Internformat: Having it both ways

Having it both ways: hybrid theories and modern metaethics

A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-lik...

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Weitere Verfasser:	Fletcher, Guy 1983- (HerausgeberIn), Ridge, Michael (HerausgeberIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	New York Oxford University Press 2014
Schriftenreihe:	Oxford moral theory
Schlagworte:	Metaethics Normativismus Erkenntnistheorie Kognition Metaethik Aufsatzsammlung
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other such views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. These essays examine the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language (focusing mainly but not exclusively on moral thought & talk)
ISBN:	9780199347605
DOI:	10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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spelling	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge New York Oxford University Press 2014 txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Oxford moral theory Includes bibliographical references and index A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism and pure noncognitivism by adopting views that seek to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other such views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. These essays examine the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language (focusing mainly but not exclusively on moral thought & talk) Metaethics Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd rswk-swf Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 s Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 s 2\p DE-604 Fletcher, Guy 1983- edt Ridge, Michael edt Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780199347582 https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk
spellingShingle	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics Includes bibliographical references and index Metaethics Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4268278-2 (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4031630-0 (DE-588)4169556-2 (DE-588)4143413-4
title	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics
title_auth	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics
title_exact_search	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics
title_full	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge
title_fullStr	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge
title_full_unstemmed	Having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics Guy Fletcher and Michael Ridge
title_short	Having it both ways
title_sort	having it both ways hybrid theories and modern metaethics
title_sub	hybrid theories and modern metaethics
topic	Metaethics Normativismus (DE-588)4268278-2 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Kognition (DE-588)4031630-0 gnd Metaethik (DE-588)4169556-2 gnd
topic_facet	Metaethics Normativismus Erkenntnistheorie Kognition Metaethik Aufsatzsammlung
url	https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199347582.001.0001
work_keys_str_mv	AT fletcherguy havingitbothwayshybridtheoriesandmodernmetaethics AT ridgemichael havingitbothwayshybridtheoriesandmodernmetaethics

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