Strategic voting:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[San Rafael, California]
Morgan & Claypool Publishers
[2018]
|
| Series: | Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning
lecture 38 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Physical Description: | xvii, 149 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781681733593 |
Staff View
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Record in the Search Index
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| adam_text | XI
Preface...................................................................xv
Acknowledgments.........................................................xvii
1 Introduction...............................................................1
2 Basic Notation ............................................................5
2.1 Social Choice........................................................5
2.2 Game Theory..........................................................8
2.3 Game Forms are Voting Rules.........................................11
PART I Tie Quest for Truthful Voting..................................... 13
3 Strategyproofness and the Gibbard-Satterthwaitc Theorem...................15
3.1 Voting Manipulations ...............................................15
3.2 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem...................................17
3.3 Frequency of Manipulation...........................................22
3.4 Group Manipulations.................................................23
3.4.1 Safe Manipulations............................................24
3.5 Irresolute Social Choice Correspondences ...........................26
3.6 Exercises...........................................................28
4 Regaining Truthfulness in Voting..........................................29
4.1 Domain Restriction..................................................29
4.1.1 Single-Peaked Preferences on a Line...........................29
4.1.2 Other Single-Peak Domains.....................................31
4.1.3 Dichotomous Preferences.......................................33
4.2 Complexity Barriers.................................................35
4.2.1 Few Candidates and Coalitional Manipulations..................36
4.3 Randomized Voting Rules.............................................38
;n
4.3.1 Gibbards Characterization..........................................39
4.3.2 Stronger Impossibility Results.....................................40
4.3.3 Output Approximation...............................................41
4.4 Almost-Strategyproof Rules...............................................42
4.4.1 Approximation with Almost-Strategyproof Rules .....................42
4.4.2 Differential Privacy...............................................43
4.5 Exercises................................................................45
5
Voting am! Mechanism Design.....................................
5.1 Payments..................................................
5.1.1 flic VCG Mechanism.................................
5.2 Range Voting..............................................
5.2.1 Approximation by Randomized Voting Rules............
5.3 Facility Location.........................................
5.3.1 Location in a General Metric Space..................
5.3.2 Location on a Line..................................
5.3.3 Location on a Circle................................
5.3.4 Other Variations....................................
47
48
49
51
52
54
55
58
60
61
5.4 Judgment Aggregation.................................................62
5.4.1 Formal Framework...............................................62
5.4.2 Incentives and Manipulation ...................................64
5.5 Exercises............................................................66
PART II Voting Equilibrium Models.........................................67
5 Simultaneous Voting Games.................................................69
6.1 Desiderata for Voting Models........................................69
6.2 Implementation......................................................71
6.2.1 Nash Implementation...........................................73
6.2.2 Strong Implementation.........................................74
6.2.3 Implementation in IJndominated Strategies.....................75
6.2.4 Other Notions of Implementation...............................76
6.3 Fallback Strategies.................................................77
6.3.1 Truth Bias/Partial Honesty....................................77
6.3.2 Laziness and the Paradox of Voting............................79
Xlll
6.4 4he “Calculus of Voting ................................................80
6.4.1 4he Expected Value of Voting .....................................81
6.4.2 Equilibrium Stability.............................................86
6.4.3 Social Networks...................................................87
6.4.4 Quailtal Response Equilibrium ....................................87
6.5 Other Equilibrium Models................................................88
6.5.1 Minimax Regret ...................................................88
6.5.2 Robust Equilibrium................................................89
6.5.3 Iterated Removal of Dominated Strategies..........................90
6.6 Exercises...............................................................91
7 Iterative and Sequential Voting..............................................93
7.1 Convergence and Acyclicity..............................................94
7.2 Examples ...............................................................96
7.2.1 Plurality.........................................................96
7.2.2 Veto..............................................................97
7.2.3 Borda.............................................................98
7.3 Convergence Results ....................................................98
7.3.1 Convergence in Plurality..........................................98
7.3.2 Other Voting Rules...............................................100
7.3.3 Simultaneous Moves...............................................101
7.4 Welfare Implications ..................................................102
7.5 Sequential Voting......................................................103
7.5.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium......................................103
7.5.2 Iterated Majority Voting.........................................105
7.6 Exercises..............................................................106
8 Voting Heuristics............................................................109
8.1 Heuristic Voting Models................................................109
8.1.1 Ad Hoc Heuristics ...............................................109
8.1.2 Local Dominance..................................................112
8.1.3 Other Dominance-based Heuristics.................................114
8.2 Equilibrium and Convergence............................................115
8.2.1 Sampling Equilibrium.............................................118
8.3 Implications of Heuristic Voting.......................................119
8.4 Exercises..............................................................122
XIV
9 Summary: Toward a Complete Theory of Strategic Voting...................127
9.1 Empirical and Experimental Findings................................127
9.2 Conclusion.........................................................129
Bibliography.............................................................131
Author’s Biography.......................................................149
Series Editors: Ronald J. Brachman Jacobs Technion-CornellInstitute at Cornell Tech
Peter Stone, University of Texas at Austin
Strategic Voting
Reshef Meir, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology
Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available
alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting.
There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various
considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes
particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences
in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where
multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds
the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics,
and computer science.
The book has two parts. The first part asks “are there voting rules that are truthful?” in the sense that
all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey
both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as
restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design
such as locating a facility that serves multiple users.
In the second part, we ask “what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically?” rather
than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts
from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social
welfare.
We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in
future development of game theoretic voting models.
About SYNTHESIS
This volume is a printed version of a work that appears in the Synthesis
Digital Library of Engineering and Computer Science. Synthesis
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| spelling | Meir, Reshef Verfasser (DE-588)1161186662 aut Strategic voting Reshef Meir (Technion-Israel Institute of Technology) [San Rafael, California] Morgan & Claypool Publishers [2018] © 2018 xvii, 149 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning lecture 38 Synthesis digital library of engineering and computer science Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd rswk-swf Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd rswk-swf Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd rswk-swf Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 s Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 s Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Äquivalent Druck-Ausgabe, Hardback 978-1-68173-361-6 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-68173-360-9 Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning lecture 38 (DE-604)BV035750800 38 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030487098&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030487098&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Meir, Reshef Strategic voting Synthesis lectures on artificial intelligence and machine learning Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4022393-0 (DE-588)4079009-5 (DE-588)4057952-9 |
| title | Strategic voting |
| title_auth | Strategic voting |
| title_exact_search | Strategic voting |
| title_full | Strategic voting Reshef Meir (Technion-Israel Institute of Technology) |
| title_fullStr | Strategic voting Reshef Meir (Technion-Israel Institute of Technology) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic voting Reshef Meir (Technion-Israel Institute of Technology) |
| title_short | Strategic voting |
| title_sort | strategic voting |
| topic | Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Kollektiventscheidung (DE-588)4022393-0 gnd Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Spieltheorie Kollektiventscheidung Wahlverhalten Strategie |
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