Reasons without persons: rationality, identity, and time
"Brian Hedden defends a radical view about the relationship between rationality, personal identity, and time. On the standard view, personal identity over time plays a central role in thinking about rationality. This is because, on the standard view, there are rational norms for how a person�...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2015
|
| Edition: | First edition |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Summary: | "Brian Hedden defends a radical view about the relationship between rationality, personal identity, and time. On the standard view, personal identity over time plays a central role in thinking about rationality. This is because, on the standard view, there are rational norms for how a person's attitudes and actions at one time should fit with her attitudes and actions at other times, norms that apply within a person but not across persons. But these norms are problematic. They make what you rationally ought to believe or do depend on facts about your past that aren't part of your current perspective on the world, and they make rationality depend on controversial, murky metaphysical facts about what binds different instantaneous snapshots (or 'time-slices') into a single person extended in time. Hedden takes a different approach, treating the relationship between different time-slices of the same person as no different from the relationship between different people. For purposes of rational evaluation, a temporally extended person is akin to a group of people. The locus of rationality is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. Taking an impersonal, time-slice-centric approach to rationality yields a unified approach to the rationality of beliefs, preferences, and actions where what rationality demands of you is solely determined by your evidence, with no special weight given to your past beliefs or actions" ... Provided by publisher's website |
| Item Description: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-208) and index |
| Physical Description: | viii, 210 pages |
| ISBN: | 0198732597 9780198732594 |
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Record in the Search Index
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|---|---|
| adam_text | REASONS WITHOUT PERSONS
/ / HEDDEN, BRIANYYEAUTHOR
: : 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
NOTE CONTINUED: 6.7. OPTIONS AS DECISIONS
6.8. OPTIONS AND THE SEMANTICS OF OUGHT
7. OPTIONS AND DIACHRONIC TRAGEDY
7.1. DIACHRONIC TRAGEDY AND THE PRISONER S DILEMMA
7.2. DEPRAGMATIZATION AND THE NO WAY OUT ARGUMENT
7.3. RATIONALITY AND THE STABILITY OF INTENTIONS
8. REPLACING DIACHRONIC PRINCIPLES
8.1. REPLACING CONDITIONALIZATION
8.2. REPLACING UTILITY CONDITIONALIZATION
8.3. CODA : UNIQUENESS, COHERENCE, AND KOLODNY
9. REPLACING REFLECTION PRINCIPLES
9.1. EXPERT DEFERENCE
9.2. PREFERENCE DEFERENCE
10. DOXASTIC PROCESSES AND RESPONSIBILITY
10.1. DOXASTIC JUSTIFICATION
10.2. WHAT ABOUT REASONING?
10.3. RATIONAL EVIDENCE-GATHERING
11. RATIONALITY AND THE SUBJECT S POINT OF VIEW
DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT.
|
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| discipline | Philosophie |
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| format | Book |
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| isbn | 0198732597 9780198732594 |
| language | English |
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| physical | viii, 210 pages |
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| spelling | Hedden, Brian Verfasser (DE-588)1143865154 aut Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time Brian Hedden First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2015 viii, 210 pages txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-208) and index "Brian Hedden defends a radical view about the relationship between rationality, personal identity, and time. On the standard view, personal identity over time plays a central role in thinking about rationality. This is because, on the standard view, there are rational norms for how a person's attitudes and actions at one time should fit with her attitudes and actions at other times, norms that apply within a person but not across persons. But these norms are problematic. They make what you rationally ought to believe or do depend on facts about your past that aren't part of your current perspective on the world, and they make rationality depend on controversial, murky metaphysical facts about what binds different instantaneous snapshots (or 'time-slices') into a single person extended in time. Hedden takes a different approach, treating the relationship between different time-slices of the same person as no different from the relationship between different people. For purposes of rational evaluation, a temporally extended person is akin to a group of people. The locus of rationality is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent. Taking an impersonal, time-slice-centric approach to rationality yields a unified approach to the rationality of beliefs, preferences, and actions where what rationality demands of you is solely determined by your evidence, with no special weight given to your past beliefs or actions" ... Provided by publisher's website Rationalism / fast / (OCoLC)fst01090275 Reason / fast / (OCoLC)fst01091272 Self / fast / (OCoLC)fst01111441 Time / Philosophy / fast / (OCoLC)fst01151053 Kunskapsteori / sao Förnuftet / sao Identitet (filosofi) / sao Philosophie Rationalism Reason Self Time Philosophy Time Kunskapsteori Förnuftet Identitet (filosofi) LoC Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029953183&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Hedden, Brian Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time Rationalism / fast / (OCoLC)fst01090275 Reason / fast / (OCoLC)fst01091272 Self / fast / (OCoLC)fst01111441 Time / Philosophy / fast / (OCoLC)fst01151053 Kunskapsteori / sao Förnuftet / sao Identitet (filosofi) / sao Philosophie Rationalism Reason Self Time Philosophy Time Kunskapsteori Förnuftet Identitet (filosofi) |
| title | Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time |
| title_auth | Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time |
| title_exact_search | Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time |
| title_full | Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time Brian Hedden |
| title_fullStr | Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time Brian Hedden |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reasons without persons rationality, identity, and time Brian Hedden |
| title_short | Reasons without persons |
| title_sort | reasons without persons rationality identity and time |
| title_sub | rationality, identity, and time |
| topic | Rationalism / fast / (OCoLC)fst01090275 Reason / fast / (OCoLC)fst01091272 Self / fast / (OCoLC)fst01111441 Time / Philosophy / fast / (OCoLC)fst01151053 Kunskapsteori / sao Förnuftet / sao Identitet (filosofi) / sao Philosophie Rationalism Reason Self Time Philosophy Time Kunskapsteori Förnuftet Identitet (filosofi) |
| topic_facet | Rationalism / fast / (OCoLC)fst01090275 Reason / fast / (OCoLC)fst01091272 Self / fast / (OCoLC)fst01111441 Time / Philosophy / fast / (OCoLC)fst01151053 Kunskapsteori / sao Förnuftet / sao Identitet (filosofi) / sao Philosophie Rationalism Reason Self Time Philosophy Time Kunskapsteori Förnuftet Identitet (filosofi) |
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