Corporate governance and finance:
Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management co...
Gespeichert in:
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
|---|---|
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Amsterdam
JAI
2003
|
| Ausgabe: | 1st ed |
| Schriftenreihe: | Advances in financial economics
v. 8 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FHN01 FWS01 FWS02 UEI01 UER01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choice for international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 193 p.) |
| ISBN: | 9781849502146 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV045302130 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20190808 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 181121s2003 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781849502146 |c electronic bk. |9 978-1-84950-214-6 | ||
| 035 | |a (ZDB-55-BME)bslw06443686 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1076330897 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV045302130 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e aacr | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-863 |a DE-862 |a DE-92 |a DE-824 |a DE-29 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 658.15 |2 21 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Corporate governance and finance |c edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija |
| 250 | |a 1st ed | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Amsterdam |b JAI |c 2003 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 193 p.) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Advances in financial economics |v v. 8 | |
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references | ||
| 500 | |a Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task | ||
| 520 | |a Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choice for international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey | ||
| 520 | |a Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task | ||
| 600 | 1 | 7 | |a bisacsh |2 bicssc |
| 650 | 4 | |a Business & Economics / Corporate Finance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Business & Economics / Finance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate finance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politics & government | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporations / Finance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corporate governance | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Hirschey, Mark |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)170110303 |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a John, Kose |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)130409936 |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Makhija, Anil K. |e Sonstige |0 (DE-588)170107523 |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 978-0-7623-1027-2 |z 0-7623-1027-8 |
| 830 | 0 | |a Advances in financial economics |v v. 8 |w (DE-604)BV023055208 |9 8 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-55-BME | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030689249 | ||
| 966 | e | |u http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8 |l FHN01 |p ZDB-55-BME |q FHN_BME_Archiv |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8 |l FWS01 |p ZDB-55-BME |q FWS_BME_Archiv |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8 |l FWS02 |p ZDB-55-BME |q FWS_BME_Archiv |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8 |l UEI01 |p ZDB-55-BME |q UEI_BME_Archiv |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8 |l UER01 |p ZDB-55-BME |q UER_BME_Archiv |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | 707907 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1806185648603791360 |
| any_adam_object | |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170110303 (DE-588)130409936 (DE-588)170107523 |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045302130 |
| collection | ZDB-55-BME |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-55-BME)bslw06443686 (OCoLC)1076330897 (DE-599)BVBBV045302130 |
| dewey-full | 658.15 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.15 |
| dewey-search | 658.15 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.15 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1st ed |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>06206nmm a2200565zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV045302130</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20190808 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">181121s2003 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781849502146</subfield><subfield code="c">electronic bk.</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-84950-214-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-55-BME)bslw06443686</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1076330897</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV045302130</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">aacr</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-862</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-29</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">658.15</subfield><subfield code="2">21</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Corporate governance and finance</subfield><subfield code="c">edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1st ed</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Amsterdam</subfield><subfield code="b">JAI</subfield><subfield code="c">2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (viii, 193 p.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Advances in financial economics</subfield><subfield code="v">v. 8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bank monitoring, firm performance, and top management turnover in Japan / Christopher W. Anderson, Terry L. Campbell, Narayanan Jayaraman, Gershon N. Mandelker -- Ownership structure and shareholder voting on board structure changes / Teresa A. John, Gopala K. Vasudevan -- Did earnings management contribute to the overvaluation of Enron's stock? / John D. Martin, Akin Sayrak -- Operational risk in financial service providers and the proposed Basel Capital Accord : an overview / Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen -- Auditor resignations, litigation risk and litigation experience / Susan Scholz -- Corporate governance in Singapore : the impact of directors' equity ownership / Gurmeet S. Bhabra, Stephen P. Ferris, Nilanjan Sen, Peng Peck Yen -- Method-of-payment choice for international targets / Kathleen P. Fuller, Michael B. Glatzer -- Organization structure and corporate governance : a survey / Mark Hirschey</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Papers in this volume focus upon corporate governance, broadly defined as the system of controls that helps the corporation effectively manage, administer and direct economic resources. Questions of what and how to produce become equally important as organizations strive to better serve demanding customers. As a result, the design and control of effective organizations structure has been described by the vertical and horizontal relationships among the firm, its customers and suppliers. More recently, researchers have come to understand that the efficiency of firms depends upon the ability of participants to find effective means to minimize the transaction costs of coordinating productive activity. As financial economists have learned, resource allocation will be efficient so long as transaction costs remain low and property rights can be freely assigned and exchanged. An important problem that must be addressed is the so-called agency problem resulting from the natural conflict between owners and managers. Agency costs are the explicit and implicit transaction costs necessary to overcome the natural divergence of interest between agent managers and principal stockholders. The value-maximizing organization design minimizes unproductive conflict within the firm. Papers in this volume show how corporate control mechanisms inside and outside the firm have evolved to allocate decision authority to that person or organization best able to perform a given task</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="600" ind1="1" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">bisacsh</subfield><subfield code="2">bicssc</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Business & Economics / Corporate Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Business & Economics / Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Politics & government</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporations / Finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate governance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hirschey, Mark</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)170110303</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">John, Kose</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)130409936</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Makhija, Anil K.</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)170107523</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-7623-1027-2</subfield><subfield code="z">0-7623-1027-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Advances in financial economics</subfield><subfield code="v">v. 8</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV023055208</subfield><subfield code="9">8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-55-BME</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030689249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8</subfield><subfield code="l">FHN01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-55-BME</subfield><subfield code="q">FHN_BME_Archiv</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8</subfield><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-55-BME</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_BME_Archiv</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8</subfield><subfield code="l">FWS02</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-55-BME</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_BME_Archiv</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8</subfield><subfield code="l">UEI01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-55-BME</subfield><subfield code="q">UEI_BME_Archiv</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8</subfield><subfield code="l">UER01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-55-BME</subfield><subfield code="q">UER_BME_Archiv</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV045302130 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-08-01T13:47:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781849502146 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030689249 |
| oclc_num | 1076330897 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-92 DE-824 DE-29 |
| owner_facet | DE-863 DE-BY-FWS DE-862 DE-BY-FWS DE-92 DE-824 DE-29 |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (viii, 193 p.) |
| psigel | ZDB-55-BME ZDB-55-BME FHN_BME_Archiv ZDB-55-BME FWS_BME_Archiv ZDB-55-BME UEI_BME_Archiv ZDB-55-BME UER_BME_Archiv |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publishDateSearch | 2003 |
| publishDateSort | 2003 |
| publisher | JAI |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Advances in financial economics |
| series2 | Advances in financial economics |
| spellingShingle | Corporate governance and finance Advances in financial economics bisacsh bicssc Business & Economics / Corporate Finance Business & Economics / Finance Corporate finance Politics & government Corporations / Finance Corporate governance |
| title | Corporate governance and finance |
| title_auth | Corporate governance and finance |
| title_exact_search | Corporate governance and finance |
| title_full | Corporate governance and finance edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija |
| title_fullStr | Corporate governance and finance edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate governance and finance edited by Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil Makhija |
| title_short | Corporate governance and finance |
| title_sort | corporate governance and finance |
| topic | bisacsh bicssc Business & Economics / Corporate Finance Business & Economics / Finance Corporate finance Politics & government Corporations / Finance Corporate governance |
| topic_facet | bisacsh Business & Economics / Corporate Finance Business & Economics / Finance Corporate finance Politics & government Corporations / Finance Corporate governance |
| url | http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1569-3732/8 |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV023055208 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hirscheymark corporategovernanceandfinance AT johnkose corporategovernanceandfinance AT makhijaanilk corporategovernanceandfinance |