Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China
According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 per...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ithaca, N.Y.
Cornell University Press
[2012]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UBG01 UPA01 FAW01 FAB01 FCO01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocratic levels.Wedeman finds that the Chinese economy was able to survive predatory corruption because corruption did not explode until after economic reforms had unleashed dynamic growth. To a considerable extent corruption was also a by-product of the transfer of undervalued assets from the state to the emerging private and corporate sectors and a scramble to capture the windfall profits created by their transfer. Perhaps most critically, an anticorruption campaign, however flawed, has proved sufficient to prevent corruption from spiraling out of control. Drawing on more than three decades of data from China-as well as examples of the interplay between corruption and growth in South Korea, Taiwan, Equatorial Guinea, and other nations in Africa and the Caribbean-Wedeman cautions that rapid growth requires not only ongoing and improved anticorruption efforts but also consolidated and strengthened property rights |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed Feb. 24, 2017) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 9780801464270 |
| DOI: | 10.7591/9780801464270 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV044255494 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 170403s2012 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780801464270 |9 978-0-8014-6427-0 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.7591/9780801464270 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-23-DGG)9780801464270 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1165486494 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV044255494 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-Aug4 |a DE-859 |a DE-860 |a DE-473 |a DE-739 |a DE-1046 |a DE-1043 |a DE-858 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 364.13230951 |2 23 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Wedeman, Andrew |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Double Paradox |b Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China |c Andrew Wedeman |
| 264 | 1 | |a Ithaca, N.Y. |b Cornell University Press |c [2012] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c © 2012 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed Feb. 24, 2017) | ||
| 520 | |a According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocratic levels.Wedeman finds that the Chinese economy was able to survive predatory corruption because corruption did not explode until after economic reforms had unleashed dynamic growth. To a considerable extent corruption was also a by-product of the transfer of undervalued assets from the state to the emerging private and corporate sectors and a scramble to capture the windfall profits created by their transfer. Perhaps most critically, an anticorruption campaign, however flawed, has proved sufficient to prevent corruption from spiraling out of control. Drawing on more than three decades of data from China-as well as examples of the interplay between corruption and growth in South Korea, Taiwan, Equatorial Guinea, and other nations in Africa and the Caribbean-Wedeman cautions that rapid growth requires not only ongoing and improved anticorruption efforts but also consolidated and strengthened property rights | ||
| 546 | |a In English | ||
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1980- |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Wirtschaftsentwicklung | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Corruption |z China | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economic development |z China | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Political corruption |z China | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Korruption |0 (DE-588)4032524-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wirtschaftswachstum |0 (DE-588)4066527-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a China |0 (DE-588)4009937-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a China |0 (DE-588)4009937-4 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Wirtschaftswachstum |0 (DE-588)4066527-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Korruption |0 (DE-588)4032524-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Geschichte 1980- |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-23-DGG | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029660518 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l FHA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FHA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l FKE01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FKE_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l FLA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FLA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l UBG01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q UBG_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l UPA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q UPA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l FAW01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FAW_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l FAB01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FAB_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |l FCO01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FCO_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804177427180552192 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Wedeman, Andrew |
| author_facet | Wedeman, Andrew |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Wedeman, Andrew |
| author_variant | a w aw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV044255494 |
| collection | ZDB-23-DGG |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-23-DGG)9780801464270 (OCoLC)1165486494 (DE-599)BVBBV044255494 |
| dewey-full | 364.13230951 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 364 - Criminology |
| dewey-raw | 364.13230951 |
| dewey-search | 364.13230951 |
| dewey-sort | 3364.13230951 |
| dewey-tens | 360 - Social problems and services; associations |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| doi_str_mv | 10.7591/9780801464270 |
| era | Geschichte 1980- gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1980- |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>04155nmm a2200625zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV044255494</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">170403s2012 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-8014-6427-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-23-DGG)9780801464270</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1165486494</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV044255494</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-858</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">364.13230951</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wedeman, Andrew</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Double Paradox</subfield><subfield code="b">Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China</subfield><subfield code="c">Andrew Wedeman</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Ithaca, N.Y.</subfield><subfield code="b">Cornell University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">[2012]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">© 2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed Feb. 24, 2017)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocratic levels.Wedeman finds that the Chinese economy was able to survive predatory corruption because corruption did not explode until after economic reforms had unleashed dynamic growth. To a considerable extent corruption was also a by-product of the transfer of undervalued assets from the state to the emerging private and corporate sectors and a scramble to capture the windfall profits created by their transfer. Perhaps most critically, an anticorruption campaign, however flawed, has proved sufficient to prevent corruption from spiraling out of control. Drawing on more than three decades of data from China-as well as examples of the interplay between corruption and growth in South Korea, Taiwan, Equatorial Guinea, and other nations in Africa and the Caribbean-Wedeman cautions that rapid growth requires not only ongoing and improved anticorruption efforts but also consolidated and strengthened property rights</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="546" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In English</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1980-</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftsentwicklung</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corruption</subfield><subfield code="z">China</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Economic development</subfield><subfield code="z">China</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Political corruption</subfield><subfield code="z">China</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Korruption</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4032524-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftswachstum</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066527-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">China</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4009937-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">China</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4009937-4</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftswachstum</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066527-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Korruption</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4032524-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1980-</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029660518</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">FHA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FHA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">FKE01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FKE_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">FLA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FLA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">UPA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">UPA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">FAW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FAW_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">FAB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FAB_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270</subfield><subfield code="l">FCO01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FCO_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | China (DE-588)4009937-4 gnd |
| geographic_facet | China |
| id | DE-604.BV044255494 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:47:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780801464270 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029660518 |
| oclc_num | 1165486494 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-Aug4 DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-739 DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| owner_facet | DE-Aug4 DE-859 DE-860 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-739 DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| physical | 1 online resource |
| psigel | ZDB-23-DGG ZDB-23-DGG FHA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FKE_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FLA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG UBG_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG UPA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FAW_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FAB_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FCO_PDA_DGG |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | Cornell University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Wedeman, Andrew Verfasser aut Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China Andrew Wedeman Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press [2012] © 2012 1 online resource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed Feb. 24, 2017) According to conventional wisdom, rising corruption reduces economic growth. And yet, between 1978 and 2010, even as officials were looting state coffers, extorting bribes, raking in kickbacks, and scraping off rents at unprecedented rates, the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 9 percent. In Double Paradox, Andrew Wedeman seeks to explain why the Chinese economy performed so well despite widespread corruption at almost kleptocratic levels.Wedeman finds that the Chinese economy was able to survive predatory corruption because corruption did not explode until after economic reforms had unleashed dynamic growth. To a considerable extent corruption was also a by-product of the transfer of undervalued assets from the state to the emerging private and corporate sectors and a scramble to capture the windfall profits created by their transfer. Perhaps most critically, an anticorruption campaign, however flawed, has proved sufficient to prevent corruption from spiraling out of control. Drawing on more than three decades of data from China-as well as examples of the interplay between corruption and growth in South Korea, Taiwan, Equatorial Guinea, and other nations in Africa and the Caribbean-Wedeman cautions that rapid growth requires not only ongoing and improved anticorruption efforts but also consolidated and strengthened property rights In English Geschichte 1980- gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftsentwicklung Corruption China Economic development China Political corruption China Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 gnd rswk-swf China (DE-588)4009937-4 gnd rswk-swf China (DE-588)4009937-4 g Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s Geschichte 1980- z 1\p DE-604 https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Wedeman, Andrew Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China Wirtschaftsentwicklung Corruption China Economic development China Political corruption China Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4066527-6 (DE-588)4009937-4 |
| title | Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China |
| title_auth | Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China |
| title_exact_search | Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China |
| title_full | Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China Andrew Wedeman |
| title_fullStr | Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China Andrew Wedeman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Double Paradox Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China Andrew Wedeman |
| title_short | Double Paradox |
| title_sort | double paradox rapid growth and rising corruption in china |
| title_sub | Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China |
| topic | Wirtschaftsentwicklung Corruption China Economic development China Political corruption China Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wirtschaftsentwicklung Corruption China Economic development China Political corruption China Korruption Wirtschaftswachstum China |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801464270 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wedemanandrew doubleparadoxrapidgrowthandrisingcorruptioninchina |