists versus Metaphysical Libertarians 26 XV. Compatibilists versus Free Will Skeptics 26 Conclusion 27
viii Contents 2 New Compatibilism versus the Ought-Implies-Can Principle 31 Introduction 31 I. Five Definitions of Free Will 31 II. Moral Responsibility 33 III. Frankfurt’s Argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities 35 IV. The Maxim Argument 37 V. The Anti-Maxim Position 38 VI. Objections and Replies 39 VII. Why Frankfurt’s Conclusion Defeats the Maxim 41 Conclusion 42 3 Moral Responsibility Does Not Require the Power to Do Otherwise, But It Does Require at Least One Alternative Possibility 47 Introduction 47 I. Three Objections to Frankfurt’s Argument against PAP 48 II. David Hunt’s Blockage Argument 50 III. Hunt’s Neural Wall 51 IV. Why Hunt’s Blockage Argument Fails: The Dilemma Argument against Blockage 52 V. Implications for Incompatibilism 53 Conclusion 55 4 The Puzzle of Responsibility 57 Introduction 57 I. The Responsibility Axiom and Two Kinds of Blameless Wrongdoing 57 II. The Blameless Wrongdoer Argument 58 III. A Working Conception of Responsibility 60 IV. The Sympathy Argument 61 V. fust Criminal Punishment Does Not Necessarily Require Moral Responsibility 62 Conclusion 63 5 Contrary to Responsibility Skepticism, Metaphysical Libertarianism Is Metaphysically Possible Introduction 66 I. Responsibility Skeptidsm 67 66
Contents ix II. Tite Responsibility Skeptic’s Objection to Robert Kane’s Defense of Metaphysical Libertarianism 68 III. Supplementing Kane’s Metaphysical Libertarianism with Susan Wolfs Rationalist Theory of Responsibility 69 IV. The Randomness Objection 71 V. One Last Defense of Metaphysical Libertarianism over Responsibility Skepticism 72 VI. Agent Causation 74 Conclusion 77 6 The Dark Side of Metaphysical Libertarianism 79 Introduction 79 I. The Self-Made-Man Postulate 79 II. Success Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Good Luck 81 III. Constitutive Luck and Responsibility Skepticism 86 IV. Situational Luck 88 V. Failure Is (Almost?) Entirely a Matter of Bad Luck 89 Conclusion 90 7 Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Psychopaths Introduction 93 I. Psychopathy Defined 94 A. A Working Definition of Psychopathy 95 B. The Psychological Community’s Definition 95 C. Possible Problems with the PCL-R 97 D. Differences between Psychopathy and Antisocial Personality Disorder 100 II. Three Consequentialist Reasons for Criminally Punishing Psychopaths 103 III. Three Arguments that Psychopath Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior 104 A. Fint Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: Normative Incompetence 105 B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: Inability to Do Otherwise 107 93
x Contents C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Not Morally Responsible for Their Criminal Behavior: No SelfControl 108 IV. The Insanity Defense 111 A. Assumptions Underlying the Insanity Defense 111 B. Different Versions of the Insanity Defense 112 V. Four Arguments that Psychopath Are Insane 113 A. First Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 114 B. Second Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 116 C. Third Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 116 D. Fourth Argument that Psychopaths Are Insane 117 VI. Why the Criminal Justice System Regards Psychopaths as Criminally Responsible 118 VII. Why Psychopaths Are Criminally Responsible Even Though They Are Not Morally Responsible 119 A. Why Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility 119 B. Why Moral or Emotional Understanding of the Law Is Not Necessary for Criminal Responsibility 122 C. Psychopaths Have Sufficient Control over Their Behavior 123 Conclusion 125 8 Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Situationism Introduction 135 I. The Excuses 137 A. Stephen Morse’s Dualist Theory of the Excuses 137 B. A Monist Theory of the Excuses 139 II. Situationism and Moral Responsibility 140 A. Our Nearly Universal Capacity for Cruelty 141 B. The Dispositionism Paradox 142 C. Situationism and Norm-Compliance 143 D. Stanley Milgram’s Shock Experiment 144 E. Arguments for Recognizing Situationism as a Moral Excuse 145 III. Situationism and Criminal Responsibility 148 IV. The Insanity Defense: Two Final Objections 152 Conclusion 152
Contents xî 9 Addiction, Indoctrination, and Responsibility 157 Introduction 15 7 I. Addiction 157 II. The “Addiction Negates Responsibility” Argument 159 III. Addiction versus Weakness of Will 160 IV. The Disease Theory Is Actually Consistent with Responsibility for Addiction 161 V. Indoctrination 162 VI. Doxastic Control 164 VII. Greedy, Addict, Mr. Insane, and the Dangers of Responsibility Skepticism 167 Conclusion 169 References Index 172 191 |
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| author | Levy, Ken M. |
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| spelling | Levy, Ken M. (DE-588)119556743X aut Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction Ken M. Levy New York ; London Routledge 2020 xiii, 197 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we have both-that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are neither determined nor undetermined but rather fully self-determined. By contrast, most philosophers understand just how difficult it is to defend this "metaphysical libertarian" position. So they tend to opt for two other theories: "Responsibility skepticism" (which denies the very possibility of free will and responsibility) and "compatibilism" (which reduces free will and responsibility to properties that are compatible with determinism). In opposition to both of these theories, Levy explains how free will and responsibility are indeed metaphysically possible. But he also cautions against the dogma that metaphysical libertarianism is actually true, a widespread belief that continues to cause serious social, political, and legal harms. Levy's book presents a crisp, tight, historically informed discussion, with fresh clarity, insight, and originality. It will become one of the definitive resources for students, academics, and general readers in this critical intersection among metaphysics, ethics, and criminal law Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd rswk-swf Verbrechen (DE-588)4062653-2 gnd rswk-swf Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd rswk-swf Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 s Verbrechen (DE-588)4062653-2 s Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-351-25178-5 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031546382&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Levy, Ken M. Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd Verbrechen (DE-588)4062653-2 gnd Verantwortung (DE-588)4062547-3 gnd |
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| title | Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction |
| title_auth | Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction |
| title_exact_search | Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction |
| title_full | Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction Ken M. Levy |
| title_fullStr | Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction Ken M. Levy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Free will, responsibility, and crime an introduction Ken M. Levy |
| title_short | Free will, responsibility, and crime |
| title_sort | free will responsibility and crime an introduction |
| title_sub | an introduction |
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| topic_facet | Willensfreiheit Verbrechen Verantwortung |
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